ISRAEL IN THE MIDDLE EAST-FROM PERIPHERY TO CENTER.PT.2 ISRAEL AND STATES—-THE CASE OF IRAN FROM A FRIEND TO A FOE

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ISRAEL IN THE MIDDLE EAST-FROM PERIPHERY TO CENTER.PT.2
ISRAEL AND STATES—-THE CASE OF IRAN FROM A FRIEND TO A FOE

By Josef Olmert

The Israeli search for non-Arab allies in the Middle East led to interesting connections with non-state actors like ethnic and religious minority communities. Israel also developed relations with states, in particular Iran and Turkey. It may sound like political science fiction today as both these countries have turned up to be Israel’s bitterest enemies in the Middle East. The change in their attitude towards Israel has had regional strategic and political implications, but it is first and foremost a change reflecting a profound, revolutionary upheaval in their domestic politics, which led them both from Western orientation to a dogmatic Islamic one. Israel has been on the receiving end of these changes.  When these changes affected Israel’s position in the Middle East, they have also affected the region’s overall strategic and political realignment. This piece deals with Israel’s relations with Iran until the big break after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The next article will deal with  Turkey until the early years of the 21st century.

Under the rule of Shah Muhamad Reza Pahlavi, Iran objected to the United Nations Resolution that created the state of Israel. However, on March 5, 1950, the Shah decided to grant de facto recognition to the new state, which signaled dualism in Iran’s official attitude. This policy was described as Calculated Ambivalence.[R.R.Kamazani, Iran and the Arab-Israeli Conflict”,”Middle East Journal, vol.32, no.4, Autumn 1978, pp.413-428.].The Iranian attitude was undoubtedly influenced by domestic as well as regional and international factors. Islamic movements and leaders displayed a strong anti-Jewish and anti-Israel attitudes in the face of war between Israel and the invading Arab armies after 1948. They saw it as a religious war between the Muslims and the Jews [D. Itzchakov, Iran and Israel, 1948-1963; Bilateral Relations at a Crossroads in a Changing geopolitical environment, second edition-Hebrew, Tel Aviv, 2020, pp.45-50.].However, the Israeli victory in the war led the government to reassess the situation and grant the recognition, an act which was facilitated, among other reasons, by a payment given by the Israeli government to the then- Prime Minister of Iran, Muhammad SaSa’edItzhakov, p.63]. In other words, a personal bribe, a fact to be remembered as we deal with Iranian politics in the years to come, when the Shah was in full, absolute control.

The evolving relations suffered a setback with the temporary rise to power in Iran of the “National Front,” led by the anti-Western politician Muhammad Mossadegh, whose policy was predicated on the demand to nationalize the oil industry. Mossadegh tried to win Islamic and Arab support, and consequently, to also weaken the relations with Israel. On July 7, 1951, Mussadegh closed the Iranian consulate in Jerusalem[Itzhakov, p.108]. The connections with  Israel were a controversial matter in Iran. While it is not my intention to get into every detail of every aspect of these relations, it is essential to emphasize that two important political forces in Iran were opposed to friendly ties with Israel. These were the Islamists and the secular, Left Wing anti-West nationalists. Following the downfall of Mossadegh in the 1953 notorious CIA-MI6 inspired coup, the domestic situation in Iran changed dramatically, with the gradual ascendancy of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi to the position of overall, absolute ruler. The Shah tied his political fortunes with the West, namely, the US.  He also adopted an Iranian national policy that was nor Islamic neither third world type, as was Mussadegh’s. The Shah was also amenable to a new relationship with Israel. 

SHAH MUHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI  AND ISRAEL;

Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi became the absolute ruler of Iran due to foreign intervention in its affairs. He was perceived and denounced as a stooge of foreign interests, a message that spoke to the Shi’i population. Therefore, it is crucial to give a brief sketch of Iran’s ethnoreligious demography and the implications of this situation on the Shah’s regional policies. The vast majority of Iranians [90 %] are Shi’i Muslims, though only half of the population are ethnic Persians, and nearly one-quarter are Turkish-speaking Azeris, who are Shi’is. They are concentrated on the border with the former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan, currently an independent state. This proximity has been an ongoing problem in the modern history of Iran. About six percent of the population is Kurdish, mostly Sunni, and about 3 percent are Arabs, Sunnis, and Shi’is. The rest include other small minorities, including Christians of various denominations and ethnicities, Zoroastrians, Baha’is, and Jews. 

Under the Shah’s regime, “the close connection between him and the State of Israel led to increasing prosperity and security for Iranian Jews.

Of the 80,000 Jews in Iran in the 1970s, only 10 percent were classified as impoverished;80 percent were middle class and 10 percent wealthy. In 1979, two of the 18 members of the Royal Academy of Sciences, 80 of the 4000 university lecturers, and 600 of the 10,000 physicians in Iran were Jews. Nevertheless, one-third of Iranian Jewry emigrated to Israel between 1948 and 1953″, mostly Jews from rural provinces, the most impoverished Jewish population. [E. Sanassarian, Religious Minorities in Iran, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp.47-48]. The Shah’s attitude towards the Jews was part, but not the most important feature of the relationship with Israel. There were strategic, military, political, and economic interests at play. The positive attitude towards the Jews was in line with the Shah policy of co-opting members of minority communities in his administration. Iranian minorities supported the Sha’s secular policies, which were viewed as totally different than past policies where non-Muslim minorities were discriminated against by the Shi’i majority. In the case of the Jews, discrimination also meant forced conversion to Islam. The ALLAHABAD crisis of Mashhad was an 1839 pogrom against the Jews of Mashhad and Khorasan, in more than 40 Jews were murdered, and 150 Jewish families were forced to convert to Islam. From a Jewish perspective, a regime that was not based on Islamism was a welcome change. \

While Jews played a positive and supportive role in the Shah regime, other elements were decisive in creating close relations, and they had to do with geopolitical considerations.

Between 1954 -1957, the relationships were determined primarily by the oil factor. Iran supplied Israel the one thing that its Arab neighbors were so vehemently opposed to, as part of the Arab boycott against Israel. That in itself indicated how the Shah viewed Iran’s regional position and Israel’s place in it. After 1957, the ties became more and more security-oriented. They were conducted mainly by the two states’ defense and intelligence communities, which was especially convenient to the Iranian side. It enabled the Shah regime to keep beneficial relations with Israel while not displaying the full range to the Iranian public.  Large sections of which were strongly opposed to any ties with Israel. Of course, the Israelis agreed to it as the best of all other options, though they would have liked public and formal relations. If that were the case, the Iranian public could see the fruits of the ties in the military-strategic sphere and the civil side.

On September 1, 1962, an earthquake devastated the Buin Zahra region in Iran’s Qazvin province, leading to 12 225 fatalities. It was an enormous disaster, 7.1 on the Richter Scale. In Iran, the allegation that the Shah regime conducted inept relief efforts gained credence[Marcelo Di Cintio, Poets and Pahlevans; A Journey into the Heart of Iran, Random House, digital, p.272, 2007]. Israel offered its help and sent planning experts to assist in the relief efforts. A small project, the reconstruction of one village, led to a larger project encouraged and administered by the UNU.N.in. A team of Israeli experts started to survey and plan the rebuilding of the entire region. It was an extraordinary and successful humanitarian effort, but it also had political dividends in store for Israel and demonstrated the young Israeli state’s agricultural and architectural achievements.[N.Feniger, R.Kallus, “Expertise in the Name of Diplomacy; The Israeli Plan for Rebuilding the Qazvin Region, Iran,” International Journal of Islamic Architecture,  March 1, 2016, pp.103-134]. It is important to mention this project [there were others as well] to give this side of the relationships the credit it deserves, but let us make no mistake. The relationships were mostly focused on the range of common geopolitical interests. Among them, the Kurdish issue was of great importance. 

The Kurdish rebellion in Iraq against the Saddam Hussein regime in the 1970s created a joint interest for the two anti-Saddam countries, Israel and Iran. This was a partnership between the two countries, though based on different calculations. Iran’s anti-Saddam and pro-Kurdish policy was not a foregone conclusion. Kurdish separatism in Iran was no different than Kurdish separatism in the neighboring countries. It was a major thorn on the Pahlavi dynasty’s side, which sought to establish a strong, centralized regime, so it was fundamentally opposed to any large separatist community while promoting the small minorities that looked to the regime as their savior rather than the oppressor.[see above]. The attempt to establish a puppet, pro-Soviet Kurdish state in NorthWestern Iran in 1945-46- the so-called Mahabad Republic[See A.Vali, Kurds and the State in Iran; The making of Kurdish identity]- was the most daring Kurdish separatist effort in Iran.

