With the 60-day U.S.-Iran negotiating period now expired and the two sides still far apart, the Strait of Hormuz remains at the center of the confrontation. Traffic through one of the world’s most important energy corridors remains a fraction of prewar levels, while Washington and Tehran continue to disagree fundamentally over the terms under which normal navigation would resume. The immediate dispute raises a larger strategic question: can Tehran use control over a critical international waterway to compel a change in American strategy?

In May, The New York Times reported that Iran’s former president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, had allegedly been recruited by the United States and Israel to assume power if the Iranian regime was toppled.
Ahmadinejad has long had a troubled relationship with the Iranian establishment. He publicly accused senior regime figures of corruption, was later barred from running for president, saw several of his aides arrested, and was eventually placed under house arrest.

It’s remarkable to witness the level of ignorance displayed by certain public officials, segments of the media, and various analysts when evaluating the rationale behind the joint American–Israeli military operation against Iran.

As with many contemporary challenges, the case for foreign intervention in Iran has a clear precedent: NATO’s intervention in the former Yugoslavia against the regime of Slobodan Milošević.