Russians may not support the war in Ukraine, but Western Sanctions might strengthen the Putin regime  

By Anzhelika Minaeva Ph.D. 

The war between Russia and Ukraine has been ongoing for over a year. 

According to some polls, most Russians support the war. However, those findings are hardly accurate because most outspoken Russian activists have embraced silence or left the country. According to different estimates, between 400,000 and 800,000 left Russia after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In March 2023, Levada Center published the results of a February survey of Russian public opinion. Sixty-eight percent of respondents answered that things in the country are heading in the right direction, while 21% believed the opposite. Eighty-three percent of respondents approve of Putin’s job. 

When asked, “Whether or not you support the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine?”, 77% of respondents supported the war, and 17% opposed it. Sixty-three percent of respondents believe the war in Ukraine is successfully progressing, while 24% think that the war is going poorly. Moreover, a survey in the same year by the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VCIOM) shows that 80% of respondents trust President Putin, 76.7% support his policy, and 40% trust Putin’s United Russia party.

At first glance, Russians seem to support Putin’s regime and the war. However, on closer examination, it is safe to argue that this impression is deceiving, given the socio-political conditions in which pollsters conducted the surveys.

In March 2022, the Russian government introduced Article 280.3 of the Criminal Code, which criminalized “discrediting” the war effort. First-time offenders have to pay an administrative fee. Second-time offenders can be sentenced to up to 5 years in prison. Moreover, Article 207.3 of the Russian Criminal Code enjoins up to 15 years in prison for spreading “fake news.” 

Furthermore, in July 2022, the Russian government allowed the Prosecutor General’s Office to block mass media sites that engage in what the Russian government perceives as efforts to undermine the war effort. Similarly, media sites that spread “false information” about the war or try to discredit the authorities may lose their media license. Significantly, these laws are vaguely worded, thereby allowing arbitrary interpretation. Russian courts have already issued verdicts based on random explanations of the laws.

For example, the prosecution of the Moskalev family is a case in point. Masha Moskaleva, a 13-year-old girl from the Tula region, drew an anti-war picture at school. Her father, Alexey, wrote anti-war comments on social media. As a result, the government arrested her father and sent her to a shelter. Under pressure from the public, the father was released from prison but put under house arrest. 

Nevertheless, the authorities left the child in a shelter, and the Guardianship authorities sued to restrict parental rights. Finally, in March 2023, the Russian court sentenced Alexey to two years in prison for “discrediting” the war effort.

Another example is the persecution of the politician Evgeniy Roizman from Yekaterinburg for his anti-war position. Initially, a court banned him from using the Internet and engaging in public activities. In March 2023, Roizman was arrested for 14 days for “violating” the court’s restrictions. The reason for the arrest was reposting a publication by the Anti-Corruption Foundation of Alexei Navalny on social media. It was posted by a group named Roizman. Even though the group’s administrators testified in court that the group had no affiliation with Roizman, the court did not change its verdict. 

These two examples demonstrate the Russian government’s strategy of intimidating its citizens. Thus, fear plays a role, and it is reasonable to assume that this affects the accuracy of the polls.  

Another element that plays a role is the dependence of a large number of people in the public sector. According to Internationale Nederlanden Group (ING) analysts, the Russian government pays the salaries of 42% of the population, which makes many employees dependent on the government.

No less significant, the low average salary of Russians makes them dependent on state benefits and subsidies. According to Russian official statistics, in 2021, the average monthly income of Russians was 40,272 rubles ($536).

It’s clear, therefore, that Russian surveys offer distorted results from opinion polls on the people’s support of the invasion of Ukraine. Many Russians are reluctant to answer pollsters’ questions because they fear political repercussions or losing their jobs or benefits.

Likewise, support for the Putin regime and the war in Ukraine may increase over time due to a growing population segment nearing retirement and Western sanctions.

Notwithstanding a low birth rate, the proportion of elderly citizens has increased in Russian society. According to official Russian statistics, 29.5% of the total Russian population are citizens aged 55 and over. In contrast, a significant number of young Russians either died in the war or left the country. Older people, many of whom are conservative, are still affected by the vestiges of norms that lingered following the collapse of the Soviet Union, including not opposing the government. 

Similarly, many religious Russians embrace historical and cultural traditions, making them more prone to submit to political authorities. The Greek Orthodox church has historically preached asceticism and obedience to political authority to avoid civil strife. The Church teaches people to trust political leaders because power descends “from God.”

As such, support for the Russian status quo from the majority of the aging population and conservatives may well ensure the stability of the government for the next few decades.

Western Sanctions have united Russians around the Putin regime as defenders of a besieged fortress. Underscoring Russia’s existential threat from Western sanctions, Putin has rallied Russians around their common enemy: Western Europe and the United States.

On a personal level, Russians do not feel responsible for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, they are bombarded daily by harsh anti-Russian Western rhetoric and restrictive policies blaming and punishing them. Meanwhile, the Russian government maliciously amplifies the adverse effect of Western sanctions on Russian society and economy while at the same time providing subsidies to help citizens in need.

Putin decided to invade Ukraine without the population’s consent. However, Western sanctions and harsh treatment of Russians have been perceived as a nefarious collective punishment of all Russians regardless of their political orientation, which made many Russians rally around the regime.

Russians have little power to change the discourse or course of the war. Significantly, they are, on the one hand, shackled by government intimidation, laws, and traditions and, on the other hand, by Western collective punishment. Such an awkward situation increases the population’s adherence to Putin.

About Anzhelika Minaeva Ph.D.

Anzhelika Minaeva received her Ph.D. in history from the Tula State Pedagogical University, Tula, Russia. She served as editor-in-chief of the newspaper “Moskovskiy Komsomolets” in Moscow. She was Chairman of the Public Council under the Ministry of Domestic Policy in Tula (2017-2021). She won the All-Russian competition of journalistic works “Truth and Justice,” Moscow, 2018. She is a board member of the Russian Historical, Educational and Human Rights Society, a 2022 Nobel Peace Prize Winner.