However, even after this short-lived “republic” came to an end,   there were other attempts. Thus,   when the Shah decided to support the Kurds in Iraq, he took the risk since this action could have backfired. Still, the Shah did it, signaling the profound enmity towards Saddam. For Israel, though, it was a much simpler decision. Any weakening of the menacing Saddam regime was in the interest of Israel. Thus,  the partnership between both countries was inevitable. The problem from an Israeli perspective was the fact that it meant complete Israeli dependence on the Iranians, which had a common border with Iraqi Kurdistan. Therefore, the joint effort depended on the goodwill of the Shah. When he decided in 1975 to sign an agreement with Saddam to end their border dispute, the Iranian-Israeli-US operation to help the Kurds collapsed and left the Kurds once again to the mercy of the cruel Iraqi regime. 

Here we are getting close to the big break between  Iran and Israel-the Islamic revolution and the turning of Israel into becoming the little Satan, second only to the big Satan, the USA. The relationships after 1979 are out of this piece’s scope, but here is a critical feature of the relations until 1979, which has to be covered to give us the fullest possible picture of these relations’ nature.  .This has to do with the Western intelligence failure, especially the American, to foresee the revolution and prepare for it. In a way, it is ironic to blame foreign intelligence when the Shah himself, despite being in control of a vast apparatus of internal security and intelligence agencies, most notoriously the SAVAK, failed to anticipate the storm which brought its downfall. 

From the beginning,  the Israeli delegation in Tehran was aware that the Shah was not as popular as he deemed himself to be and fully recognized its reasons. 

When opened in 2014, the Israeli state archives gave us an interesting view of how Israelis in official positions described and analyzed the Iranian domestic situation. Before 1962, no one in Israel had heard about Ayatollah Khomeini. He was mentioned in the documents only after delivering an attack on the “Zionists” in Iran, which,  according to posters distributed in his city of Qom, were behind the Shah secular reforms. Soon the reports started to portray the scope and implications of this campaign against Israel. On June 9, 1963, during the Ashura day, demonstrators in Iranian cities called for the destruction of Israel, and the leader of the rioters was Khomeini. After Khomeini’s expulsion from Iran in November 1964, Israeli reports from Tehran no longer mentioned this fiery cleric’s name. Still, his day was to come, and in December 1977, he issued a religious decree calling for the expulsion of the Shah from Iran. In hindsight, it should have been clear to Iran watchers that the Shah regime was in mortal danger then. Who understood it? Not the Shah himself, and not other interested parties, especially the U.S.but there was an astute, experienced foreign observer who did. This person was Uri Lubrani (1927-2018), the Israeli Ambassador in Tehran. In June 1978, he described the unrest and predicted that the Shah regime was doomed, though it would not be a near fall. He then went on to explain the implications for Israel, “The Significance of what it will do to Israeli-Iranian relations is severe.” In September 1978, he met the Shah himself before returning to Israel at the end of his mission, and then his report gave the final verdict: The Shah was finished. Until February 1979, the reports continued to provide an accurate description of the situation, including referring to the desperate appeals by the Embassy to the Jews to leave as early as they could. On February 16, 1979, the Shah’s regime came to its end. A new era in the relationships with Israel opened and has continued until now.[See Roi Mandel, YNET, July 2, 2014].

The deep Iranian enmity to Israel after 1979 should not come as a surprise. Even under the Shah, Israel was considered the mistress whose very existence was supposed to be kept a secret. The common interests were between governments, whereas they did not reflect a popular sentiment in Iran. If at all, the majority sentiment was one of hostility, and this sentiment had very little to do with Israel’s actions and policies, rather with its very existence, something which [as we showed], the Islamists objected to already in 1948. Israel was right to cement strong relations with the Shah, as it was right to do it with the non-Sunni minorities in the Middle East. Still, then the lesson is that even vital common geopolitical interests cannot, by themselves, guarantee lasting relations based on cooperation, as was with the Shah, if there is no substantial body of public opinion that can back these relations up. It did not exist in Iran. 

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Dr. Josef Olmert is a Senior Fellow at the Palm Beach Center for Democracy and Policy Research and an adjunct professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina