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What Comes After Maduro Is the Real Test

By Luis Fleischman

On the morning of January 3, U.S. special operations forces arrested Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro in a highly coordinated operation that immediately drew global attention. U.S. authorities allege that Maduro oversaw an extensive drug-trafficking network that harmed American interests. Critics, some quoted by The New York Times, questioned whether the scale of narcotics flows from other regions poses a more immediate threat, raising broader questions about the operation’s justification.

President Donald Trump’s public remarks added further complexity. His comments suggested that U.S. economic interests—particularly in Venezuela’s energy sector—may have factored into Washington’s calculations. At the same time, Trump expressed skepticism about opposition leader María Corina Machado’s readiness to govern, indicating a temporary willingness to work with Vice President Delcy Rodríguez as an interim authority.

These debates, however, risk overlooking a broader issue: Venezuela’s crisis cannot be understood solely through the lens of drug enforcement or energy policy. The Venezuelan state under Hugo Chávez and later Maduro developed into a political project with regional ambitions that extended well beyond its borders.

During the Chávez years, Venezuela actively supported ideologically aligned movements and governments across Latin America, including those led by Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. Together with Cuba, these governments formed the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA), a bloc that openly defined itself in opposition to U.S. influence in the region. Venezuela also sought to expand its reach through diplomatic, financial, and political means, sometimes straining democratic institutions in neighboring countries.

At the same time, the Chávez government cultivated relationships with armed non-state actors, including Colombian guerrilla groups and other militant organizations. These relationships were framed by Caracas as a deterrent strategy against foreign intervention, though they also contributed to regional instability.

Venezuela’s oil wealth initially underwrote much of this foreign policy. Subsidized energy agreements helped secure political loyalty from Caribbean and Central American governments, while relaxed passport and visa practices raised concerns among regional security services. As oil revenues declined, however, the Maduro government increasingly relied on illicit activities—such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, and smuggling networks—to sustain itself.

The so-called Cartel of the Suns, which has been linked to elements of the Venezuelan regime, operates as a decentralized network of military-connected cells involved in smuggling, illegal mining, and drug trafficking. These illicit activities fuel corruption and strengthen cross-border criminal networks, including gangs, arms trafficking, and related forms of organized crime. The resulting dynamics undermine regional stability and create permissive environments in which terrorist organizations—such as the FARC, the ELN, and Hezbollah—can operate and benefit.

That said, removing Maduro is only the first step—and arguably the easier one.

Key figures within the Venezuelan power structure remain in place, including Diosdado Cabello, a central figure in the security apparatus, and Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, who maintains the loyalty of much of the military. While Delcy Rodríguez has signaled openness to cooperation with the United States, internal divisions are already visible, with hardline elements accusing moderates of betrayal.

Some argue that preserving parts of the existing regime is necessary to maintain order and prevent institutional collapse, citing the chaos that followed Iraq’s post-2003 de-Baathification. This concern deserves serious consideration. However, continuity does not require impunity. It is possible to preserve administrative capacity and public services while removing individuals most closely associated with repression, corruption, and criminal activity.

President Trump recently stated that “we (Americans) are in charge” of what is happening in Venezuela. That is not clear at all. If the Trump administration fails to provide clear and enforceable directives to interim president Delcy Rodríguez, the result will be a situation in which the dictatorship remains in control—Maduro absent, but the regime intact.

For example, the recent publication of a decree declaring a State of External Emergency establishes an exceptional legal framework that concentrates broad powers in the executive branch amid a context of direct confrontation with the United States. One of the central elements of the measure is a direct order to the security forces to act against those whom the Chavista regime considers having supported the U.S. military action. Journalists and suspected collaborators have already been arrested, underscoring the risks of allowing entrenched power structures to persist unchecked.

Ultimately, the success of the U.S. operation will not be judged by its tactical execution, but by what follows. A stable, inclusive, and accountable transition—one that avoids both institutional collapse and authoritarian continuity—will determine whether Venezuela can move toward recovery or remain trapped in crisis.

One significant shift is already evident: hope and optimism have returned among the Venezuelan people. Going forward, sustained civic engagement will be essential, as a democratic transition cannot depend solely on outside intervention.

Luis Fleischman, Ph.D., is a professor of Sociology at Palm Beach State College, co-president of the Palm Beach Center for Democracy and Policy Research, and the author of the book “The Middle East Riddle: The Peace Process and Israeli-Arab Relations in Changing Times.”