SYRIA IN CIVIL WAR; THE SOUTH -THE DRUZE, THE ASSAD REGIME, AND ISRAEL SOUTHWEST SYRIA—-THE AS -SUWAIDA GOVERNORATE

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SYRIA IN CIVIL WAR; THE SOUTH -THE DRUZE, THE ASSAD REGIME, AND ISRAEL
SOUTHWEST SYRIA—-THE AS -SUWAIDA GOVERNORATE

By Josef Olmert

Many so-called experts have already closed the chapter titled the Syrian civil war. For them, the war is over, Assad won, and now we can go back to deal with the least non-existent but most talked-about conflict in the Middle East, that is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. These so-called experts are to be found everywhere, in the US, Europe, Israel, but far less than that in the Middle East itself, and definitely not among the people most affected by what is actually happening in Syria, and these are the people of Syria itself. Here is a situation report about what is happening in one region of Syria, the South, especially in South-West Syria, and what is happening there is no different than other regions, but here we specifically deal with it, because of its proximity to Israel and with it, the possible dangers to Israel as a result of the situation there.

South Syria is bordering with Jordan and Israel, and it was the quietest of all Israel’s borders from 1974 until the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011. This was in line with the Alawite-oriented regional policy that characterized Syria of the two Assads. Rousing rhetoric about Israel, but not anything that could trigger a full-scale war with Israel. Such a war could ruin the Syrian army and, with it, the Alawite community.[SEE J.Olmert, Israel and Alawite Syria-The Odd  Couple of the Middle East? Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, vol.7, 2013, issue 1, pages 17-25]. At the same time, the regime meddled in Lebanon, which they always considered part of Syria, an area wrongly detached from her by the French. They did not do it only for historical and ideological reasons, also because they understood that the sectarian conflicts in Lebanon posed an immediate danger to their minoritarian regime in Syria itself. The Achilles heel of this concept from an Israeli perspective was the fact, that precisely because of the inherent illegitimacy of the minority Alawite regime in Syria, the rulers needed to rely on Shi’i Iran as a rainy day backer, and were afraid to make peace with Israel even when presented with far-reaching Israeli territorial concessions in the Golan Heights. It is the case, however, that the regime can claim success in applying this policy because the civil war of 2011 and onwards has proved that the Assads needed  Iranian support, though not only them, to survive[on the Syrian-Iranian axis,  and its implications on the talks with Israel, see Y.Olmert, ‘’Iranian-Syrian Relations; Between Islam and Realpolitik’’, in D.Menashri[ed.], The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World, Westview, 1990, pp.171-189. On the Israel-Syria peace talks, see Y.Olmert, Towards a Syrian-Israeli Peace Agreement; Perspectives of a Former Negotiator, The Washington Institute Policy Focus, no.25, April 1994. 

Y.Olmert, ‘’Israel-Syria; The Elusive Peace ‘’, in DOMES- Digest of Middle East Studies, vol.20, no.2, Fall 2011, pp.202-212.]

SOUTH SYRIA- A ZONE OF CONFLICT;

The South of Syria is comprised of four governorates [provinces] out of the fourteen governorates of Syria. These are the governorate of Dara’a, the governorate of Quneitra, that of Rif Dimashq, and that of As Suwaida, which is the one covered in this piece. It is a volatile region, and the most dramatic evidence of that is the fact that it is in Dara’a that the rebellion against Bashar Assad started in March 2011, when Sunni Muslim protesters destroyed the statute of Hafiz Assad and ransacked the offices of the cell phone company owned by Bashar’s notoriously corrupt cousin, Rami Makhlouf. The immediate trigger for the outburst there was the terrible economic situation, greatly aggravated by the impact of years of drought and the shortage of water. The outcry of the rioters was, of course, that the regime deliberately neglected the needs of a region with a non-Alawite population.

In late October 2020, the Arab news outlet ILAF reported from Jerusalem about a discussion with an Israeli intelligence officer where a very grim picture of the situation in South Syria was described in great detail. The main point was that the situation there is terrible, with poverty and starvation actually ravaging the region, so much so that for a meager sum of 25 US Dollars, hostile elements connected with Iran and their ally Hizballah can hire local people to serve in military forces loyal to them, whose aim is to provoke troubles with Israel. In fact, as the Israeli source described it, many local people became ‘’human bombs’’ in the service of the Iranians and Hizballah. According to many discussions with locals, the Assad regime has intentionally forfeited its responsibility to improve the situation there so that the locals, being so desperate, will be driven towards collaboration with the Iranians. Israel, according to the report, is not sitting idly by. It attacks pro-Iranian targets, sends clear messages to the Assad regime about the dangers resulting from their policy, and even interfered in ways that were not specified, to quieten down armed conflicts in the region in order not to give the Iranians any pretext to intervene and use these conflicts to mobilize locals against Israel. Put in sum, the South of Syria has become a powder keg. A zone of despair and conflict, consequently, a zone that poses a potential risk to neighboring Israel. 

The main community in Suwaida governorate are the Druze, a community with a rich and significant history in Syria, which will be discussed in great detail in another chapter of the on-going series on Syria. However, in this piece, it is the story of the South-West of Syria and the Druze role in it, which is the main focus. The South-Western province of As Suwaida is the southernmost governorate of Syria and has an area of 5,550 Km, which forms part of the historic Hauran region. Its capital is the town of Al -Suwaida. This is a region with a diversified population. On the eve of the Syrian Civil war in 2011, this was the demographic distribution of the population there;

Druze-495,000

Christians-34,378

Shi’is-12,396

Alawites-3,269

Circassians[Sunni Muslims, but not Arabs]-3,310.

In 2019, the demographic distribution looked like this;

Druze-381,000—minus 23%

Christians-23,762-minus 31%

Shi’is -3,806-minus 69%

Alawites-2,535-minus 22%

Circassians-900-minus 75% [The data from ‘’Manufacturing Division; The Assad Regime and Minorities in South-West Syria’’, ETANA, SYRIA, March 2020, Policy Paper 2020-6].

The overall population decrease is a clear indication of the devastation caused by the years of continuing conflict. It is not, however, an exception, rather the rule in Syria, which has witnessed major demographic changes caused by the civil war.

It is a common theme for many writers about Syria, among them Syrian writers, to minimize in their analysis of the Syrian civil war, the importance of the sectarian issue as a factor in instigating the conflict and in perpetuating it. This is so, because of some reasons, such as the tendency to blame outside powers for being responsible for sectarianism, in the case of Syria and Lebanon, these were the French who got the blame.  There is also a tendency to portray conflicts in Arab countries in terms that make sense to Westerners, and sectarianism is not one of them, and clearly, there is a fear that emphasizing problems like sectarianism will indicate overall societal backwardness and portray Arab societies in a negative light. That said, it is arguably the case that in South-West Syria, the problem of sectarianism was not as significant as in other regions of Syria, and this is because of the vast numerical superiority of the Druze community. Sectarianism, however, has existed in so far as the relationships between the Druze community and the central government in Syria were concerned. It is so, because even in the heydays of the Assad regime in Syria, the Damascus government enabled the Druze a measure of autonomy in running their own religious-communal affairs, so long as they kept their overall total political loyalty to the regime and were ready to be drafted to the Syrian army, and the Druze have complied. The Druze of Suwaida kept an on-going connection with the Druze community of the Northern Israeli Golan area, making sure that these nominal Israeli citizens continued to display support for the Assad regime. The service of Druze in the Assad army was for the dictator the utmost test of their loyalty, and some of the Druze officers even became national heroes, such as Issam Zaher Al Din[1961-2017], a major general of the Syrian Republican Guard, commanding regime troops in some important campaigns. On 18 October 2017, he was killed during battle with ISIS in the Deir A Zor region. Zaher Al Din death occurred when there were already problems between the regime and the hitherto loyal Druze community in the South. 

In the case of the Druze, the problems are exemplified by the numerical decline, as 40000 young Druze fled the region since 2012 in order to evade conscription to the Assad army, whereas others left to the Gulf States in order to get employment, which is so scarce in the South.  They send back remittances, which have become a major source of income in the growingly impoverished South. According to reports, many thousands of Druze, particularly the escapees from military service were put on the wanted lists of the Assad regime, and altogether, the once cordial relations between the regime and the community worsened and turned into open violent hostility.[See ETANA, Ibid., pp.9-11]. So, as of 2011, the relationships became greatly, though not exclusively, dominated by violent collisions. The confrontational, violent nature of the relationships was in evidence already as early as 2001, when a Druze youth was murdered near Suwaida by a group of Sunni bedouins, and the Druze rioted forcefully in protest, something which led to a strong repressive action by the regime forces against the Druze community.[dozens of Druze were killed, See Sa’do Rafi, 

‘’The reality of the Druze in the Syrian Revolution’’, Arabic, Jawlan, 23 October 2011].

Violence and repression have always been the first and last means used by the Assad regime of dealing with any sign of opposition, particularly one coming from a community like the Druze. So, the reaction in 2001 by the regime to this local incident should not have come as a surprise to those who really wanted to regard the Bashar Assad regime for what it was, a totalitarian, sectarian regime, not a reformist, modern, secular, and even a liberal regime, enjoying genuine multi-communal popularity. These bombastic praises were heaped on the regime and the dictator personally by an array of world leaders and dignitaries, among them then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.[See, J.Olmert, ‘’What World Figures Said about Bashar Al Assad- An Enlightening Reminder’’, Huff Post, 28 May 2012]. In the face of repression, however, the Druze community in the mountains of South -West Syria reacted in a way that defied the regime expectations, that violent repression was enough to put down any sign of defiance.

The traditional tribal leadership of the Druze has gradually found its influence in society marginalized. A case in mind is that of the events surrounding the chief of the influential Al-Halabi clan. The Halabi clan originally from Aleppo [Halab] district is a clan which also have a presence in Israel [they are the dominant clan in Daliyat Al karmel, near Haifa], from where they migrated to As Suwaida region in the 17th and since then has retained the name of their ancestral land. In December 2011, an extremist Sunni group kidnapped sixteen Druze, among them the Chief of the Halabi clan, Jamal Izzedine Halabi. Only in 2015, it was revealed what happened, when a new emerging Druze leader, Wahid al -Bal’ous kidnapped some Sunnis, and then there was an exchange, and it was discovered that the Halabi Sheikh was murdered. In the past, an event like that would have led to a widespread communal reaction, but not this time. Clearly a sign of weakness that reflected the changes occurring in Syria since 2011, but also was the result of the systematic Assad regime policy since the 1970s. This was aimed at weakening the Druze as well as other minorities.[See, Mahmoud Al-Lababidi, ‘’The Druze of Sweida; The Return of the Regime Hinges on Regional and Local Conflicts’’, Middle East Directions, European University Institute, 28 August 2019, p.6]. The rise of Al-Bal’ous himself was a sign of the changes in the Druze community, which led to internal splits and the emergence of new social and political forces. The religious leadership split into three factions, but they still united in 2014 in jointly issuing the religious HARAM [Excommunication] of Al-Bal’ous because of his growingly anti-Assad position, which they felt put the community in danger. Al Bal’ous himself defined his policy towards the regime as one of neutrality. His adversaries also considered him a threat because he was not a religious leader, and his movement The Men of Dignity adopted a secular posture, although trying to keep it within a religious context.  This is so because it is impossible to separate communal and tribal affiliations from the religious context in the Druze community. Therefore, it is important to understand that using western terms such as’’ secular’’ can create the wrong impression. The use of these terms should be understood in the context of the community we are dealing with and not in the context of Western terminology. That said, the fact is that a car bomb killed Al-Bal’ous and there is no need to delve into too much speculation about the identity of the assassins.[AP, REUTERS, 5 September  2015]. Following his death, the map of local forces ‘’fragmented to the point of chaos and hostility, which still dominates the scene to this very day’’ [Lababidi, p.8], partly because the movement of Al-Bal’ous has not fully recovered from his loss. However, the internal splits among the Druze brought about a big change in the overall situation, and this is the return of the Assad regime, which was part of a bigger development, and this is the growing influence of non-Syrian forces in the region, namely the Iranians and their allies, and Russia. Here is a phenomenon that characterizes the so-called Assad’s win in the civil war. The Assad regime, if left to its own devices, simply cannot control Syria. Therefore, their hold over large regions depends completely on the support of outside forces, mostly the Iranians and Russians. This is so mainly because of the Alawi demographic problem. The civil war simply depleted them dramatically, which will be described and analyzed in a future paper devoted to this issue. 

SUWAIDA GOVERNANCE AS OF 2018 TO PRESENT

LOCAL AND OUTSIDE FORCES;

The overall situation in the Druze region already in turmoil before the death of Al-Bal’ous became completely chaotic afterward, with a variety of local militias fighting for and against the regime. Some of these forces have become aligned with the Iranians and Russians. The pro-Iranian and pro-Hizballah forces are the National Defense Forces, Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and the Al Bustan Association. The Al Fahd Forces are close to Russia; the Al Baath Brigades and the Protectors of the Homeland are pro Assad. The Single Artery militia and the Cleric of Dignity Forces are expressly anti-Assad, and the movement that was founded by Al Bal’ous, the Men of Dignity has maintained official neutrality [Lababidi, p.9]. On top of all these groups, there are others that are closely related to the Assad security forces, as well as to the Iranians and Russians. Russian intervention in the South is a significant factor in the situation there, being a demonstration of the overall Russian commitment to the maintenance of the Assad regime. Russian intervention in the South started in earnest in 2016 with humanitarian aid provided to internally displaced persons in Suwaida, and from there, the Russians went on to achieve a political ‘’settlement’’ with the pro-regime militias in order to coordinate their activities. However, they soon found themselves involved in a big controversy, one that has further aggravated tensions in the South. They tried to enforce Druze youth to draft to the Assad army, and that has proved a problem. The Druze have always been ready to be part of the army if it suited their interests, but in the context of the civil war, the weakening of central authority and dangers posed by the Sunni rebels, the minoritarian instinct of the Druze is to care for themselves by themselves. The Russians are having their own militia, the Fifth Corps, and they actively encouraged Druze youth to join their loyal forces. The bottom line of the Russian maneuvering in the Druze areas is to strengthen the Assad regime’s hold over the region as part of their overall policy to allow Assad to regain his authority. The regime, of course, did not miss the opportunity to get involved again in the affairs of the region, but with all the various competing factions and the Druze growing disenchantment, the Assad forces find it increasingly difficult to reassert an effective control. They did not try to take the Suwaida province by force in its entirety, as they did not want to engage in a head-on collision with the Druze community. This is in contrast to what they did in the Sunni-dominated Dara’a province, which was occupied by Assad’s army in a successful campaign between 18 June and 31 July 2018. In the Suwaida area, however, Assad had to contend with another complication. He has to also deal with another external force that has meddled in recent years in the affairs of Syria and the South. These are the Iranians and their Lebanese allies, the Hizballah.

The actual one and only Iranian interest to get engaged in the affairs of the South is the proximity to Israel and the potential for opening a new front for the Israelis. Iran has funded dozens of armed gangs, security cells, and militias in Suwaida and established and financed a Druze religious center, in itself an indication of the deep commitment to mobilize local Druze to their ranks. The Druze are not Muslims, and the Iranian investment in their religious studies is, therefore, exceptional. Hizballah, while wishing to participate in anti-Israel activities, is also using the South as a ‘’drug smuggling route to Jordan and the Gulf’’.[Lababidi, p.13]. The drug and religious activities of Iran and Hizballah should not mislead us to think that there is no military goal behind all that. The Iranians established in Suwaida the Druze National Religious Commission. This is a movement that was originally formed as a religious group. However, it turned into yet another militia and is affiliated with the Iranians through the Security Bureau of the Fourth Armed Division of the Syrian army. This, in itself, is a fact that perhaps clarifies somewhat the complicated picture described until now. This division is under the command of Maher Assad, the younger brother of President Assad, but it is closely associated with the Iranians in Syria while keeping personal loyalty to Bashar Assad himself. This state of affairs is a mirror image of Syria’s real situation regarding actual control in the country.  Another Syrian unit, the Fifth Armoured division of the same Syrian army, is closely associated with Syria’s Russian military. [on Assad army, See, G.Waters, The Lion and the Eagle; The Syrian Arab Army’s Destruction and Rebirth, 18 July, 2019.].With the Iranians and Hizballah so close to Israel’s border, the Israeli factor in all this myriad of conflicting factions is of importance.

ISRAEL AND SOUTH-WEST SYRIA;

The interview given by the Israeli intelligence source to ILAF about the situation in the South [cited above] is a precise reflection of the Israeli concerns. The overall analysis of Israel’s policy regarding the Syrian civil war is out of the scope of this article, but it is important to emphasize the fact that Israel, and rightly so, confined its interest and actual actions only to what it considered its immediate security interests. Therefore, Israel did not engage in any regime change plans. However, they kept an eye on the Iranian presence in Syria as they were trying to turn it into a zone of active conflict with her, and obviously has paid close attention to the South. The extent and intensity of the effort against Iranian military presence in Syria, whether by them directly, or through Hizballah, is indeed very impressive. The aerial activity in almost every part of Syria has had major successes. It is worth noting that it could be achieved also because of the cooperation between the IDF and the Russian military in Syria. It is still an open question, whether aerial activity by itself will prove sufficient to put an end to the Iranian plans in Syria, a question not to be discussed here. However, it safely can be said that it has gained time for Israel, strengthened Israel’s deterrence and showed an amazing military ability, as well as success of the Israeli intelligence penetration to Syria in general and to the Iranian and pro-Iranian forces in particular. The South, however, poses a different challenge to Israel. Here, aerial activity is not the solution. Besides, there is the Druze factor, mainly the fact that dealing with the South is not just an external security issue for Israel but also a domestic political problem. Israel cannot afford an Iranian-Hizballah military presence on its borders, nor direct one, neither through Druze proxies. There is a need here for a combined military-political-economic strategy, one which will specifically target the non-Druze anti-Israel elements, will try to keep the Druze factions out of any engagement in anti-Israel activity, not an easy task considering the internal Druze communal divide as described above, and above all, will help the needy population. It is a need for Israel to establish the Golan version of the ‘’good fence’’ which existed in South Lebanon for so many years until 2000. That is all easier said than done, though. The Iranians are determined to get as close as possible to the Israeli border, Assad is collaborating with them, the Russians do not always deliver on the promises to contain the Iranians, the Druze are so split between themselves, and now a new factor to be considered is what will be the policy of the new Biden administration?

The Trump administration actually gave Israel a free hand in dealing with Iranians in Syria, but the Biden team makes ever-increasing conciliatory noises about Iran. 

The reports from the South of Syria, both from the Suwaida and Dara’a provinces, indicate that the tensions described and analyzed here are nearing a point of uncontrolled eruption. These are not good news to Israel, which may have to make some tough decisions.

Syria altogether continues to be a powder keg. Nine years of atrocious conflict and no end in sight.

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Dr. Josef Olmert is a Senior Fellow at the Palm Beach Center for Democracy and Policy Research and an adjunct professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina