YOU WANT TO KNOW ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST?—-GO TO LIBYA

Image by aymen-juha from Pixabay

By Josef Olmert

It is arguably the case that most people interested in the situation in the Middle East, including members of the media, the academic community, and those in the corridors of government, will hardly advise laypersons to view the current situation in Libya as anything like a useful guide to understanding the problems of the Middle East at large.

What, after all, makes Libya an important country? Situated in the Western edge of the Middle East, its long-time dictator Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown and killed in 2011. its oil production is not of such magnitude as to cause problems in the overall world energy market. We need, therefore, to trust the main news outlets. They do not talk about Libya, so there is no problem in Libya. One notable exception is former Vice President Biden. In June 2016, he said to Charlie Rose on PBS, ”look we’ve had a problem overthrowing these dictators, like … Gaddafi … and it’s come back, and we might ask the question, “would we have been better off if he stayed?”[NICK GLAS, POLITICO, 6/21, 2016]. Biden’s rhetoric question reflected the sense that removing Gaddafi just exacerbated a problem rather than solving it. So, this piece is about the problems and why they are important, even though so few Americans really care to know and understand the implications.

Let us start with Vice President Biden’s interview cited above. He raised a fundamental question about Middle East politics-what really is preferable? Stability or Western look-alike democratic regime? Gaddafi ruled the country since 1969, preparing a smooth succession when the time comes, to his oldest heir-apparent son, Seif Al Din Gaddafi. The meaning of this name-the Sword of Islam-and yet clueless Western observers related to Gaddafi and his regime as being a moderate Islamic regime, if not even anti-Islamic. Just consider an American President named Sword of Christ Bush or Clinton. On its face, there was a facade of stability, so very little attention was given to the factors leading to this apparent stability. Chief among them was unprecedented regime brutality, suppression of minorities, large-scale corruption. Put in sum, a regime that seemed invincible while lacking actual, genuine legitimacy in the eyes of its own subjects. Syria of Bashar Assad was the main example of that. So when the Arab Spring came in 2011, and Arab regimes, including Libya, crumbled, the West was first surprised, and then confronted the same dilemma-Stability or democracy? Egypt was another case in mind- choosing between democracy and the ruling military elite. President Obama decided democracy should prevail there, and that turned out to be a disaster. In one year, the Muslim Brotherhood dictatorship caused havoc in Egypt, and that lead the military to bring them down. In the case of Libya, President Obama chose the no Gaddafi option, but then what?. Gaddafi was brought down, but Libya sunk quickly into a bloody civil war lasting already for nine years. This is one of the most horrific conflicts in a region, the Middle East, where horrific conflicts are the norm, rather than the exception. Human Rights Watch World Report 2019 tells us, in great detail, about the atrocities, including mass executions, slave trade, mass migration to Europe, mostly Italy, starvation, and overall destruction. Libya has been pushed back to another century. 

The truth is that there was no chance for Libya to become democratic, with so many factors mitigating against this happening. Some of these factors are- the lack of any democratic tradition, the lack of civic society organizations, and the fact that the only ideological-oriented movement to have emerged in the post-Gaddafi era were the Islamists, the Brotherhood and other factions. The rise of the Brotherhood should not come as a surprise, not being different than what happened in other Middle Eastern countries, and being the result also of the absence of any secular political force of any significance. On top of all that, there was the problem of regionalism and tribalism, forces that were suppressed by Gaddafi’s dictatorship. In the absence of forces that could form the basis of a new Libya, the post-Gaddafi chaos led to the re-emergence of old Libya, ”the existence of dozens of local interests in villages and provinces, where militias have been organized and equipped by dubious self-proclaimed military commanders”.[Nicola Pedde, ”The Libyan conflict and its controversial roots”, European View, 16, pp.93-102[2017]. 

Libya, as we know it now, is one of these Arab states of the Middle East, established in the 20th Century, whose boundaries did not correspond with a long historic tradition, something that contributed to ongoing instability. Historically, the main division was between the Western province of Tripolitania with Tripoli as its capital, and the Eastern province of Cyrenaica with Benghazi as its capital. This was a division reflecting tribal differences, as well as competition between these two urban centers over political dominance in Libya. On 1 March 1949, the Senussi religious order that was the largest Islamic movement in the country, credited with leading the country’s struggle for independence, declared the independence of the Emirate of Cyrenaica, and it was only on 24 December 1951 that the Kingdom of Libya was declared, again with a Senussi as the King. This was the regime brought down by Gaddafi on 1 September 1969. So, when the Gaddafi regime itself was brought down, the old divisions resurfaced. On 6 March 2012, a member of the Senussi family declared the establishment in Benghazi of the Cyrenaica Transitional Council. This was just the prelude to the Libyan civil war, lasting relentlessly until now. This war is closely connected with Khalifa Belqasim Haftar, the commander of the Cyrenaica-based Libyan National Army[LNA], but it is, in fact, a conflict much greater than the whims of one person. With all its implications, this war deserves a detailed piece, and this one is not intended to be like that, rather to denote the main features of the conflict and their overall regional implications.

Haftar was born on 7 November 1943 in Eastern Libya, to a family of Berber origin[in fact, the majority of Libya’s population are of Berber origin, and their language was forbidden under Gaddafi, who enacted Arabization policy]. He served in the Gaddafi army, took part in the fighting initiated by Gaddafi in Chad, was taken prisoner there, and after being released in 1990, due to American mediation, he formed with other Libyan officers an anti-Gaddafi opposition group and was in touch with the CIA. His time came after Gaddafi’s fall, and he became a key actor as of 2014 and onwards when he was commander of the Libyan army when the Libyan National Congress [GNC] refused to give up power in accordance with its terms of office. This was when Haftar started his armed resistance to the government in Tripoli, accusing it of surrendering to the Islamists, building up an image of being anti-Islamist, though his army includes militant Salafist elements. It is actually a rebellion centered in Eastern Libya against a government based in Western Libya. It soon became a regional Middle Eastern and even international conflict.

Here are the main features of the Libyan war. First- we have another Arab state, which is, in actual terms, a failing state, a formal entity, but not a real, viable state. There are two competing governments, the Haftar -backed in Eastern Libya, and the government in Tripoli governed by the GNC[General National Congress]. Second- while there are various political factions that associate with each government, the basic loyalty of those fighting each other continues to be regional and tribal. This is again a phenomenon becoming so familiar, look at Yemen, Iraq and Syria as examples. Third- the rise of Islamists as a potent force. While general elections in Libya after Gaddafi’s fall brought in parties with non-Islamist agenda, the elected parliament still enacted religious legislation, which Hafter used as one of his main reasons for starting a rebellion. However, Haftar himself draws most of his support from the tribes of Eastern Libya. To this very day, there is a great traditional support to the Senussi religious order mentioned above. It was established in 1837 by Muhammad Ibn Ali Al Senussi [1787-1859], whose teachings espoused mystical Islam and led the struggle against the Italian occupation of Libya. The First and only King of Libya was a Senussi, and the current leader of the Senussi order still has a lot of political and religious influence. Arguing, therefore, that Haftar represents anti-Islamist forces only is wrong, and surely it is wrong to say it when we see the regional map of support for the two warring sides in Libya. It is customary to Western commentators to acquaint their readers with terms that sound familiar, such as Islamist instead of secular. This is not, however, the core reason for the civil war in Libya. Being anti-Islamist in the Libyan context does not mean that we can define Haftar as a secularist. He conducts a political struggle, and in this struggle, Islam and Islamists play a major role. Fourth-who supports whom in Libya?. Here is where the regional and international dimensions of the conflict are so visible and, to an extent, dramatic. We shall survey here only the main actors, not all of them. The main backer of the GNC in Tripoli is Turkey. Turkey? A variety of reasons lead Turkey under President Erdogan to intervene in Libya. Late in November 2019, Turkey signed an agreement with the GNC government, formally the internationally recognized government of Libya. The two countries agreed on maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean sea, an agreement which has to do with Turkey’s dispute with other Mediterranean countries over the extent of their territorial waters. This is the dispute that Turkey has with Cyprus and Greece over the exploration of natural gas in the Mediterranean, a conflict that also involves Israel. Israel is closely allied with Greece and Cyprus over the exploration of gas, but more generally, over their joint concerns about Turkey’s growingly aggressive Middle East and Mediterranean policies. The Turks argued that the agreement ”protecting Turkey’s rights deriving from international law”, but the Greeks have no illusions. According to them, the agreement ”ignores something which is blatantly obvious, which is that between those two countries there is the large geographical land mass of Crete”. [Daren Butler, Tuvan Gumrukcu, ”Turkey signs maritime boundaries deal with Libya amid exploration row”, REUTERS, 28 NOVEMBER 2019].This is clearly a strong motive for Erdogan to intervene, but there are other motives. The important role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Tripoli is one of them. Erdogan IS Mr. Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. He supports Hamas in Gaza [Hamas is formally the Palestinian section of the Muslim Brotherhood]. He invests money in Islamist activities and institutions in East Jerusalem, portraying himself as the defender of the Muslim Holy Sites there, chiefly the Al Aksa Mosque. To this very day, he refuses to accept the Al Sisi regime in Egypt because it brought down the Mursi Muslim Brotherhood government in there. In 2011, Erdogan made a much-publicized visit to Egypt, being the only Middle East leader to express support to President Mursi[About this visit, see J.Olmert, Erdogan in Cairo; Not a new Nasser, HUFFPOST, 18 SEPTEMBER 2011]. There is something else -Is it all part of Erdogan’s alleged Neo-Ottomanism? In our case, Is it a policy drawing on the past, when Libya was, until 1911, an Ottoman province? A pro-Erdogan Turkish writer gives an illuminating answer; ”historical documents and resources show that-following the entirety of the Abbasid and Umayyad dynasties -the Arab world experienced the longest political stability during the Ottoman rule… Let us take a brief look at Libya’s history.The Ottoman Empire did not set out from Istanbul to Libya with a religious ruling to launch a holy war…It went there upon the Libyan’s public call to help it overcome Spanish oppression…hence this call provided Turks and Libyans the opportunity to bond like a family…When the Italians emerged as a new foreign threat in 1911, Libyans were supported by two young Ottoman commissioned officers; Enver and Mustafa Kemal Pshas”[Ataturk-J.O], [see Zekeriya Kursun,” How the Ottoman Empire, Turks protected Libya from foreign threats”, Yeni Safak, 20 April 2020]. His adoring fans portray Erdogan as the savior of genuine Islamic interests, and in that context, the references to the Ottoman legacy are of significance. Erdogan, of course, needs oil, and Libya has it, but it is important that his supporters emphasize the historic Islamic connection, as this is what they think that both Turks and Libyans are interested in, as well as other Arabs, but not all the Arabs.

Chief among those skeptical Arabs is Egypt-Libya’s immediate neighbor. ”The Libyan crisis is a significant challenge to Egypt’s domestic stability and political legitimacy.” [See Alessia Melcangi and Giuseppe Dentice, ”Libya’s crisis is a tough puzzle to solve for Egypt”, MENASource, 18 June 2020].This is so because Egypt views the Muslim Brotherhood as an external and internal major challenge to the Al Sisi regime. The Turkish involvement in Libya with Qatar’s support fuels these concerns, especially as the regime deals with Islamic terrorism of ISIS in the Sinai desert and is so nervous about the Ethiopian Renaissance project concerning the Nile. The last thing that Al Sisi wants is another front in Libya, but the Turkish involvement may very well force his hand. The Egyptian army is amassing troops along the border, military maneuvres are taking place, and the verbal saber-rattling is in full gear.

AL Sisi enjoys the support of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and also Jordan. Still, as of now, his horse in Libya Haftar is doing badly, is being pushed towards his core territorial and tribal base in the East, and so Al Sisi will very soon have to make a big decision. The town of Sirte in East Libya is fast becoming THE flashpoint in the current stage of the civil war. Al Sisi declared, ”if some think they can go beyond the line, Sirte and Jufra, this is a red line for us”, providing Egypt, in this case, with ”international legitimacy” to intervene. [Egypt’s Defense Review; ”Egypt’s Military Limitations; Cairo’s Options to Defend Eastern Libya”, 13 July 2020.] This is a commitment from Al Sisi, but then there is Erdogan on the other side, and he also is preparing. The Turks have troops in Iraq and Syria. They are issuing threats towards Greece and Cyprus. They are members of Nato, all are possible potential limitations from their perspective, but Erdogan wants Sirte badly, being the coastal city, which is the key to Libya’s oil industry. Therefore, Al Sisi needs to decide whether to move from rhetoric to action, and if I need to predict, it is my sense that he will NOT go to war over Sirte. On the other side, also Erdogan does not want to go to war, but he has, as of now, a winning card in his hands-his Libyan allies have the upper hand in the battle against Al Sisi’s ally, Haftar. Al Sisi has proved himself to be a careful leader, and so is the case with Erdogan. They can still get engaged in a direct fight, but they do not want to be in it. The fluidity of the situation in Libya is such, though, that what seems unlikely, and in a way, illogical can still happen. This is, after all, the Middle East. 

However, what happens in Libya not only does not stay in Libya but also does not stay in the Middle East, as it has international ramifications, with four countries playing a role that needs to be addressed. Former colonial powers are expected to show interest and be actively involved in what is happening in their former possessions. It is not different in the case of Italy and Libya, but the situation is complicated. The Fascist dictatorship of Mussolini encouraged Italian settlement in Libya prior to WW2. In 1939, there were 119, 139 Italians in Libya, comprising over 13% of the entire population, which, during the Italian rule from 1911, was decimated due to brutal colonial suppression of local resistance. The Italian regime set its capital in Tripoli, and this is an important fact to be borne in mind regarding Italian policy towards Libya after 2011. The main Italian interests were to stem the flow of migration from Libya to Italy of both Libyans fleeing the civil war, and Africans trying to enter Europe through the Libyan-Italian gateway. Some can see this migration as some kind of historic justice in the making. The former colonialists are now being subjected to a process of colonization by the former colonized. In Italy, this situation was seen as a threat to national security and has had a significant impact on domestic politics. Another important Italian interest was to protect the Greenstream pipeline from Tripolitania to Sicily, as well as the Mellitah oil and gas terminal. All these interests meant that Italy had positioned itself on the side of the GNC government in Tripoli, a government assisted by an Italian military mission supporting its coast guard in attempts to prevent migration to Italy. That said, the Italians tried to play in all fields, keeping an open line of communications with Egypt, having in mind lucrative arms deals with the Al Sisi regime. Two Frigates were sold already. Put in sum, the overall Italian role is not as significant as could be expected. The Italians clearly will prefer some kind of a diplomatic solution, though not being really in a position to broker one. [Oscar Teja, ”what’s at stake for Italy in Libya”, Al Jazeera, 14 July 2020. ]

Italy’s European neighbor and, on occasion a colonial rival, France is also actively involved in the Libyan saga. The French have been ”quietly involved at least since 2015 in building up the flashy uniformed baron of Benghazi [Haftar-J.O] as a strongman. In doing so, it has trampled none too subtly on the economic and security interests of its EU neighbor Italy”[Paul Taylor, ”France’s double game in Libya”, Politico, 17 April 2019]. France’s President Macron may have believed that intervention in Libya could enhance France’s regional and global posture. So while supporting Haftar, the French President tried also to mediate between Faftar and the GNC government, a futile effort on his part. The French siding with Haftar has a lot to do with Turkey’s role as the GNC main protector. French-Turkish relations have been sour for quite a while. From a Turkish perspective, there is a deep grudge against France. A Turkish source goes back to the Ottoman legacy, mentioning the Gallipoli battle, then reminding France, that Turkey was one of the very few countries which supported ”Algerie Francaise”, but then it was not the Turkey of Erdogan, rather the one still virtually controlled by the Pro-West secular Turkish army. Then came the French betrayal, because ”no single political movement in France supports Turkey’s membership in the EU”. [Emre Gonen, ”France and Turkey; How did relations sour?”, Daily Sabah, 24 June 2020]. There were other reasons leading to the near-constant state of Franco-Turkish enmity. Some weeks ago, there was a near collision in the Mediterranean between a Turkish and French ship, and all this between two member states of NATO. No military clash between these two countries seems realistic, but the French now, at least, seem to be in the losing side of the Libyan conflict, with Haftar being on the retreat, suffering bad defeats by the GNC, the Turkish -supported government in Tripoli.

One more power that seems to be on the losing side, at least temporarily is Russia, another backer of Haftar. From the Russian perspective, the conflict in Libya provided an opportunity to expand Russia’s influence in the Mediterranean. Even more so, to do it in a country that formally, at least, was liberated from the Gaddafi tyranny in 2011 by Nato forces. President Putin wants oil and gas contracts, but a short look at the map indicates an even bigger strategic interest-a naval base in the Mediterranean, on Europe’s southern flank. Syria comes to mind as another example of Putin’s outreach. However, there is no similarity between Russia’s involvement there and Libya, in terms of the vastness of investment and resources. The investment in Libya is smaller than in Syria, and as of now, bears very marginal fruits to Putin, if at all. [Robin Dixon, ”Russia’s ally in Libya is battered by defeats”, WP, 6 June, 2020].

That brings us back to the beginning-Joe Biden question; ”what’s next”? .He asked it towards the end of his term as Vice President, and an answer is provided by the Trump administration, which basically keeps a low profile in the conflict. This may be an example of Trump’s policy of diminishing American involvement in conflicts in the Middle East, where no immediate and urgent American interest is at stake. However, it is still the case that the Libyan powder keg can implode in a way that will necessitate an American involvement of one kind or another. Vice President Biden’s question though, leads us to a much bigger and more profound question besetting the Middle East, one that is larger than the particular crisis in Libya, but still one that this crisis illuminates in such a dramatic way.

This question can be termed as THE MODERN DAY EASTERN QUESTION-why is the Middle East SO unstable? Why is this region becoming the arena of so many conflicts that start as local, and develop into regional and international crises? These are just two out of many questions connected with the Middle East.

So here is Libya’s contribution to this discussion, to the search for answers to these questions; what happens in Libya, as described above, is what happens in so many other countries of the Middle East, this is why Libya provides us with a mirror image of the greater issues of the region.. American readers and policymakers tend to shy away from delving into historic contexts of conflicts, trying to deal with them as if they are business opportunities-here is a crisis, and here are the possible solutions. All this is based on the assumption, almost conventional wisdom, that there must be a solution. This IS the basis of Vice President Biden’s question. There may be a solution to the Libyan conflict, at least one that may terminate even temporarily the current conflict, but then let us remember the very definition of what a solution is, should be reexamined and redefined. It is so, because Libya is no more-a formal political entity, but not a functioning, viable state, and so is Yemen, so is Syria, so it may be Lebanon, to a large extent Iraq, and experience shows us, that it could and very probably will happen in more Middle East countries.

Dr. Josef Olmert is a Senior Fellow at the Palm Beach Center for Democracy and Policy Research and an adjunct professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina