QUO VADIS TURKEY?—- FROM KEMALISM TO ISLAMISM?

By Josef Olmert

It is arguably the case that of all the great revolutions of the Twentieth Century, one was never given its due attention in the Western world, nor by intellectuals, neither by statesmen despite being of great significance. This is Kemalism, the secular revolution in Turkey initiated by Mustafa Kemal, known more popularly as Ataturk[father of the Turks-1881-1938]. Reasons have mostly to do with the Western reluctance to deal with a religious/political/cultural environment so much different than the West, especially after the defeat of the last great Islamic empire, the Ottomans, and the sense that Kemalism by its very nature symbolized the eventual victory of Western ideas over Islamic ones. It seemed that Ataturk’s revolution is the key to a new state of relationships between Islamic nations and the West. A done deal-the West won, and Ataturk realized it-If you can’t beat them, join them, something that in the West was taken for granted. In the Middle East, Kemalism aroused interesting reactions. The new Pahelavi Shah of Iran initiated his Ataturk- style reforms in Iran, and secular movements emerged in the Arab world, with varying degrees of influence over segments of the pubic, with people like Antun Sa’ada, Michel Aflaq, and others preaching the gospel of secular nationalism. Turkey itself seemed to be a safe bet-Political Islam was defeated, and secular Turkish nationalism became the order of the day. Little attention was given to the emergence of the Islamic response to the new challenge-especially the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, first in Egypt in 1928 [under Hassan Al Bana-1906-1949], then in many parts of the Middle East. In Turkey itself, not much attention was given to the different appeal of Kemalism over different population groups. Much more in the urban centers, much less in the rural, peripheral regions, a difference which will be dramatically highlighted decades later with significant political consequences.

For decades, it seemed as if Kemalism was successful where the Islamic Ottoman empire failed-It pushed away the foreign interference in Turkey and built a new strong state. Outside of Turkey, Kemalism signaled that there can be a state of Muslims, but not an Islamic state. That is to say, that separation between state and mosque was possible, in fact essential, as all this was imperative for the building of a political community based on a wide basis of genuine legitimacy predicated  on democratic principles. It was not a Western-style democracy, but it was not also a classic style of Islamic theocracy. It was the Turkish road to be a respected member of the new world. It was a revolution because it meant a total departure from the past, and also because it offered a viable alternative to the rest of the Islamic world. So what were the main tenets of Kemalism?

The 1920s were the years in which Ataturk made his big changes, but it was only in 1931 when his policies became an official doctrine and later in 1937 became part of the Turkish constitution. The main pillars of the doctrine were;1]Republicanism 2]Nationalism-this is a tenet requiring a wider clarification. It meant Turkish nationalism, and by Turkish, it meant a rejection of Turkic nationalism or Pan-Turanism. Pan -Turanism embodied the combination of the language with Islam, the languages of what would become the Muslim Republics of the Soviet Union, all belonging to the Turkic family of languages spoken by Sunni Muslims, and its geographic scope was stretching deep into Central Asia. This was the dream of many Ottomanists, particularly after the Young Turk revolution of 1909. On the eve of WW1, the famous poet Ziya gokalp[1875-1924], himself as ironic as it is of Kurdish origin, wrote; ’’ the land of the enemy will be destroyed… turkey will grow and become Turan’’. The enemy was the Russian Empire, the eternal mortal enemy of the Ottomans, but the dream remained a dream. The Ottoman Empire collapsed, Turan was not to be. Ataturk nationalism was basically Anatolian nationalism, the Turks of Anatolia, and no more. The exceptions were the unsuccessful demand to annex Mosul in Iraq and the successful one to annex Alexandretta in Syria, currently the Turkish province of Hatay. By rejecting Turanism, Ataturk signaled the direction for the future-West, not East. Not just the geographic direction, more importantly, the cultural/political one. However, nationalism for Ataturk meant the legitimacy of only ONE national identity-Turkish, and none other. Armenians were subjected to the genocide of WW1, Greeks were exchanged for Turks from Greece, and then there were the Kurds-nearly 20% of the population. Here Kemalism was very definite-no Kurdish identity, no Kurdish nationalism, no Kurdish language, and culture. Kurds were officially defined as  “Mountainous Turks,’’ and Kurdish rebellions in 1925, 1930, and 1037 were suppressed brutally. 3]Populism-this was an effort to deal with class differences, to spread the state educational system all over the country, to create a genuine Turkish community united by patriotism, rather than religion. 4] Statism-the drive to create state-controlled economic development.5] secularism-the main base of the entire revolution-separation of state and mosque. Latin Alphabet instead of the Koranic Arabic, adoption of the Gregorian calendar, ban on Hijab wearing in Government-run institutions, and many more such changes. In sum-Islam at home, secularism in public life. Put together, this was a revolution by all accounts. 

With this revolution, Turkey considered itself, and to a large extent was considered by foreigners as  part of the Western world. In the Nineteenth Century, an Egyptian ruler, the Khedive Ismail Pasha declared, that Egypt ceased being in Africa and became part of Europe. He proved so wrong, but in the case of Ataturk, it was different. Turkey became part of Europe. The historic lesson was that whereas European-enforced reforms failed to Westernize the Ottoman Empire in the Nineteenth Century, a domestic movement of reforms succeeded, as was demonstrated by Ataturk. The implication was that real revolutions should emanate from the people themselves, not from outside forces. Many Turks accepted Kemalism and actually worshipped the man himself, first during his lifetime, and later after his death. Whether it was through conviction or the result of state-run indoctrination machine did not seem to matter, but  It was never ALL the Turks. The obvious authoritarian nature of the entire political system managed to create the semblance of a transformation unchallenged. But it was. Changes have occurred, political and social reality in Turkey was not static, and the Kemalist domination started to falter. It was in 1996 when Necmettin Erbakan[1926-2011] became the first Islamist Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic. While he served for only one year, before being forced down by the military, his initial election signaled the shape of things to come. The only viable political alternative to Kemalism was presented by the Islamists. Islam did not die in Turkey as a result of decades of Kemalism, and was still a potent force. The army, the guardian of the secular constitution, forced Erbakan down, charging him with an attempt to undermine the separation of state and mosque.

To refer to Erbakanism will be somewhat irrelevant, rather we should refer to the resurgence of Islamism, personified by Erbakan and called by him  MILLI GORUS[‘’National and Religious Vision’’]. The movement and ideology which were meant to restore Islamist values in Turkey, to turn Turkey away from the Western world, in fact, to turn the clock back and do away with a lot, perhaps most of the Kemalist Revolution. Erbakan tried in his short spell as PM to enhance Pan-Islamic policies, in sheer violation of Kemalism. He tried to develop cordial relations with the Arab states, emphasized strong anti-Zionist feelings, and created the D-8, THE DEVELOPING 8, designed to achieve economic and political unity among the Muslim nations. The members were-Turkey, Iran, Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nigeria. [only half Muslim state]. Reviewing the overall analysis of Erbakan about the state of the Muslim world, it is clear, that he drew a lot from the Muslim Brotherhood, emphasizing the moral strength of Muslims compared to Western materialism, and condemning the Western cultural influences. It is significant in that context that Erbakan was very keen on spreading his influence among Turkish immigrants in Europe, especially in Germany and with success. It is important because it may indicate the fact that beneath the veneer of secularism imposed by the Kemalist revolution, many Turks still felt strong attachment to Islam, and the living in Europe instead of decreasing it, rather achieved the opposite. 

To understand the rise of political Islam in Turkey, we need to go beyond Erbakan himself and look for a wider, more profound background. Bernard Lewis in his seminal article, ‘’The return of Islam’’[Commentary, 1 January 1976], an article which can be considered a prophecy come true, related to the reemergence of Islam in many Muslim countries in the 1960’s and after, mentioning one of Erbakan-led parties[The National Salvation party]. Even more importantly, with regard to Turkey, he stated significantly the following; ’’Even today, in the secular republic of Turkey, the word TURK is by common convention restricted to Muslims’’. Here is a key point relating to the very basic question of collective identity, which is the basis of Kemalism. It proved impossible to separate Turkish national identity from Islamic identity. That is to say that while Kemalism managed for many years to remove Islam from playing a role in the politics of the country, it did not manage to suppress the sense of Islamic identity. This is what proved to be Kemalism weak point. Islam remained the only viable, potentially popular alternative to Kemalism, and this provides us with the specific reasons leading to the reemergence of Islam in Turkey’s polotical life, to Erbakan and his Islamist successors.

The first signs of a change in Turkey and the beginning of the gradual weakening of Kemalism can be traced back to 1950, when the moderate, Right-Wing Democratic party led by Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes rose to power after elections, unseating for the first time the Ataturk party. This was the Republican Peoples’ party led by his successor, Ismet Inonu[The ‘’National Chief, 1884-1973]. The new party swore allegiance to Kemalism, but its tenure of 10 years until 1960, can be viewed as a time which facilitated the resurgence of Islam in Turkey. They were brought down by the army in 1960, led by General Gursel, the head of the National Unity Committee, a Kemalist group of officers.  Menderes was executed, and the party was dissolved. Still, there were two conclusions to be drawn-first, the Republic of Ataturk, while having popular support, needed the military to continue to exist. It had a positive element-the existence of a strong central power, which was committed to Kemalism, but it had a very weak element as well-the identification of the army, a venerated institution established by Ataturk to protect the nation and its constitution with anti-democratic political suppression. 

There were more military interventions [1971 and 1980], and they happened because Turkey was gripped by political instability, mounting economic and social crisis, and rising terroristic Kurdish nationalism. Kemalism seemed to be failing to address the crisis-Islam was there to offer its solution[ISLAM UL HAL-Islam is the solution], first Erbakan, then others. One of them was a young popular, charismatic leader-Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and with him, a new chapter is opening; the demise of Kemalism.

Dr. Josef Olmert is a Senior Fellow at the Palm Beach Center for Democracy and Policy Research and an adjunct professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina