TRUMP, POPULISM, AND THE FUTURE OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

Image by chayka1270 from Pixabay

TRUMP, POPULISM, AND THE FUTURE OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

By Luis Fleischman

The sycophancy displayed by Republican members of Congress – individuals with sufficient strength of personality, drive, endurance, and leadership –  to the presidency of Donald Trump was puzzling. However, it was not completely surprising, if we examine it in context. That said, Republicans stunned many, here and abroad, when they tolerated and turned apologetic to every single act of the president, whether unethical, inappropriate or suspected of being illegal. 

I discussed elsewhere the problem of party prevalence and party leadership above constituency. Members of Congress in both parties respond to party leadership (often represented in the figure of the president or congressional leadership) rather than to local concerns. Such phenomenon has moral and ethical implications. 

This helps explain Trump’s complete domination of the Republican in his four-year tenure. A man  despised by Republicans during the 2016 primaries rose to be the leader of the party. Furthermore,  as the Trump Administration unfolded, almost no one, with a few notable exceptions, dared to challenge Trump’s decisions, actions or words. 

In the same article I mentioned above, I advocated the passing of legislation aimed at checking executive decisions and converting ethical issues into clearly legal issues.  

However, I have now begun to question if legal reform or even constitutional amendments would be sufficient to prevent the deeper threat the populist illiberalism displayed by Trump presents. 

Trump represented what the late philosopher Ernesto Laclau calls an ‘empty signifier”, a sort of vehicle devoid of specific content but which resonates with a large number of people who otherwise do not necessarily share a great deal in common. Donald Trump amassed an electorate that included those who resented the educated and economic elites; those annoyed by political correctness; and those who lost jobs in the manufacturing sector. More alarmingly, he gave meaning and hope to various racists, nationalists, and other fanatics. Likewise, Trump attracted the support of those who believed in the need to fight terrorism, eradicate militant Islam, and stop immigration of non-whites. Trump also attracted contradictory groups such as those who feared the decline and weakening of America and those who felt that America should withdraw from the world, reject globalization and dismantle the administrative state. With the exception of specific groups such as the Evangelical Christians, the corporate and entrepreneurial class, Second Amendment advocates, and a few other isolated groups, Trump represented nothing specific. But at the same time, he embodied a vague vision and stance magnetic, even mesmerizing, to millions.

The Trump phenomenon did not create what we would call a coalition of interests or a “big tent”. Instead, it assembled a heterogeneous mass of people who share very little amongst themselves other than grievance, disgruntlement, and alienation, but they found their man in Donald Trump. These disparate sectors of American society were not united by a specific rationale but by a sentiment.  The more heterogeneous and fluid the mass, the more they strengthened the power of the leader. 

That has been intuitively understood by Republican Members of Congress who felt and feared the intensity of such mass emotion they could have never by themselves generated. Therefore, this phenomenon, combined with the Congressmen’s detachment and aloofness, made these elected officials  dependent on their populist leader. This also explains the sense of impunity that characterized Trump throughout his tenure and the silence of party elected officials. 

Politicians, Republicans and Democrats, are increasingly disconnected from constituencies. The frequent ouster of incumbents in both parties is telling proof of the fact that elected officials are not in tune with constituencies. Thus, in the Republican party, more often than not local elections turned to be dependent on Trump’s populist force. Lindsey Graham, a longtime moderate Senator from South Carolina, once close to the defiant iconoclast, John McCain, epitomizes this problem. His felt need of electoral dependency on the new populist force led him to abandon his principles (even consistency). The anti-establishment force of Trump’s populism seemed unstoppable within the GOP. Thus, Republican Party elected officials and members enabled the president and allowed him to bulldoze the government institutions that he hated so much.

Trump’s tax reform failed to benefit workers; the lost manufacturing sector never recovered the lost jobs, and millions were affected by the Administration mishandling of COVID-19. Still, his followers believed his rhetoric and embraced his excuses at face value. People were encouraged to adopt conspiracy theories and provided justification to almost everything the president did. 

It is true that some sectors used Trump to advance their agenda: those who supported tax reform, advocates of conservative appointments to the judiciary, anti-immigration nationalists and others from disgruntled opponents of environmentalism, globalism, and international institutions. But none of these groups defined the intensity and popularity of the Trump phenomenon. The people taken as a cult-like wave established a strong emotional connection to Trump making Trumpism into the most powerful social and political force within the Republican Party since Ronald Reagan.

The number of votes that Trump received, greater than any elected president, Republican or Democrat, except Joe Biden, confirms this reality.  . He indeed received the highest number of minority votes a Republican ever received despite his often-pejorative remarks towards minorities. Trump’s messianic figure defied any sociological or conventional policy analysis. 

Trump is aware of this and this is why he is likely, health and legal concerns aside, certainly large asides, to come back in 2024. Populist leaders, regardless of their records, leave among people the desire to try it again, like a drug.

On January 20th, Trump will leave the White House. In America’s culture, an official exiting a position of influence ceases to be relevant. But the Trump phenomenon looks to create an exception. Two scenarios are possible: either Trump will become irrelevant after leaving the White House, or he will prepare his return as the bearer of a powerful political and social force deeply ingrained in the masses. 

Will Republicans generate new leaders in the next four years or will Trump retain a monopoly on future leadership? 

Trump’s anti-system rhetoric has frightened a Republican establishment already guilty of constituent negligence. But ironically, this anti-establishment rhetoric was instrumental in increasing the electoral base. The Democratic party was similarly negligent, with scattered populist forces emerging (as it is shown with the loss of various incumbents to emerging left-wing figures), but still far from successful at the presidential level. 

With Trump’s departure, the Republican party has an opportunity to reestablish a connection with constituents to build new leadership. This leadership must be responsive, inclusive, creative, and gentle. It will have to regain the confidence and hearts of the disenchanted constituents.  Otherwise, the shadow of the mighty populist force of the departing leader will stand as an effective veto power in the party. Trump may have lost the election but his presence will be missed as soon as those in power begin to disappoint. Such is the irrational power of populism. No better example than Argentina, where Peronism has always been the imaginary panacea to every crisis, even when the Peronists themselves were responsible for these disasters.  

The Republican party now has an opportunity to rebuild itself. To do so it cannot remain confined to a conservative, religious, and anti-urban base only. Republicans have to have answers to issues such as health care, education, environmental pollution, opportunities for social mobility, women’s and other minority rights. Ideology offers a poor response. Ideology is a utopia in the minds of those who imagined and promote it. It may excite some but typically falls far short of society’s specific needs. Listening to constituencies, to personal stories, to show empathy, is the essence of democracy, and hopefully both parties, but particularly the post-Trump GOP, will move in that direction. 

.

About Luis Fleischman

Luis Fleischman is a professor of Sociology at Palm Beach State College, the co-founder of the think-tank the Palm Beach Center for Democracy and Policy Research. He is also the author of “Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Threat to U.S. Security,” and the author of a forthcoming book, “The Middle East Riddle: The Arab-Israeli Conflict in Light of Political and Social Transformations in the Arab World,” to be published by New Academia.”