TURKEY AGAIN INVADES THE SYRIAN KURDISH -CONTROLLED TERRITORIES—-SYRIA CH.6

TURKEY AGAIN INVADES THE SYRIAN KURDISH -CONTROLLED
TERRITORIES—-SYRIA CH.6

By Josef Olmert

The Autonomous Administration of north and east Syria, or ROJAVA, consists formally, though not necessarily practically [at least before the Turkish invasion] of the sub-districts of Afrin, Jazeera, Euphrates, Raqqa, Tabqa, Manbij, and Deir A Zor. Let us pay special attention to, at least, four of these regions. Raqqa is located on the northeastern bank of the Euphrates, 160 kilometers East of Aleppo. An important city that played a role in Islamic history, as between 796-809 AD, was the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate under the famous Harun Al Rashid. During the Syrian civil war, the city was taken by the Sunni rebels and then by ISIS, which recognizing its historical significance, turned the city into the capital of its self-proclaimed Caliphate in 2014. The non-Sunni cites there, including churches and a famous Shi’i mosque, were destroyed by ISIS, and in the process, the US and Russia targeted ISIS strongholds in the city, but these were the KURDS who captured Raqqa after bloody battles, and on 17 October 2017 declared its liberation. By so doing, surely enhancing their perception as the most important anti-ISIS force, the most trustworthy allies of the US. Tabq is a strategic city with the Tabqa Dam nearby, which compounds the Euphrates and creates Lake Assad.

Deir A Zor is the largest city in Eastern Syria, located 450 kilometers to the northeast of Damascus. For three years , 2014-2017 ,ISIS imposed a siege on the city which was held by Assad army, one of the few cities of the northeast of Syria, which was not evacuated by the Syrian regime in 2012-2013, and so Kurdish claims for control of Deir A Zor district related to some of the rural surroundings, not the city itself. Deir A Zor has become one of the areas where Syrian so-called sovereignty has been compromised by the increasing Iranian presence in areas along the Syrian-Iraqi border in particular, as well as in Syria in general. This trend is not without opposition from other actors with interests in the Syrian arena. One of them is Russia, which has no interest in seeing Iran becoming dominant in Syria. Late in 2018, it was reported that the Russians were resisting Iranian attempts to take over the Deir A Zor area[Muhammad Hassan, ‘’Russian-Iranian conflict erupts in Deir Ez-Zor”, Chatham House analysis, November 2018]. The Euphrates Region included in ROJAVA is having two subordinate sub-districts, the Kobani area, and the Tel Abyad area. Kobani deserves our attention here. A city in the Aleppo Governorate in northern Syria, lying South of the Turkish border. The city was under ISIS siege from September 2014 to January 2015, and many of the inhabitants fled to Turkey but returned after the Kurdish militia defeated ISIS. Being a mostly Kurdish-populated area, the Euphrates region was the scene of Turkish military operations. Operation ‘’Euphrates Shield” was a Turkish invasion to the region between the Euphrates River to the East and rebel-held territory to the West. The offensive was supported by Sunni Syrian militias. It involved fighting against ISIS and the Kurdish militias from 24 August 2016 until 29 March 2017, when the Turks announced the successful completion of the operation. Beforehand, on 21-22 February 2015, the Turks conducted a local incursion to take over the tomb of Sulayman Shah, a historic Ottoman figure.

The Turkish operations indicated the growing active Turkish interest in northern Syria,  at a time when ROJAVA has become a zone of virtual Kurdish self-rule on the borders with Iraq and Turkey, and with Kurds on the other side of these borders. From Turkey’s standpoint, it was a major challenge, and this is where the Turkish factor is becoming so crucial. Turkey, as noted in CH.4, has a vested interest in the fortunes of the Turkmen population in the mostly northwest side of the Syrian border with Turkey. It also has a significant foothold in the Idlib region with its predominantly Arab Sunni population. Idlib, the capital of the Idlib Governorate in northwest Syria, is 59 kilometers southwest of Aleppo. At a very early stage of the civil war, the city was taken over by Sunni rebels, and in 2017 became the seat of the Syrian Salvation Government, an anti-Assad Sunni group, controlling the region in cooperation with the Sunni Tahrir Al Sham militia [Meaning in Arabic freedom of Syria]. Tahrir Al Sham itself is an organization that demonstrates the complicated nature of the Syrian civil war, being an umbrella of many Sunni factions, and with Jihadist ideology, though they deny being an offshoot of Al Qa’ida. Iran, however, does blame Tahrir Al Sham of being supported by Qatar and Saudi Arabia, in itself a problematic claim, because Qatar and Saudi Arabia are hostile to each other. The real influential external force, however, in Idlib is Turkey, rather than the two Arab states. 

Turkey wanted its influence in Idlib for the same reason ,that it wanted it in other parts of northern Syria-to unite with the Turkmen, to create a loyal Arab following, in both cases it is designed to cement a Sunni axis, whereas the Iranians and Assad are creating a Shi’i axis AND, of course, to curb what is perceived by them to be the Kurdish threat.

The modus operandi of the Turks is of great importance-there is no reckless, adventurist activity which entails a prospect of a collision with other potentially strong forces, not the Russians, not the Iranians, Assad or the US. The fact is that their incursions to northern Syria until the one to Idlib in October 2017 passed without effective external challenge. President Erdogan may arouse his political base with fiery rhetoric, but his actions usually indicate subtlety and careful preparation.

So, in October 2017, the Turkish military invaded Idlib, following the Astana [in Kazakhstan] agreement between Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Astana process is one of the many peace initiatives to resolve the Syrian civil war, all of which have failed to achieve the desired goal. Astana process can be viewed more as the non-US process, whereby three powers that have vested interests in Syria try to reach their own understanding without the participation of the US. We shall return to this point when we relate to the latest Turkish invasion, what is called ‘’operation fountain of peace”, starting in October 2019.

The Turkish operation in Idlib went through some stages, and was focussed on establishing military observation posts, a clear violation of Syrian sovereignty. Still, on 15 September 2018, the Turkish observation posts were officially recognized as part of the Idlib Demilitarization Agreement. This agreement is, in fact, a Turkish-Russian understanding to create a demilitarized zone in the rebel-held Idlib region. This is another display of Turkish diplomatic acumen. Their presence in Idlib became part of the accepted situation there, not without occasional artillery exchanges with the Assad army, but with Russian consent, and Russian consent is all that really matters. In Idlib itself, the Tahrir Al Sham militia has become the strongest local force, but big brother Turkey is the strongest force altogether. It is Turkey that has prevented any Assad army attempt to retake Idlib, which is considered the largest remaining Sunni-held territory in Syria. There are  3 million residents there, and with supportive Arab and Turkmen, both Sunnis, on its side, President Erdogan could move towards inflicting his last major blow against the one population in northern Syria, which is a problem for him -the Kurds. It took the Erdogan government some time to formulate a policy with regard to the Syrian civil war [as noted in chapter 4], and as early as July 2011, Syrian Sunni rebels in Turkey announced the formation of the Syrian Free Army[FSA]. The Turkish National Intelligence Organization was in charge [M. Weiss, ‘’Syrian rebels say Turkey is arming and training them”, The Telegraph, 30 June 2012]. The FSA went through internal upheavals and splits and mergers with other Sunni rebel groups, but as of 2011-2012, it was obvious, that their stated goal of bringing Assad down coincided with overall Turkish strategy to see that happening, AS WELL AS creating a force to assist Turkey in its anticipated battles with the Kurds. Still, with Turkish diplomacy being subtler than usually catches the eye, they tried to have connections with the ROJAVA Kurds. In 2013 Ankara even hosted talks with ROJAVA leader, Salih Muslim, of the Democratic Union Party [Hurriet Daily News, 25 July 2013], and entertained the possibility of opening a ROJAVA office in Ankara, provided it suits its interests. This is an altogether moot point in the Turkish strategy, but as noted before, not one to be dismissed out of hand. Nothing, as can be expected, came out of that, however. The Turks moved from an attempt, whose sincerity was questionable at best, to reconcile with ROJAVA, to a consistent policy of hostility based on the following pillars; Economic blockade, campaign to bring about international isolation of the Kurds, AND most importantly, support for the Sunni anti Kurdish Jihadist movements, even including ISIS. This is a point of major significance and will come back to it. Turkish government policy, in that case, enjoyed a wide range popular support for the reasons that many Turks do adhere to the old Kemalist fear of Kurdish nationalism, ISIS was considered a legitimate anti-West and anti-Assad militia, and US support for the Kurds was perceived as anti-Turkish, an opposition to Turkish legitimate regional aspirations, coming as it was from the main NATO ally.

Erdogan scored points emphasizing all this, while his opposition rival, Salahadin Demirtas, expressing support for ROJAVA lost points because it seemed like an attempt to mobilize Kurdish public opinion in Turkey against Erdogan. [On Demirtas position, see Al Monitor, 1 April 2016, Washington Post, 2 May 2016]. Erdogan government pursued a double-edged policy. Condemning ISIS, but refraining from helping the Kurds in their fight against the Islamists in Kobani[see above], and, in fact, allowing ISIS to use Turkish territory to fight against the Kurds in Kobani. At the same time, Eoghan had to deal with bloody Kurdish riots and renewed activity by the PKK-The Kurdish Workers Party in the Kurdish regions of SouthEastern Turkey. Here is the inherent problem of the Turks in dealing with the Kurds, in this case, the Kurds of Syriaw

Supporting their separatist aspirations can inevitably encourage similar aspirations in Turkey itself. Suppressing Kurdish aspirations lead inevitably to instability in Turkey itself. Inaction may, at any rate, lead to a Kurdish victory in northeast Syria, with the obvious negative implications for Turkey. The inevitable conclusion from Turkish perspective-intervention in northeast Syria is the only guarantee to prevent Kurdish self-rule. Any thought of another possible solution-internationally agreed settlement about Kurdish self-rule seemed impossible due to the geopolitical complications involved. So, from 2011-2012, it was only a question of time until the inevitable will happen-an an all-out invasion to put an end to ROJAVA, but also to achieve other goals.

We discussed above the Kobani, and the two Euphrates campaigns, but it was always understood that they all had a local dimension, not an overall one. This is where and why operation ‘’Fountain of Peace” is so significant.

TURKISH GOALS;

1]Creation of a Security Zone stretching all over northern Syria from west to east, of 20-30 kilometers south of the border-A significant chunk of Syrian territory.

2] Solidifying the Sunni Idlib enclave

3] Using the Security Zone as a  threat on the Alawi enclave of northwest Syria, the main pillar of Assad’s regime.

4] Using the Security Zone as a threat on the Aleppo province, another card against the Assad regime. Aleppo being mostly Sunni province, could become the capital, whether formal or not, of a separate Sunni state in Syria, one which will have Turkey as its protector.

5] Using the Security Zone as a safe zone for the Turkmen. Another option for Turkey to put pressure on the Bashar Assad regime.

6] Killing, once and for all, the ROJAVA self-rule region, and with it inflicting a major blow on Kurdish separatism also in Turkey.

7] By killing ROJAVA, the Turks also want to separate the Syrian Kurds from the Iraqi Kurds, further weakening the overall potential for Kurdish separatism. 

8] To create a population change in north Syria-by chasing as many Kurds out, though not to Turkey itself-to replace them with Syrian Sunni refugees in Turkey -Erdogan uses these refugees as a bargaining chip also against the EU-give me more money, or I will chase Sunni Syrians to Europe.

9] The creation of a buffer Sunni state will also help Turkey to curb/restrict Iranian-Shi’i influence in Syria-this is a point used by Turkey in dealing with the US and Russia, both for different reasons, object to an increased Iranian influence in Syria.

All of this is, historically speaking, rooted in deep-seated Turkish policy and strategy. Turkey never accepted Kurdish separatism-here is the place to state, Turkish has never accepted the JUSTIFIED  Kurdish aspiration for self-determination. Turkey also had historic misgivings about the Syrian state, and especially with its Alawi-dominated character, as of 1963. Call it Neo-Ottomanism, Revised Kemalism, or just national and religious desire for supremacy in the Middle East, or even a desire to check the growing Iranian-Shi’i challenge-the fact is, that Erdogan government is determined and consistent. Knowing the history of Turkish-Kurdish relations, one can expect the worse as this current round of fighting is continuing and escalating. 

It is always too presumptuous to predict the outcome of a situation as complicated as the one existing in northeast Syria. However, it seems likely that Turkish military superiority will prove too much for the Kurds. Atrocities against the Kurds by the Sunni Arab militias and the Turkish army [if not actively, passively by not stopping the militias] will lead to hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees. Short of a terrible mistake by the Turks [hitting American or Russian targets], both the US and Russia will not intervene, nor will Iran.  Assad regime is seen in its full pathetic weakness, unable or unwilling to defend its own territory. All this put in perspective the claim about Assad winning the civil war[dealt with in chapter 1].

Kurdish PKK terrorism in Turkey will be resumed. Altogether another tragic defeat to the Kurdish National Movement-The The Kurds say, “the mountains are our only friends”… maybe, but yet again not in this case, and it is all possible because the US gave a free hand to Turkey of Erdogan, a state plunging quickly to Islamism and dictatorship.

  As always before, Erdogan took the plunge only after protecting his wings-in this case, the free hand given by the Trump Administration. President Trump justifies his action with a variety of excuses. First, there are only 50 American troops in the areas in action, and they cannot do anything to stop a far superior Turkish force. Strang argument, as it is the case, that the US , THE superpower of the world, has so many options to put pressure on Turkey. The fact is, Erdogan had far superior force over the US in Syria for years, but refrained from using it as opposed to now, EXACTLY because of the American veto power. Second, as President Trump put it, let everybody else deal with ISIS, as the US did its share. Wrong again, as Turkey[see above] helped ISIS in the past, and will not hesitate to do it again, particularly as ISIS can be of help in the creation and solidification of a Sunni buffer state as planned by Turkey. Third, the US should not intervene in the centuries-old Middle East wars. Sounds simple, logical, but how wrong. All the wars in the Middle East are centuries-old, surely in terms of their deeper historical roots. For example, the wars involving Israel. Another example, the Sunni-Shi’i conflict, also known now as the Iran-Saudi Arabia conflict. Yet, the Administration sends 3000 more troops to defend Saudi Arabia. No consistency, no credibility. President Obama lost credibility by going back on his promise to go after Bashar Assad if he were to use chemical weapons. He betrayed President Mubarak, or, at least, was perceived of doing so. He acted behind the back of Israel orchestrating the Iran nuclear deal and ended his term without any Middle East leader singing his praises. 

The Kurds fought ISIS; Turkey did not. The Kurds trusted the US, and now they are abandoned. A bad lesson for the rest of US allies in the Middle East, a bad policy. Here is the Kurdish tragedy in a nutshell- They are in an impossible geopolitical situation-between them and a regional power like Turkey; they have no chance. SO SAD!

Dr. Josef Olmert is a Senior Fellow at the Palm Beach Center for Democracy and Policy Research and an adjunct professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina