ISRAEL IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM PERIPHERY TO CENTER-PT.3: ISRAEL AND TURKEY-FROM KEMALISM TO ISLAMISM

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ISRAEL IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM PERIPHERY TO CENTER-PT.3: 

ISRAEL AND TURKEY-FROM KEMALISM TO ISLAMISM

By Josef Olmert

Turkey was another Middle Eastern country, alongside Iran, which from day one of Israel’s existence was regarded as a likely and desirable friend, possibly an ally, of the Jewish state. The story of the relationships between Israel and Turkey can be considered a typical Middle Eastern story in as much as it is based on a long historic legacy whose implications are felt to this very day. In the case of Israel and Turkey, the legacy has mainly to do with the Ottoman Empire and the somewhat overlooked fact that the land of Israel was an integral part of the Ottoman Empire for five centuries.  As such, it is logical to assume that this long period may have left some impact, though far less than in the Arab -Muslim countries of the Middle East. Then there is also the legacy connected with the modern Turkish Republic founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

Assaf Likhovski, a professor of law and legal history at Tel Aviv University, wrote about one aspect, not the only one, but highly significant, of Ottoman legacy still in existence in Israel. The article is based on a lecture celebrating the connection of Israel’s founding father, David Ben Gurion, and his close friend, Yizhak Ben Zvi, the second president of Israel, with Istanbul, the Istanbul University Faculty of Law. “When Israel was established in 1948, many observers expected that the country would immediately replace the Ottoman-English legal heritage with a new legal system linked in some way to Jewish law. This expected change did not occur’  “. [A. Likhovski, “The Ottoman Legacy of Israeli Law,” Annales de la Faculte’ de Droit D’Istanbul, 2007]. This is not a reminder just to discuss a historic episode because, beyond the fact that such critical Israeli figures got their education in Istanbul, there is the fact that to this very day, some of the Ottoman laws are still playing a role in the politics of Israel, in particular so far as the dispute over lands between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs in Judea and Samaria is concerned. While it may be a gross exaggeration to suggest that the conflict over ownership of lands in today’s Israel and Judea and Samaria’s disputed territories is the core of the entire conflict, it is not a claim to be wholly dismissed out of hand. Such disputes are a facet of the conflict, one of its consequences. If that is the case, we can agree with Rabbi Jon-Jay Tilsen writing about “Ottoman Land Registration Law as a Contributing Factor in the Israeli-Arab Conflict” [ Congregation Beth-El Keser Israel, New Haven, CT, 2003]. The impact of these Ottoman Laws can be seen to this very day, and a notable example is a conflict over the area of Susiya. This is a typical dispute in which the two sides’ basic claims are presented to get into the Palestinian-Israeli situation’s fundamentals. [See, Josef Olmert, “Susiya is a Case Study,” Algemeiner, 22 August 2016]. Susiya is an old village built 1600 years ago by the country’s real indigenous people, namely Jews, and was destroyed later. However, about 20 years ago, Palestinians, with the E.U. and other international organizations’ help, claimed the land as “Private Palestinian Land,” basing themselves on an 1881 Ottoman Emire Land Grant document.[See Ari Briggs, “Beware Ottoman Land Law,” Jerusalem Post, 30 July 2015]. 

Perhaps even more significant is the “treasure,” as the Palestinian Authority calls 140,000 

Ottoman documents were given to her by the current Erdogan government in Turkey, papers that could have dramatic implications on Palestinian claims regarding lands in Israel and Judea and Samaria[See Nadav Shragai, Israel Hayom, 6 January 2020].

There are, of course, other instances connected with the impact of Ottoman laws, so the point is that the Ottoman legacy is a fact which needs to be accounted for in the description and analysis of recent and current Israeli-Turkish relations.  Nor can we ignore Kemalism’s impact, the ideology associated with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk[1881-1938], the founder of modern Turkey, and its repercussions Israel-Turkey relations. 

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was the founder of the Turkish Republic and the man. He led the Turkish nation in the turbulent period between the end of WWI and the final abolition of the Khalifate and the end of the seven centuries-long Ottoman Empire. Ataturk[a symbolic name, meaning the father of the Turks] has never received the worldwide recognition he deserved as one of the most outstanding leaders of the Twentieth Century, a revolutionary of great magnitude. Well, there was, at least, one excellent world figure who recognized the importance of Ataturk. It was Albert Einstein, and the unfolding tale, known in Turkey, though not so much in the Western world, including the Jewish world, is of significance. Cankaya University in Ankara brought the story.[See National Geographic society newsroom, 22 May 2012].In 1949, Einstein met a young Turkish student, Munir Ulgur, at Princeton, and he told him, “Do you know… your nation produced the greatest leader of the century!”. Then, as it is the case, the story behind this unprecedented compliment is that on 17 September 1933, Einstein sent a letter to Ataturk, which first came to the Turkish PM Inonu’s attention, in which he asked the Turks to accept German Jewish scientists. Inonu refused, but Ataturk overruled him, and the scientists were received, and with that started a reform of the Turkish higher education system. So, there is an interesting fact about Ataturk and Jews. Still, here we just scratch the surface, as this story about Ataturk and Jews is much more incredible than even is suggested by this Einstein letter and the response to it.

It has to do with a much bigger question. Was Mustafa Kemal Ataturk Jewish? The very question begs a background. Ataturk was born in Saloniki, currently the second-largest Greek city, and until 1912 the center of the Ottoman Vilayet[Province] of Saloniki, a city, and region with a large Jewish population. In fact, in the town itself, the Jews were the largest community, more extensive than ethnic Turks and Greeks until WWI. [there is ample literature about this important Jewish community from their deportation from Spain in 1492, until the tragic end during the Holocaust, when the Germans occupied Greece]. The Ottoman vilayet population in 1906 /7 was; 419,604 Muslims, 263,881 Greeks, 155, 710 Bulgarians and 52, 395 Jews.[K.Karpat, Ottoman Population,1830-1914; Demographic and Social Characteristics, University of Wisconsin Press, 1985, pp.1680169]. Most of the non -Jewish population was rural, whereas the Jews concentrated in the city itself. The people also included members of the community/sect known as Donmeh. This was a group of followers of Shabbatai Zevi[1626-1676], the false Messiah who was forced to convert to Islam. Like him, they outwardly converted to Islam while retaining Jewish traditions in secret.[Also, on the Donmeh, there is wealthy literature]. There are Donmeh in Turkey to this very day, though the number is a few thousand only. An unknown number of Donmeh lived in Saloniki when Ataturk was born there. As Ataturk led the religious-oriented Islamic Ottoman Empire towards becoming the new secular Turkey, whose constitution he was the architect of, separated religion from state, he became the source of speculations about his origins.

Interestingly enough, both devout Muslims who loathed Ataturk and devoted  Zionist Jews indicated that Ataturk might have been of Jewish origin, possibly a hidden Donmeh. Here is the testimony of no other than the first Hebrew Child, Itamar Ben Avi, called so because he was the child of the great Eliezer Ben Yehuda, who is considered the father of modern Hebrew. Ben Avi met Kemal twice before he was Ataturk. Here is what he wrote about these meetings, quoting Kemal; “I am a descendant of Sabbetai Zevi-not indeed a Jew anymore, but an ardent admirer of this prophet of yours. My opinion is that every Jew in this country would do well to join his camp….I have at home a Hebrew Bible printed in Venice….I can still remember a few words of it…Shema Israel, Adonai Elohenu, Adonai Echad”.Ben Avi was a serious person, a noted journalist. He did not fabricate these discussions with the young Ataturk. [See Hillel Halkin, “When Ataturk Recited Shema Yisrael, “in Forward, 28 January 1994.].

Some readers may raise their eyebrows as to why there is any discussion about the Ottoman past and Ataturk’s real or alleged identity?. The answer is that there is no way to discuss Israel’s international standing, including its Middle East position, without understanding the importance of the Jewish situation. Israel is viewed, first and foremost, as the Jewish state, and referring to its Jewish identity means very thoroughly. Very painfully, a need to delve into questions connected with antisemitism, and Turkey is no exception. Whether Ataturk was or was not a hidden Jew may remain an unsolved question. However, there is no question about the legacy of anti-Jewish feelings in the Ottoman Empire and the new, secular Turkish Republic. It is the case that the Ottoman authorities greeted kindly a lot of the Jews deported from Spain in 1492, and Saloniki, which was mentioned above, was an example of that. However, there were also other examples of a discriminatory attitude.

In 1579, Sultan Murad the Third reportedly heard that Jewish women wore silk cloths decorated with precious stones, so he ordered the destruction of all Jews in the Empire. [I.Fadeevs, “Status of Jewish Communities in the Ottoman Empire” [Russian], Lechaim.ru.]. The decree was lifted thanks to a senior Jewish adviser’s intervention to the Grand Vizier of the Sultan. However, the incident indicated the precarious position of Jews in the Empire, as they were subjected to the whims of Sultans and other senior people. It should be emphasized, though, that the Ottoman government’s overall attitude towards Jews was not as bad as in some European countries. For example, the two most notorious blood libel cases against the Jews in the Empire, both in 1840, in Damascus and Rhodes, were initiated by local Greek Orthodox people, not by the Ottoman authorities. As a result of pressures by Jews on the Ottomans, notably Sir Moshe Montefiore, Sultan Abdulhamid the first, issued on 6 November 1840 a decree stating that “we cannot permit the Jewish nation…to be vexed and tormented upon accusations, which have not the least foundation in truth…”.[Jewish Electronic Library[Russian], retrieved 24 May 2010].

As we approach WWI, the Ottoman attitude towards Jews started to be significantly affected by the emerging Arab-Jewish conflict and the rise of the Zionist movement. This showed itself dramatically during the war when Israel’s Jewish population was reduced due to Ottoman persecutions. This was when the group NILI was established to spy for the British in Egypt, and two of its members were hanged. Zionist leaders led by Ze’ev Jabotinsky found in Egypt the Hebrew Battalions, which participated in the last stage of the British-Ottoman fighting. The vast majority of the Jews supported the British, particularly after the Balfour Declaration on 2 November 1917.

In Turkey itself, after the Republic’s establishment, there were strong anti-Arab feelings because of the “Arab stab in the back” [referring to the Arab Rebellion of the Hashimites], and the slogan ‘Filthy Arabs! They shot us in the back'” has been heard since the 1920s in Turkey[See’’Turkish-Arab Relations from Past to Today”, Erkem Bugar Ekinci, Daily Sabah, 20 November 2015]. These were not universal feelings, though, and historians referred to the fact that two-thirds of the troops under Ataturk’s command in the famous Gallipoli battle were Syrian Arabs.[Al Jazeera, 14 January 2004]. When it came to the Jews, the antisemitic feelings expressed in the new secular Republic reflected traditional themes. They were aggravated by the influence of foreign actors, such as Nazi propaganda in the 1930s. The conventional themes were Islamism, Left-Wing anti-Zionism, and Turkish nationalist Right Wing extremism.

It should be emphasized that anti-Jewish acts took place also when Ataturk was still in charge. [I have no intention here to delve too extensively into Ataturk politics and personality, but it may be of interest to note that the Nazis, and Hitler personally, admired certain aspects of Ataturk policies, See, S.Ihrig, Ataturk in Nzi Imagination, 2014. Ataturk was not a fan of Nazism, and that too needs to be noted].

Altogether, there is a case to question the somewhat conventional wisdom that the Turkish state stands out among other nations regarding its pro-Jewish attitude, particularly during WWII. Corry Gottstadt, in the groundbreaking book Turkey, the Jews and the Holocaust [Cambridge University Press, 20 May 2013], argued that contrary to this mostly Turkish-inspired claim, Turkey was far from welcoming to the Jews during the Holocaust. 

On 24 February 1942, a ship MV STRUMA, carrying  Jewish refugees from Axis-controlled Romania who tried to reach Israel, was sunk near the coast of  Sile, in North Istanbul, by a Soviet submarine. 781 Jews sunk to their death. Only one, 19-year-old David Stoliar, survived. Here is a Turkish account of this tragedy; “Since Turkey was the country which cut the ropes connecting the Struma to land, she is responsible for this tragedy. Yet, Turkey was no guiltier than others, but she was geographically positioned to make a difference”. [H. Surel, Were Britain and Turkey responsible for the Struma Tragedy? (November 2005, p.27]. What is written here is not a collective indictment of Turkey and its government and its policy towards Jews, rather an attempt to put it all in a proper context. It is important to note that other Jews think differently about that issue. In June 2005, PM Erdogan of Turkey[he became President later on], received an award in N.Y. from the A.D.L. of all organizations for the efforts of Turks who saved Jews during the Holocaust.[U.Heilman, JP, 10 June 2005]. Individual Turks did save Jews, and Yad Vashem recognized some. However, with regards to the government, the debate continues, though there are historians who do praise the Turkish government at the time for its efforts on behalf of Jews. [See, S.J.Shaw, Turkey and the Holocaust; Turkey’s role in Rescuing Turkish and European Jewry from Nazi persecution, 1933-1945]. This award was unique because it was given to a PM, but not for the government’s actions, rather those of individuals. Undoubtedly, it reflected the strong political motivation of a mainstream Jewish organization to personally reward Erdogan for being an Islamist PM and a friend of the Jews and Israel. With that in mind, we can get a contextual perspective of the complicated relationships between Turkey, Israel, and the Jews. Erdogan and what he symbolizes gives us a good beginning to the description of these triangular relationships as of the establishment of Israel in 1948, relationships which a great Israeli scholar, Rafi Israeli[was my teacher…] described in a book [ Odd Couple; The Aberrant Relations Between Turkey and Israel, SBPRA, 2019.].

TURKEY AND ISRAEL, 1948-PRESENT;

 Professor Israeli describes in such a way the relations; “The metaphor that comes to mind when one reflects about the ups and downs in the fortunes of this odd couple-Turkey and Israel is that of a marriage of convenience, where the interests of both sides have attracted them to each other to conclude some sort of partnership, following a long courtship.” Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, tentative contacts and low-level and discreet dates allowed the parties to get to make the acquaintance of each other, culminating in the 1990s in an explosion of “rage and happiness”…[Israeli, pp.1-2]. This is an accurate description, but any relationship should start sometime, and in this case, it was in March 1949, when Turkey was the first Muslim majority country to recognize Israel. The first Turkish representation in Israel was a “legation”, and even this low-level delegation was further relegated to “Charge D’Affaires” following the Suez crisis in 1956. In 1958 David Ben Gurion met secretly the then Turkish PM Adnan Menderes to discuss a “peripheral pact” which was supposed to include intelligence and military cooperation. [Timeline of Turkish-Israeli relations,1949-2006, Wayback Machine, March 2009]. Ben Gurion remained Israel’s PM until 1963, but poor Menderes was brought down by the Turkish military in 1960 and was later executed by hanging. After the 1967 war, Turkey condemned Israel but opposed pressure to cut off the diplomatic relations with her. In January of 1980, the relations were elevated to the level of an Embassy, but nearly a year later were drastically relegated again ‘, due to Turkey’s opposition to Israel’s decision to annex East Jerusalem and accept it as its eternal capital. All these twists and turns clearly indicate the volatile nature of the relations. Even when the governments in Ankara were secular and followed the Ataturk model, it was difficult for Turkey to maintain stable, normal relations with Israel. The governments had to contend with the strong Islamist body of opinion, which has never disappeared. There was a change though in the 1990s when the influence of the Turkish army in the politics of the country was at its height.

The reasons for this state of affairs have to do with internal Turkish politics, and our out of the scope of this piece. Still, it should be remembered that the army is, according to the constitution, the custodian of the secular character of the state, and in the 1990s, the Islamists were on the rise. In 1996 Turkey had its first Islamist PM since the establishment of the Republic. Necmettin Erbakan[1926-2011] was the father figure of political Islam in Turkey, but in 1997 was forced down by the secular army and later banned from politics by the Constitutional Court for violating the separation of religion and state as mandated by the constitution. Among his followers was one called Recip Tayyip Erdogan, a name to remember. The Islamists were, at that time,  temporarily checked by the growing role and influence of the army[See, Gencer Ozcan and Ofra Benjo, “The decade of the Army in Turkey; The question of Cooperation with Israel in the 1990s [Hebrew], in M.Winter and M.Sheffer [eds.], Turkey; The Ottoman Past and the Republican Present, Tel Aviv University, 2007, pp.279-303]. 

As part of the Turkish military’s growing role in initiating and formulating foreign policy, the relations with Israel were promoted. This was primarily the result of the overall impact of global changes, mostly the end of the cold war. As far as Turkey was concerned, there was a problem with the reevaluation of Western countries of Turkey’s role as a strategic ally. One of the results of that was the refusal of countries, including the U.S., to sell sophisticated arms to Turkey. Israel, with its developing and well-reputed arms industry, seemed to be a proper alternative. There was also the ideological consideration, which prevailed in the Turkish military that they shared with Israel a common interest, namely containing militant Islam. Then there was another interest and, ironically enough,  it had to do with the Kurdish problem, which in the 1990s has become a major issue in Turkey, with the rise of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq after the first Gulf war and the creation of a virtual autonomous Kurdish region in the North of the country.  At the same time, much support was given by Syria to the militant Kurdish terror organization, the P.K.K. [The Kurdish Workers Party]. The irony lay with the fact, that traditionally Israel was on opposite sides from Turkey on the Kurdish issue – an active supporter of their national aspirations as was discussed in a previous article in this series, while Turkey being the traditional enemy of such aspirations.

The change had mostly to do with Syria and was connected with an event that can be considered the epoch of strategic Turkish-Israeli cooperation. A brief introduction is in place here.” Historically, Syria has played a central role in the formation, development, and even deterioration of Turkish -Israeli relations”, [See, M.Ulgur, “The decline of the ‘Syrian Effect’ in Turkish-Israeli relations”, Uluslararas Illiskiler, vol.16, no.62, 2019, p.136]. All in all, “developments in or associated with Syria have proved instrumental in determining Israeli-Turkish relations, for better or worse”.[See, M.Stern and D.Ross, “The role of Syria In Israeli-Turkish relations, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, vol.14, no.2, 2015, p.115]. The great crisis of 1998 between Syria and Turkey had to do with the P.K.K. and its leader Abdallah Ocalan. For years Turkey has been subjected to the conflict with P.K.K. in the South East of Turkey, which claimed 30,000 lives of military and civilians and cost 86 Billion U.S. $, “which approximated to Turkey’s external debt”. [See, O.Zeynep Octav Alantar, “The October 1998 Crisis; A change of Heart of Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Syria?”, Cahiers d’etudes Sur La Mediteranee et Le Monde Turco-Iranien, no.31, Janviere-Juin 2001, p.142.]. As part of its conflict with Turkey over water issues, Syria, and the disputed Hatay [Alexandretta] region, put pressure on Ankara by supporting P.K.K. and giving asylum to its leader, Ocalan. One of Turkey’s responses was the signing of the” Military Training and Co-Operation Agreement” with Israel in February 1996[See, H.Akyol, “Ortadogu Deleminde Israil-Turkiye Iliskileri , Ankara, Oteki Yainevi, 1998, pp.80-87], which Syria viewed as being directed against her. In 1998 the crisis came to a head, as the Turks concentrated troops along the border with Syria and categorically demanded an end to the Syrian provocations. At the same time, the Syrians could not but notice the I.D.F. concentrations on their border with Israel. According to multiple reports, the Israelis supplied much valuable intelligence to Turkey, and the Arab League issued a call for Turkey to terminate its military cooperation with Israel. Syria had no choice but to surrender to the Turkish demands, and Ocalan was deported from Syria. Soon afterward, he found himself in a Turkish jail, where he still rots to this very day.

Alongside the strategic-military cooperation, the civilian leadership of Turkey demonstrated the new line towards Israel by a series of meetings and visits, which all showed that the overall relations with Israel matured to the level of becoming an open, unabashed romance. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin visited Israel in November 1993, PM Tansu Ciller in November 1994, and President Demirel in March 1996. Let us remember two important facts-first. All these visits took place after the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the P.L.O., a fact that helped the Turkish politicians in their country when faced with criticism, and criticism there was. The Islamists were openly critical, and the Sincan incident brought it all to the open. 

In February 1997, in Sincan near Ankara, the local Islamist mayor hosted the Iranian Ambassador in Turkey in an event called “Evening for Jerusalem”, which was, in fact, a public, audacious challenge by the mayor to the Turkish army and its relations with Israel. The climax of the event was when the Iranian Ambassador publicly castigated agreements with Israel. That proved too much for the army. A day after, tanks of the army took over the town, the poor mayor was arrested, and the Iranian Ambassador was thrown out of Turkey.[Ozcan and Benjo, pp.293-294]. 

 Then, there is another important element, and this is the role of the Turkish army. We talk here about the honeymoon between Israel and the secular establishment in Turkey, led by the military. This is an important distinction because the relations were primarily predicated on the military and its interests and outlook of Turkey’s regional situation, and so were bound to be adversely affected by a change in the military’s overall stature in the Turkish political system. And the change occurred, signaling a gradual weakening of the importance of the military. In 2007, a reliable public opinion poll surveyed public trust in state institutions, and the military was still enjoying the highest level of public trust with 81% support. Religious organizations received 69 % support, less than the army but still a significant level of support, which the military could not ignore.[See, M.Rheault, “Military in Turkey Elicits Highest Levels of Public Confidence”,  9 August 2007]. The problem for the military lay with the fact that by then, the ruling party was the Islamist A.K.P. [Justice and Development Party], led by Erdogan, a party that just won a second term. In itself unprecedented in Turkish politics, and with 47% of the popular vote. This was clearly a display of popular will, which the army had to take into account, and all this came after another momentous event, which contributed to the change in the army position. In 1999, the Helsinki Summit decided to grant candidacy status to Turkey in the E.U., but the decision included a specific reference to the need to enhance democratization in Turkey, which clearly meant less military intervention in the politics of the country.[See, Z.Sarigil, “Public Opinion and Attitude Toward the Military and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey”, Armed Forces & Society, 5 November 2013]. In 2002, the A.K.P. came first to power. The combined effect of all these developments was to detract a great deal from the military’s political power while not yet reducing the military’s overall public liking as an institution. The military had to deal with a formidable Islamist challenge. That meant that both sides had to compromise to evade the type of situation that led to previous military coups. So far as Israel was concerned, the first years of the A.K.P. government were still characterized by displays of overt friendship. In 2005, FM  Gul and PM Erdogan visited Israel[separately], and in 2006 President Sezer visited and gave a speech to the Knesset. Perhaps the climax of these relations was the Turkish attempt to mediate between Israel and Syria. It was in late December 2008, when PM Olmert was in Ankara, and while being with PM Erdogan in his office, the Turkish leader talked to President Assad in Syria. It seemed that formal Israeli-Syrian peace talks could start under the auspices of the Turks. A few days later, the first Gaza war between Israel and Hamas started as Israeli, after a long period of Hamas provocations, finally retaliated in force. Then the dark clouds gathered over Turkish-Israeli relations. No more Israeli-Syrian talks, and soon also a different type of Turkish-Israeli dialogue.

Two questions are becoming very relevant as we relate to this crisis of December 2008-January 2009. First, this is the question relating to the role of Syria in the triangular Turkey-Israel-Syria. 

The first Erdogan government adopted a more active regional Middle East policy, designed by his then chief diplomatic adviser Ahmet Davutoglu [later a PM, until they fell out], who formulated the strategy of zero conflicts between Turkey and its neighbors as a key to a renewed and greater Turkish regional policy. So, improving relations with Syria was in line with that policy, and in 2004 President Assad visited Turkey, and a Free Trade Zone agreement was signed between the two countries. So much for the 1998 crisis.

The much greater question is about Erdogan and the switch to overt, aggressive, and poisonous anti-Israel policy.  The overt enmity started to be the official policy already in 2009, but much more so after the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010. Put succinctly, was this change predetermined by Erdogan, a natural result of his Islamist ideology, something which had to happen, or was it the result of misunderstandings and miscalculations by both Israeli and Turkish political leaderships. The ship Mavi Marmara was purchased in 2010 by the Turkish organization I.H.H., an N.G.O. active in 115 countries supposedly a charity organization, and endorsed by famous world leaders, such as the late  Archibishop Tutu and others, known for their vitriolic hatred of Israel. The German affiliate of I.H.H. is classified as a terror organization in Israel and Holland[B.Weinthal, Dutch Government places I.H.H. on Terror List “, J.P., 1 May 2011]. Much of their money goes to a group called Union of Good, which is designated as a terror group by the U.S. office of Foreign Assets Control[J.P., 6 March 2010]. The Israelis consider the entire I.H.H. to be a terror group, and there is no reason to believe the denials of I.H.H. At any rate, I.H.H. purchased the ship and sent it with equipment and people, Turks and people from other countries, to Gaza,  in a so-called Gaza Freedom Flotilla. On 31 May 2010, Israeli commandos took over the ship, which declined to obey their instructions not to continue its sail to Gaza. The take over was violent, and in fairness, clumsy. Nine people on the ship were killed, and a tenth died from his wounds a few years later. Ten Israeli soldiers were injured, and what was found on the ship was some humanitarian aid and a lot of stuff like knives, metal, and wood sticks, which were there exactly in preparation for a fight with the Israelis. The take over of the ship was completely justified, but there was criticism of the amount of force used by the I.D.F. leading to fatalities.

Not being a military expert, I thought then, and still now, that the operation could be conducted in another way. However, an Israeli commission of inquiry exonerated the I.D.F., and a famous Polish authority om admiralty Law, professor Andrzel Makowski also justified the Israeli action.[“The Mavi Marmara Incident and the Modern Law of Armed Conflict at Sea”, Israel Journal on Foreign Relations, May 2013.]Interestingly enough, the Turkish legal authorities themselves were investigating allegations that one of the key figures behind the Marmara adventure, Fehmi Bullent Yildirim , was involved in transferring funds to Al Qa’ida.[Haberturk, 15 June 2012].In September 2016, Israel paid 20 million U.S. $ compensation to the families of the incident victims as part of a normalization deal between the two countries. The deal was supposed to restore full diplomatic relations between the two countries, and exempted Israelis from any legal and criminal responsibility. [See, Daily Sabah, 30 September 2016]. SO-end of conflict? Return to the old days? Well… not really.

Here is THE question-what is Erdogha’s real motivation and policy about Israel? Answering this requires first an answer to the question who is Recep Tayyip Erdogan? .Clearly, we deal here with a politician and leader whose role in modern Turkish history can be compared to that of Ataturk. Whereas the former created the first Turkish Republic as a secular, Western-oriented country, the latter is in the process of creating the Second Turkish Republic, a Muslim-oriented country. Some will say that he has already done it. Be it as it may, from the perspective of this piece, the emphasis is on Erdogan and Israel, and the answer, surprisingly enough, is not so one-sided. Yes, Erdogan is anti-Israel so far as his rhetoric is concerned, but much less so by his actions. He is an Islamist politician who has never deviated from his religious roots, and in the context of Turkish politics, it means being anti-Israel. Let us examine though his actions as Prime Minister. He was first elected in 2002, and for seven years until 2009, his policies were not leading to a crisis with Israel. He visited Israel in May 2005 [as cited above], an unusual gesture for a leader of a Muslim country, and during the trip, he visited Yad Vashem. In 2007, then Israeli President Shimon Peres visited Turkey and addressed the Turkish parliament. Again, it was an unprecedented event, being the first time that an Israeli leader addressed a parliament of a Muslim country. The Gaza fighting in late 2008 and early 2009 enabled Erdogan to drastically change his tone towards Israel. At the January 2009 Davos Economic Forum, he stated, “Mister Peres, you are older than I am. Maybe you are feeling guilty, and that is why you are raising your voice. When it comes to killing, you know it too well. I remember how you killed the children on beaches…” [Huriyyet, 1 February 2009]. This was just the beginning of a campaign lasting until now of constant vilifications of Israel, provocative messages, and aggressive threats. This campaign led inevitably to an increase in antisemitic incidents in Turkey, and a major anti-Israel swing in Turkish public opinion. With that in mind, we are back to the questions raised before. First, while incidents like the Mavi Marmara take over can cause legitimate fury in a country like Turkey, the fact is that such incidents can happen between states, and there are ways in which they can be amicably resolved. In fact, the agreement between the two countries on solving the problem was supposed to put an end to the dispute.However,  Erdogan did not want this incident to be resolved amicably. He used it as an excuse to put in place a plan he had in mind already before, namely to downgrade the level of the relationships with Israel. He felt unable to do it in his first years in power, as it was one of the issues that had the potential of confronting him with the military, something he did not want to see happening while he was in the process of cementing his grip on power. The tone and contents of his attacks on Israel clearly indicate a profound enmity, something which should not come as a surprise. These attacks were in conformity with the anti-Israel line of the various Islamist parties, which Erdogan has been in touch with throughout his career. What made it easier for Erdogan was the fact that the Turkish army has gradually lost its dominant position in Turkish politics, as cited above. So, the main body in Turkey, which was committed to friendly relations with Israel, could not be anymore the guardian of these relations. The use of the Gaza situation against Israel and the Marmara tragedy helped him mobilize public opinion and made it very difficult for the army, if not outright impossible, to resist it. Still, it is important to note that there is no automatic connection between being a devoted Muslim in Turkey and having deep animosity towards Israel. For example, former President, the late Turgut Ozal was a devoted Muslim, but also a supporter of relations with Israel. With that in mind, here is the other side of the coin, and it is important to describe and analyze it here. Erdogan is a careful politician, and while his rhetoric on many issues, and not just with regard to Israel, can be toxic, his actions are usually well calculated and not so rash. [See also my articles in the series on Syria about Erdogan policy in Syria]. The fact is that he has always maintained an open line of communication with Israel, even in times when his rhetoric against Israel was the most poisonous. He also did nothing in order to undermine the trade relations between the two countries, including not Israeli military deliveries to the Turkish army.  He seems to be sensitive to the allegations about antisemitism and altogether has kept open the option of restoring relations with Israel. The case with Turkey is another ball game than the one between Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the latter, it is a zero-sum game, whereas, in the former, it is an open game. The ideal for Israel is to have good relations with both Iran and Turkey, as was the initial logic behind the search for non-Arab allies. It is still the interest of Israel, but a lot has changed from the early days of the State of Israel. 

The biggest change is the gradual decline of the importance of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and with it, the centrality of the conflict with the Palestinians. In a way, this I.S. the success of the peripheral strategy of the early days that we talk about. The Arab world failed to isolate Israel to the point of submission, not only but also because of Israel’s ability to enjoy the fruits of the friendship and near alliance with Iran and Turkey. By the same token, Israel should now use its renewed status in the Middle East to expand its network of relationships, so IF it is possible to do it with Turkey, it is worth the try. More about that in our last piece in the series on Israel from the periphery to center in the Middle East, but here is the summation about Turkey. The recent Armenia-Azerbaijan crisis showed that Israel and Turkey have a common interest there, and surprisingly enough, there is such a common interest in Syria, where both countries resent Iran’s attempts to gain hegemony. What Turkey does in the Idlib region in North West Syria is, by no means, contrary to any Israeli interest, while what they do in the North East of Syria with the Kurds should be and is dealt with by the U.S., though not clear for how long once Biden takes over. Israel proved a great deal of diplomatic skill and maneuverability in dealing with Erdogan. On occasion, there was a strong and proper verbal response to his verbal provocations, but the REAL response was the alliance with Greece and Cyprus, a new factor to be reckoned with. Turkey is in the background of this alliance, and so is the discovery of gas by Israel[See, J.Olmert, Israel, the Politics of gas, and the winds of change in the Mediterranean, Huffington Post, 22 December 2016], which opens a lot of regional options for Israel. Erdogan made it easier for Israel because his alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood is seen as a challenge to the stability of many Arab regimes, basically repeating the mistake done by Iran. All this plays in favor of Israel. In recent months, particularly after the American Presidential elections, there are growing signs that Erdogan is looking for ways to improve relations with Israel. The Israelis will be wise to adopt the old Jewish attitude of Respect and suspect, but should not dismiss it out of hand.  Put on balance, my recommendation to Israel’s policymakers will be to give Turkey and Erdogan a chance, and the order of names here is not coincidental – Turkey as a regional superpower is here to stay – Erdogan not necessarily so.

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Dr. Josef Olmert is a Senior Fellow at the Palm Beach Center for Democracy and Policy Research and an adjunct professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina