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Israel- Syria: 9 Points about the Situation

By Josef Olmert, PH.D.

The fall of the Assad regime, which was the downfall of a political ideology-Ba’athism, and a minority community -the Alawis can be somewhat connected to the overall fallout from the events of 7 October and their aftermath. Indeed, the timing of the events in Syria was greatly influenced by the smashing [though not final] defeat inflicted by Israel on Hizballah directly and indirectly on Iran. The Sunni opposition in Syria timed its final assault on the regime, which was in the making for many months, to the weakness of Iran, whose support to the Assad regime was crucial.

The new situation in Syria has presented challenges to the State of Israel, and this piece intends to give an interim summation of these challenges and how Israel has started coping with them. 

In a visit to the IDF troops stationed along the border with Syria, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu outlined the main elements of the Israeli strategy about the unfolding situation in Syria. He emphasized that Israel would not allow South Syria to be what has become of South Lebanon after the Israeli complete withdrawal from there in May 2000.

Netanyahu’s main point is that Israel would stay in parts of South Syria for as long as it takes to ensure that the area will be completely demilitarized and reiterated a firm commitment to support and protect the Druze community.

In this piece, I outline the main features of the situation in Syria after the fall of Assad and what Israel should do. 

1- Syria, despite the impressions created and fed by clueless Western media, is far from internal stability. The fact that Syria ceased to be a main time of news is not different from the way the Western, particularly the American media has dealt with Libya after the downfall of Qaddafi. As ”we” Americans are not involved, there is no newsworthy reporting. The reality is that Libya is still engaged in a civil war 14 years after the collapse of Qaddafi. Unlike what the foreign media reports, Al Shraa is not the new undisputed leader in Syria. He changed his combat attire to a western-looking statesman, but he is not, and the seeming impression of a smooth transition is grossly misleading.

2- None of the structural problems of Syria is resolved. Still, there is a lack of political legitimacy, perhaps mainly because Al Shraa is a self-nominated ruler. In a way, his ascendancy to power is yet another Syrian case of control by force, not consent. There is no real legitimacy. Still-Sectarianism and regionalism are dominant, and the situation with the Alawis is SO telling. It is not a question of either sympathy or antipathy towards the Alawis being, all of a sudden, the downtrodden minority after being the dominant oppressive regime. It has to do with the question of internal stability. Even those with superficial knowledge of Syrian history realize that the atrocities committed today against the Alawis will lead to another round of internal strife if not another civil war. So, with these issues in place, we have continuing external interference. Mostly Turkish now, though there is a fundamental misconception about what will be the Syrian reaction towards this role of Turkey. Syria will not become a Turkish colony, although, for a while, the new regime will depend on Turkish support; there are historical legacies and ethnic and linguistic differences that will play a role in the not-so-distant future. The Turkish influence will be most felt in the North West, Idlib, and Aleppo areas, with a significant Turkman minority of at least one million. Still, there is attempted Iranian interference either directly or through proxies like Hizballah and the Iraqi Shi’i militias. 

3-Therefore, It would be reckless for Israel to be the only interested party to accept the current unstable, temporary status quo and abandon any meaningful course of influence.

4- If there is any chance of negotiating with the new regime, and in my mind, it is very slim, it will be possible only from a position of force. Force is being used now and has been since the downfall of the regime in a way that indicates a strategic decision by Israel to reassert its influence in actions and not by meaningless talks. There may be no credibility attached to any Israeli-stated policy concerning Syria without boots on the ground, at least temporarily. The hope expressed by some Westerners, as well as Israelis, about possible fruitful dialogue between Israel and the new regime is naive at best and dangerous in the long run. The reason is that the Al Nusra front, which is the backbone of the HTS regime, is a Muslim Brotherhood-oriented organization, with anti-Israel as one of its core positions. Any dialogue with them will not lead to a political settlement. However, the IDF’s show of force in the South can convince them to reconsider an active anti-Israel policy on the ground. 

5-  Israel failed in South Lebanon in creating a viable security zone, and in dealing with the possibility of doing the same in Syria, it is relevant, therefore, to make the unavoidable comparison. The conditions in South Syria are different. Israel failed because when it created the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and the security zone, it was after   Israel lost the battle for Beirut as the new Lebanese regime was totally under the spell of Syria. Israel was perceived as a retreating force, clearly unlike the current situation in Syria. The new regime IS now under the spell of Turkey, BUT Israel does not seem to be on the losing side. At least in the Northern front, the Israeli victory is decisive and recognized as such, and with it comes a sense, though never total, of effective deterrence. In Southern Lebanon, Israel counted only on the local Christian community, which was a minority even in the Security zone, while neglecting the Shi’i majority. 

6- That brings us to the Druze

The Druze community has a much larger population than the Christians of Southern Lebanon. It is a community with military and fighting traditions, and there already is the Suwaida military council, and they are getting ready. It is NOT to be an Israeli attempt to tear the Druze Mountain from Syria to create an independent Druze state, something which in the past was suggested by Israeli politicians. Such a state has no viable economic base. So, we talk here about something else. The Druze strive to achieve a measure of self-rule within a federated Syrian state, and they have already demanded that the Assad regime not send Syrian army troops to their region. They will demand the same and probably more from the new Sunni regime. For them, Israeli support, including opening the border for workers to go to Israel, is a vital interest; hence, what is suggested here about them corresponds with both Israeli and Druze interests. 

7- This is also Jordan’s interest- never mind what the  King says and will say; he wants a peaceful border with Syria, and the Druze there, as a political and military force, can do it for him. The last thing that he wants is for the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood on his border, supporting his own Islamists, and stability in Jordan is an Israeli interest as well as American, so there could, should, and would be American support for the overall Druze option described here.

8- That brings us to the need for an American policy to support the North East Kurds. President Donald Trump can implement such a policy without American boots on the ground. The United States can do it with economic support, weapons supply, and an unequivocal message to Turkey- “hands off  the Kurds!” So, if they do it, then Turkey will have a lot to ponder before attempting to turn Syria into a Turkish colony. They will have to be on guard about the Kurds, and that could limit their overall aspirations about Syria. In the case of the Kurds, as is in the case of the Druze, the idea is not to have a total Kurdish separation but to create an “Iraqisation” of the situation within the Syrian state.

Isolationism is the main thrust of American policy, and I take seriously the Trump discourse about peace. What I propose is precisely an attempt to prevent Syria from becoming a regional time bomb.

9-ISRAEL.

So, we started with Netanyahu’s statements, and it is imperative to mention that, as in so many other cases, the question is whether Israel under Netanyahu and even after him will be consistent.

Dr. Josef Olmert is a Senior Fellow at the Palm Beach Center for Democracy and Policy Research and an adjunct professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina