PROTEST IN THE ARAB WORLD-THE CASE OF LEBANON

PROTEST IN THE ARAB WORLD-THE CASE OF LEBANON

By Josef Olmert

The political eruption engulfing the Middle East since late 2010, known [though erroneously] as the Arab Spring spared, until recently, a country whose history, stretching for centuries, has been characterized by frequent bloodshed, large scale violence, in fact, terrible civil wars. This is Lebanon. It is arguably the case that predictions to the effect that the eruption would strike Lebanon like an unstoppable hurricane did not materialize. However, the fact that it did not happen simultaneously with the events in other countries did not signal that Lebanon was off the hook, that the Lebanese finally found the formula enabling their country to move towards internal peace and stability. In fact, Lebanese scholars were the first to argue that this was not the case. One of them is Sami Hermez, who wrote an eye-opener book; War is coming; Between past and future violence in Lebanon, an important and valuable book. It is so because, unlike a lot of the literature about Lebanon, it does not attempt to beautify, even romanticize the Lebanese situation, by portraying a picture much rosier and more optimistic than what the actual situation is. The central thesis is really simple, and it is, that the Lebanese themselves are living in the shadow of the grim realization, that ‘’something’’ is imminent, and ‘’something’’ means bad news. It does not mean a political misunderstanding between different factions. It means war because political differences in Lebanon usually are being contested and resolved through bloodshed. It is of significance to give this background because understanding Lebanon’s present politics requires understanding of the past so that current events can be put in their proper context. This piece is not a summation of Lebanese history, but the overriding feature of conflict which goes through this history is the basis of the discussion about current events. Our departure point in this piece is the aftermath of the great civil war of 1975-1990. It has to be emphasized, that while the current wave of protest has not yet developed into a full-scale civil war, the writing is clearly on the wall.

 What happened in Lebanon since the end of this war provides us a good background to the present. In a way, Lebanon has healed in an impressive way from the horrors of the 15-years civil war, and it reconstructed its political institutions, though their level and quality of functioning are so far off what we expect to have in a real functioning democracy. Yet, rebuilding political institutions, even with differences from the past, is one thing, but rebuilding society, rehabilitating the human aspect, the relationships which were destroyed, the lives shattered, is something else altogether. So, with that in mind, Hermez leaves us with the inevitable conclusion, that as civil society ‘’being unable to deal with the war’s causes,[ it] facilitated war’s anticipation into the future ‘’’.[p.192].One of the main ‘’war causes’’ leading to an important internal political outcome, was the shake-up, in fact, the major change in the domestic, communal balance of power.It has to do with the rise of the Shi’i community in Lebanon. This is a process which started in the 1960’s with the appearance of Imam Musa Sadr in the Lebanese scene[See, J.Olmert, ‘’The Shi’is and the Lebanese State’’, in M.Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Resistance and Revolution, Westview, 1987], and was accelerated and intensified with the combined effect of two events. The Islamic Revolution in Iran and the impact of the Israeli invasion in 1982 and its aftermath.The Shi’is, until then, firmly in the camp of those who wanted to maintain a multi-communal, Arab-oriented Lebanese state, though with improvements in their own status in this state, opted to support the movement which has adopted a pan-Shi’ite approach, Hizballah. In actual terms, being pan-Shi’ite meant, being in the service of Iran and its regional ambitions.Nothing could prove it more than the participation of Hizballah in the Syrian civil war, starting in 2011, on the side of Bashar Assad, who was mostly assisted by Iran, the great patron of Hizballah.Hizballah’s mobilization to fight in Syria was more than a tactical, political decision. It reflected something bigger than that. In the moment of truth, Hizballah chose sect and religion over state. In fact, the Hizballah decision brought to the fore yet again the main problem which is at the root of the chronic instability in the Fertile Crescent in general, and in Lebanon in particular; the sectarian divide, the clash between communal and state loyalties.In a nutshell-who are we?.[see more on it in Josef Olmert, ‘’’A looming civil war? Hizballah chooses sect over state’’, Your Middle East, 9 June 2013]. Sure, the Lebanese political landscape is larger than just Hizballah and its role, but the emphasis here on the Shi’ite organization reflects its central role, the importance of foreign intervention-that of Iran, and the overall change in the communal balance of power in Lebanon. It is in this context that we have to look also at the role of the Sunni Muslim community in Lebanese politics. Also because a discussion about the Sunnis highlights the changing regional realities in the Middle East, as it relates to the struggle between the Islamic Republic of Iran on the one hand and the Saudi Kingdom on the other hand. The Sunnis were the traditional Muslim partners of the largest Christian community, the Maronites, in leading Lebanon to its independence. However, the rise of the Shi’ites put all that under a big question mark. The last significant Sunni leader, Rafiq Hariri, symbolized the changes which characterized Lebanese politics after 1990-A nouveau riche from Sidon, not a traditional Za’m[leader] from Beirut and Tripoli, a businessman and a protege of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, his Lebanese orientation was aimed against Syrian and Iranian influence, and that cost him in his life in 2005, being assassinated in a combined Syrian-Hizballah operation. The assassination was a catalyst for dramatic political changes in Lebanon, the Cedar Revolution, which was a protest against Syria and Hizballah and led to the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. This was a multi-sectarian protest, including Sunnis, Maronites, Armenians, and Druze, though hardly any Shi’ites.It also included civic organizations and not just political parties. This was a harbinger of things to come. A realization of many communities in Lebanon, that the country is being taken over by the Shi’ites. In that context, it is important to clarify that while it was a coalition united against the emerging Shi’ite domination, it was not one united behind a joint platform aimed at doing away with the sectarian nature of Lebanese politics. The very fabric of the sectarian system is such that it enables the creation of coalitions comprising of political parties from different sects, but the basis of all that is that political power emanates from having a dominant position within the respective religious/ethnic communities. So, the challenge to the rising power of Hizballah was not as effective as it could be if there were a genuine non-sectarian system based on one person one vote. Under Hizballah being in an alliance with the other Shi’ite movement Amal, the once downtrodden Shi’ites, collaborating with the Maronite faction led by General Michel Aoun and controlling a military force stronger than the national Lebanese army, also continued to be the strongest political power in the country. 

For a while, Hizballah even enjoyed cross-sectarian support in Lebanon following the Second Israeli-Lebanese war of 2006. The iconic Lebanese singer Fairuz, of Maronite-Assyrian extraction, also known as the ‘’Jewel of Lebanon’’, sung in praise of Hizballah, a symbolic act of crossing the sectarian lines. Few Lebanese paid attention to the fact that Hizballah leader, Hassan Nasrallah himself, admitted, that if he knew how the war would develop, he would not have triggered it, but the sense was, that, for a change, Hizballah acted as a national Lebanese organization. This was a short honeymoon, though, and as of the Syrian civil war of 2011, it is obvious that Hizballah is what it has always been, a manifestation of Shi’ite communal aspirations and Iranian regional ambitions.

The opposition to Hizballah, however, proved weak and ineffective. Sa’ad Hariri, Rafiq’s son, and his political heir apparent is nothing like his father. A young man better known as a playboy than a serious politician, a person who was publicly humiliated by his Saudi patrons, in short, not the figure who could unite the anti-Hizballah camp behind him. Among the Maronites, the largest Christian community, there continues to be the split between Aoun’s supporters [Aoun is the current president] and those of the Lebanese Forces, and their leader Samir Gaegea, who is based in North Lebanon, where he is the actual master of a small Christian enclave. Hizballah has continued to be the dominant political and military force in Lebanon, despite losing ground due to its involvement in the Syrian civil war. This is not to suggest that the opposition to them has disappeared. The basic reason for the hostility towards them cannot and will not disappear- it is the fear of and objection to their virtual control over Lebanon. The foundation of the entire sectarian system in Lebanon as of the creation of the Autonomous area of Le Grand Liban in 1861 has been the principle of power-sharing.[on this see J.Spagnolo, France & Ottoman Lebanon].This principle was reaffirmed with the Sunni-Maronite National Pact of 1943 [see F.El Khazen, The communal Pact of National Identities, Papers on Lebanon, no.12, Center for Lebanese Studies, Oxford, October 1991]. The arrangements leading to the end of the civil war after 1990, the so-called Taif Accords, were supposed to correct elements of the 1943 pact, but in actual terms, led to the gradual ascendancy of the Shi’ites led by Hizballah. While the Shi’ites seem to be assisted, and in a way sheltered by an emerging regional power, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Sunnis lack a significant outside patron, as the weakness of Saudi Arabia is becoming ever more obvious. It was not the case right after the 1990 Accords, but it has been the case in recent years, as was on display with the failure of Saudi Arabia to effectively support the anti-Assad Sunni rebels in Syria. This process, in itself, could provide the setting for another eruption of a popular uprising in Lebanon, like the Cedar Revolution, but other factors added to this, exacerbated the sense of deep disaffection in the country, thus leading to the current wave of popular protest, the largest in the country since 2005.

Hizballah’s actual domination of Lebanese politics inevitably meant that protest against the fast deteriorating economic situation, the rampant corruption, and the overall ineptitude of the government had to be an anti-Hizballah protest. Formally, there is a Maronite President and a Sunni PM, but everyone in Lebanon knows that the key to real power is held by Hassan Nasrallah, the Hizballah leader working in the service of his Iranian patrons. Corruption charges are nothing new in Lebanon, but despite the recurrence of these charges, very little has been done to fight this problem. As the reputed Lebanese daily Al Nahar reported, ‘’as a rule of thumb, Lebanon is still implementing outdated mechanisms to fight bribery and corruption’’[Al Nahar, 18 December 2018]. According to Transparency International, Lebanon ranked 138 out of 175 countries in the 2018 Corruption Perception Index. Sectarianism, here again, is a very fundamental reason behind corruption, as argued by Atie J El Mouallem, ‘’political corruption is weaved into the fabric of the Lebanese society’’[in Corruption in Lebanon; Demystifying the reasons and the Legal framework], and surely while this is not the only reason, it is a very significant one. The existence of wide-spread corruption is compounded by the deepening economic crisis. Fadi Hassan and Hugo Panizza, two noted experts on Lebanon’s economy, analyzed the current crisis arguing, that without dealing with the endemic corruption in the country, there is no chance for a real economic recovery, but they also connected the crisis to political factors. They claim that the humiliation of PM Sa’ad Hariri by the Saudis in November 2017 led to a lot of funds being moved out of Lebanon. [Financial Times, 20 December 2019]. True enough, but the protest in the streets now is directed mostly against Hizballah, and not against Hariri. The reason for that is the fact that many Lebanese believe that Hizballah is the main reason for internal political instability in Lebanon for a variety of reasons, chief among them the increasing fear of another Hizballah-Israel war. For the majority of non-Shi’ite Lebanese, a war, if it will happen, will have nothing to do with any Lebanese national interest, rather with that of Iran and its Lebanese proxy. Some data can shed light on the extent of the Lebanese economic crisis. As Hesham Shawish wrote in BBC Monitoring [25 October 2019], Lebanon’s economy is between “Mount Lebanon to mountains of debt’’, with a 152% debt to GDP ratio, which makes Lebanon the world’s third most indebted country in the world after Japan and Greece. So, as the country unable to meet local demand for decades now, there is electricity rationing, and most citizens use back-up generators. In fairness, it has to be emphasized, that the war in Syria was a contributing factor to the crisis, as over a million Syrians fled to Lebanon. Another contributing factor was the fact that the oil situation in the Gulf States forced Lebanese working there to reduce significantly their remittances to their families in Lebanon. With all that, no surprise, that the overall unemployment rate is 25% and 37% among youth. These are just some examples relating to the worsening economic situation, a background to the wave of popular protests, as it combined, in the minds of the protestors, with the state of corruption, the government ineptitude, and Hizballah virtual control. All leading to a sense of despair about the overall situation in the country, and the need for deep changes.

The demonstrations started in response to the intention of the government to tax WhatsApp internet use, as well as protests about the failure of the government to deal effectively with wildfires in the Western mountains. Also, importers complained about a shortage of US dollars in the banks. Soon, however, the protest turned against the entire political system in the country, leading to the resignation of PM Sa’ad Hariri government. They became distinctly anti-Hizballah, and the Shi’ites responded by sending their own people to the streets. Here is where we have to turn our attention back to Hizballah.

The obvious anti-Hizballah slant of the protests brings to the open, in a dramatic way, the transformation which the organization went through from the 1980s to our days. On 16 February 1985, Hizballah published its manifesto addressed to ‘’all the oppressed in Lebanon and all over the world’’ in which it called upon all people, surely all Lebanese “to pick the option of Islamic government which, alone, is capable of guaranteeing justice and liberty for all’’. This was a revolutionary manifesto in line with the revolutionary message of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In 2009, a new manifesto was published, which shifted gear from Islamism to a new, non-sectarian Lebanon, still a Lebanon where Hizballah alone is entitled to bear arms, a right which is not debatable. On the face of it, the 2009 manifesto could be interpreted as a moderate, patriotic Lebanese statement of policy, but in actual terms, it was not understood as such by many Lebanese. The complete subservience to Iran, the active participation in the Syrian civil war, and the control over the government signaled to the majority of non-Shi’ite Lebanese the opposite. They definitely solidified another image of Hizballah-not that of a ‘’resistance’’ anti-Israel and a revolutionary non-sectarian movement, rather that of an armed movement dedicated to protect and maintain the corrupt political sectarian system in place; a system which enables them to be in virtual control of the politics of the land.

The protests have a distinct anti-sectarian message-there is participation of members of all religious /ethnic communities, including also Shi’ites, who disobey the Hizballah calls against the protests. Yet, the bulk of them is in the big cities, not in the outlying, peripheral areas, and they are dominated by Sunnis and Christians whose call for an end of sectarianism is actually a call for an end of Shi’ite ascendancy. The anti-sectarian calls reflect a genuine desire for a process of modernization, for adaptation to the changing circumstances, but it is far too early to suggest that there is a ‘’ new ‘’ Lebanese nationalism. Yes, as Yasmeen Serhan argues in the Atlantic[30 October 2019], ‘’shared grievances over economic dysfunction and a lack of government accountability have united people across ethno-religious lines’’, but is it enough to argue that a ‘’new ‘’nationalism has emerged in Lebanon? [the same question is also relevant in the case of Iraq].The protests, as of now, have not evolved from the stage of expressing opposition to the prevailing system to that of spelling out the fundamentals of a new system.

Do these people who protest sectarianism, unite around any alternative to the principle of communal power-sharing? Are they ready to pay the price of engaging in another bloody civil war that is most likely to happen if there can be no shared agreement about a new political formula, as the powers which resist change, Hizballah and others, are powerful and determined?

The sad reality in Lebanon is that changes in the system come AFTER a bloody conflict. This is where Sami Mehrez’s book [cited above] is so relevant- “Something’’ is going to happen. This has always been like that. It is not inevitable, it is likely, and that means that the current wave of discord in Lebanon is more likely to turn violent than remain peaceful. Hopefully, for the Lebanese, it will not be the case, but if there is something we can learn from Lebanese history, it is that violence is always behind the door. 

Dr. Josef Olmert is a Senior Fellow at the Palm Beach Center for Democracy and Policy Research and an adjunct professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina