ISRAEL AND MINORITY GROUPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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ISRAEL IN THE MIDDLE EAST-FROM PERIPHERY TO CENTER STAGE
A Trilogy-PT.1
ISRAEL AND MINORITY GROUPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By Josef Olmert

It is arguably the case that momentous events are happening in the Middle East with regard to Israel’s position there. Put in sum, the political outcome of them is the transformation of  Israel’s role from being the hated bogey man out of the system of Middle East regional relations to becoming a legitimate actor within this very system. That said, an important point is almost completely left out of the discussion about this transformation. It is the near-complete change in how Israel views its role in the region and the move from the long search for allies that are either religious and ethnic minorities or non-Arab states, to alliances with states representing the Sunni-Muslim Arab majority in the region.

It is conventional wisdom that from the beginning of the Zionist movement,  the Zionists ignored the local Arab population, relating to them as if they were thin air, non-existent and irrelevant to the future decisions of the country. As if the Zionists represented a people without a land, coming to a land without a people. Like many conventional wisdoms, this, too, is a complete falsehood, an attempt to create the image of a settler-colonialist movement whose very existence depends on it being the tool of a big imperialist power. Well, the truth is, that Zionist leaders representing all wings of the Zionist movement were aware of the existence of a local Arab population, as well as Arabs AND non-Arabs and non-Muslims living in the Middle East region. This piece will deal with the constant Zionist, and then Israeli search for allies in a hostile environment. It will end with the analysis of current events, which may seem to be the beginning of a new history of relations between Israel and its neighbors. A situation that is not risk-free, as well as one offering also opportunities and positive challenges.

Let us see the fundamental assumptions which have created the Zionist and later Israeli narrative about the status and role of Jews and Israelis in the Middle East. There have been four such fundamental assumptions; 1] The Arab, Sunni -Muslim majority in the Middle East is hostile towards Zionism, as it is towards any other non-Arab national movement in the region.

2] There are non-Arab and non-Sunni populations that exist in the Middle East and are potential allies of the Jews, as they share the same sense of being isolated and persecuted by the Arab Sunni majority. 3] Arguing that the problem of lack of recognition of Jewish national aspirations is part of a general negation of such claims by the Arab Sunni majority enables the Jews to diffuse the charge that the conflict is about ”Palestine.” It makes it logical to argue that it is a much bigger issue, one that concerns other minorities’ rights in the Middle East, not just Jews. 4] After the establishment of Israel, the search for non-state allies turned mostly, though not exclusively, into a search for states as possible allies. These assumptions led to political and diplomatic conclusions. There should be an effort directed towards minorities while not abandoning any possibility to come to an understanding with the majority. This may very well not lead to positive results. The alliance with minorities should lead to the destabilization of neighboring Arab states, and at the same time, efforts should be made to come to alliances with non-Arab states in the periphery of the Middle East, aimed at achieving the same goal.

THE MINORITY OPTION;

Three specific minorities will be discussed – the Maronites of Lebanon, the Druze of Syria, Kurds of Iraq, and two states-Iran and Turkey. The year 1919 is a good year in which to start. On 3 January 1919, the Zionist leader Dr. Chaim Weitzman met Amir Faysal the Hashimite, son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, head of the Hashimite family, the then recognized leader of the Arab national movement. The meeting took place in Aqaba and ended in an agreement, according to which, Faysal excluded ”Palestine” from a future Arab state, and recognized the Jewish people’s right to establish their own national Jewish homeland in the country. Faysal included a provision which stated that the agreement would be valid only if the 

Arabs managed to gain their independence in the rest of the Middle East. The agreement, as we know, did not last long. Imperial designs about the future Middle East put paid to Arab aspirations for independence. The Palestinian Arabs put pressure on the Hashimites, and on 8 March 1920, it was declared in Damascus that the Kingdom of Greater Syria included ”Palestine” was established. It was all short-lived, though, as the French with tacit British approval took over Syria and Lebanon, and Faysal himself was installed by the British as King of Iraq in 1921. 

While in historical retrospect, the Weitzman-Faysal meeting and agreement may be an episodic note, the fact is that it was at that early stage when the Zionists showed their desire to get as close as possible to the very center of the Arab national movement.

In 1919, the Zionists started their minority strategy when contact was established between the Zionist leader Yehoshua Hankin and Maronite leaders in Lebanon, but this was short-lived and fruitless contact. [ See Y.Porath, ”modern Lebanon; background, population, economy, ethnic composition, political status, attitude towards Israel;, in M.Gabay[ed.], Lebanon’s fight for survival, 1982, Hebrew]. In 1919, the Maronite community of Lebanon, under the charismatic Patriarch Howayek, was engaged in putting pressure on the French to establish an independent Lebanese, Christian-dominated state, and an alliance with the Zionists was not in their interest. The overall story of Zionist and then Israeli relationships with the Maronites is one of ups and downs, great expectations, and great disappointments, above all, a story of aspirations versus realities. [See Y.Olmert, Lebanon’s Christians, and Israel; The quest for Allies in a Hostile Environment, Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, October 1982, pp.4-14.]. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 and the subsequent events put it all in a proper perspective. Israel and the Maronites came out of this war very injured, very frustrated, and somewhat bitter towards each other. The Israeli mistake was to misunderstand the limitations of a small minority in detaching themselves completely from their natural, historic interland in favor of a lasting and erstwhile enemy, Israel. So, Israel’s expectations were to start with unfounded, unrealistic, wishful thinking, too much of a luxury for a state like Israel that should use its own limited resources in a more restrained and beneficial way. The outcome was the collapse of the Maronite option.

The search for minorities as allies was an ever-existing option for Zionist and Israeli leaders, especially in times of war, when it seemed that new possibilities were opened for Israeli regional initiatives. Such was the case with the idea floated after the 1967 war to establish a Druze state in South Syria. This is not the place to detail the vexed history of the Druze minority in the Middle East, in fact, in Lebanon, Syria, and Israel. Gabriel Ben Dor, Israel’s foremost Druze expert, described the history of the Druze in Eretz Israel since the Sixteenth Century. He referred to the special relationships between them and Jews, relationships which ”has been in evidence on a modest scale for centuries when Jews in the region often found refuge among the Druze when attacked by others. The relationship strengthened during the 1936-39 disturbances when Jews in danger, such as Abba Khoushi, later mayor of Haifa and then an important member of the Haganah, then found refuge among the Druse of Mount Carmel. Although there was a Druze battalion in the Arab Armies, it disintegrated after the battle at Ramat Yohananin in April 1948.  ”[G. Ben Dor, The Druze Minority in Israel in the Mid-1990s ”, in Jerusalem Letters of Lasting Interest, no.315, 1 June 1995, pp.2-3.].Druze’s loyalty in Israel to the state was and still is a significant part of their religion, history, and political experience in the country where they live. The combined effect of all that is that they are loyal to the states where they live as part of the TAQIYYA. Taqiyya in Islam is the practice of actual denial of one’s real religious beliefs in order to survive and evade religious-motivated persecution. As such, it was adopted mostly by Shi’i Muslim minorities, as well as non-Muslim minorities such as the Druze. In modern, independent Syria, the Druze,  though a small minority [3-4 % of the entire population], played an important role in both the military and politics of the country, though always defended their virtual autonomy in their mountainous region, Jabal Druze[the mountain of the Druze]. Prior to the establishment of independent Syria in 1946, there were contacts between Zionist envoys and Druze in Syria [as well as Lebanon], which did not develop into any meaningful connection. In this context, we need to mention the idea floated by Yigal Allon, a senior Israeli politician and Deputy PM during the 1967 war, which was to help create a Druze state in Jabal Druze, next to the Golan region taken by Israel in the war. Near romantic idea, but one which reflected the genuine, though wrong, unrealistic, perhaps even amateurish attitude of some Israeli politicians towards minorities in the Middle East. This abortive ‘’plan’’ [See Udi Manor, ‘’Yigal Allon’s plan to establish an independent Druze State”, In Israel Affairs, Vol.25, Issue 6, 2019, pp.1057-1064.] never had any chance of materializing. However, at the time, it attracted attention and sympathy, more from Israeli Jews, much less from the Druze themselves.

The discussion about the Druze in Syria and their potential alliance relations with Israel was aroused again during the Syrian civil war of 2011 and onwards. On occasions, when Druze villages in South Syria were under attack by the Sunni rebels, there was some pressure brought to bear on the Israeli government by Israeli Druze to intervene on behalf of the Druze. That did not happen, but for some local situations in some villages near the Syria-Israel border, where IDF issued stern warnings to Sunni rebel groups not to get close. That prevented fighting between them and local Druze militias. South Syria, where most of the Syrian Druze are concentrated, is a dangerous flashpoint, an area infested with rival forces, mostly Druze but not only. It is the region where the initial rebellion against Bashar Assad regime started in March 2011. After nine years of fighting as well as periods of relative quiet, it has again become a zone of conflict, as the Druze, while nominally loyal to the regime, actually try to reassert their dominant autonomous control. Israel should be advised to monitor closely and intervene ONLY if and when its most important security interests are in danger, for example, if pro-Iranian militias will try to gain a massive foothold there. The Druze themselves have the same interest, so there is a possible meeting of interests here, but not beyond. If the Druze want to establish a self-rule region there, which will lead to a reaction from the Assad regime, then it is another situation. Still, it has to be their decision, their resolve, which will determine the outcome of their actions. A realistic assessment of the situation indicates that they can, at most, be in control of their villages and towns, but not beyond. Dismantling Syria is a process in motion, as the Turks virtually annexed a  large section of North West Syria, the Kurds of North East Syria, but in the South, the current status quo, as precarious as it is, is better than plunging into the unknown by encouraging Druze separatism. 

Druze separatism has really been a nice idea to toy with, a fantasy, but still unrealistic,  be it for the very small numbers involved here, as well as the particulars of Druze history. Obvious disadvantages significantly cancel out the advantage of the physical proximity to Israel. 

 Another minority that played, maybe still plays a role in Israeli stratagem, are the Kurds of Iraq. This piece will not delve into Kurdish history, a fascinating subject in itself, but some general observations on the Kurds are essential

1]They are the largest ethnic minority in the Middle East-15 million in Turkey, 7 million in Iraq, 6 million in Iran, 2 million in Syria. They are a minority because though they are Sunni Muslims[a tiny Shi’i minority], they are a distinct ethnic minority, with their own language[close to Farsi, not Arabic-not a Semitic language]. 

2]They are mostly inhabiting distinct geographic areas, but there is in all these countries a large number of Kurds who live in urban areas and, in many cases, assimilated within the majority population.

3]Their division between 4 different states is a direct result of the post-ww1 boundaries imposed by the colonial Western powers, as part of the creation of artificial states such as Iraq and Syria.

4]This is still, to a large extent, a tribal society. Political divisions among them are, to a significant extent, a reflection of deep-rooted tribal enmities. A notable example-the division in Iraq between the Talabani PUK[Patriotic Union of Kurdistan] and the Barzani KDP [Kurdish Democratic Party]

5] They have had a long history of resisting the status quo, particularly in Turkey and Iraq.

In Iraq, they were in a near-constant state of rebellion throughout the entire period of Iraq’s existence from 1920 onwards.

It is Iraq, with its sizeable Kurdish minority, which has been the target of intense Israeli interest. The reasons are obvious-Iraq sent troops to fight Israel in three wars, 1948-9, 1967, and 1973, despite not having a common border with Israel. Iraq never signed any agreement with Israel, not even a cease-fire one.  Iraq built a huge army as well as a nuclear program under the regime of Saddam Hussein, who publicly declared on 2 April 1990 that he will burn half of Israel with chemical weapons. Iraq launched 42 Scad missiles against Israel in the Gulf war of 1991. In sum, Iraq was exactly the type of Arab state whose domestic ethnic problems with a large and rebellious minority offered potential fertile ground for a dynamic Israeli initiative designed to help this minority in its quest for independence. 

The relations between Israel and the Kurds of Northern Iraq have always been different than with the  Maronites and Druze due to two main differences. First, the existence of a large Jewish community in Northern Iraq and second, the fact that there is no common border between Israel and Northern Iraq. The first factor is important because the existence of a Jewish community has always created a Zionist and later an Israeli interest in its welfare, security, and connections with Israel. The lack of a common border meant that there was a need to act in Northern Iraq by using the goodwill of neighboring countries, in this case, Iran and Turkey. Hence, the relationships between Israel and these countries, with their ups and downs, played a crucial role in Israel’s ability to connect with the Kurds.

Jews from Northern Iraq immigrated to Israel already at the beginning of the 20th century and mainly settled in Jerusalem, where they established a well-known, somewhat picturesque neighborhood. Members of this community played a role in public life and in politics, and like many other communities of Jews from the Middle East [Mizrachim] were supportive [though not all of them]  of Right-Wing Herut Party[the precursor of Likud]. A famous hero of the anti-British struggle for independence,  Moshe Barzani, a member of the Irgun, became a national hero after committing suicide with a member of Lehi [the fighters for the Freedom of Israel] Meir Feinstein just before they were to be hanged by the British occupation authorities. There were also members of the community who were active in the Left Wing side of Israeli politics. After the establishment of Israel, and the deportation of Iraq’s Jews, almost the entire community left to Israel, as well as the rest of Iraq’s Jews. This community’s existence created an almost inevitable sense of sympathy in Israel towards the Kurdish people and their culture, and importantly, understanding of and support for their political aspirations. This sense was greatly fueled by the fact that the relations between Muslims and Jews in Iraqi Kurdistan were always portrayed in bright colors by the Iraqi Kurdish Jews living in Israel.

So, it was a combination of traditional links, natural empathy, and ABOVE ALL INTEREST, which drove Israel and the Iraqi Kurds into a period of cooperation, covert, of course, as of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Israel’s Mossad was in charge of both establishing and maintaining these relations, which in the 1960s were aimed at reducing, if not completely, doing away Iraq’s ability to participate in any future war with Israel. This was a period in which the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq was in full swing. Most of the Iraqi army was engaged in this fighting, so had minimal ability to be of any meaningful assistance to the Arab armies, especially Jordan and Syria, in the 1967 war. This is not to say that this was the overwhelming reason, as it is always the case, that Iraq had a tradition of using high rhetoric against Israel but not actually contributing the bulk of its military forces to this cause. Saddam sharpened the rhetoric and improved his abilities dramatically. However, he committed his army in full to other wars, against Iran in 1980-88, and then Kuwait in 1990. These Saddam wars came after an event of great significance, which for some years to come changed the very nature of the Kurdish -Iraqi struggle. In the war of 1973, again, the Iraq army was diverted almost in full to anti-Kurdish activities, so Iraq’s assistance to neighboring Syria was insignificant. These were the heydays of Mossad activities in Iraq.  A lot of it became feasible due to the cooperation between Israel and Iran under the Shah in conducting activities against the common enemy Saddam. All this was to change abruptly in 1975, when the Shah and Saddam came to an agreement putting an end[temporary, of course…] to their border conflict[The Algiers Agreement]. Iran ceased its support for the Kurds. The rebellion collapsed. Israel lost its ability to use Iranian territory to support the Kurds, and this state of affairs surely became a constant reality with the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. A change will occur after Operation ”Desert Storm” in 1991, when the Kurdish question came back to world attention, as Saddam, after the defeat to the US in the war over Kuwait, tried to take revenge against his domestic enemies, the Shi’is in the South, and the Kurds in the North. Israeli and worldwide Jewish sympathy to the Kurds was clearly on display, but there was not an actual ability to assist the Kurds. Altogether though, the Kurdish situation changed dramatically as a result of the American-Iraqi wars of 1991 and 2003. Because the Americans turned the Kurdish region of Northern Iraq into a no-fly zone for Saddam air force after 1991 and later, after 2003, the Kurds gained finally a virtual, though not formal, self-rule in the American-led post-Saddam Iraq. These developments naturally lessened the Kurdish interest in cooperation with Israel, as now they had THE  patron, which could really cater to their needs in much more effective ways than what Israel could. From an Israeli perspective, aside from the natural sympathy to the Kurds, there was actually no overwhelming strategic interest to invest in the relationships with the Kurds, because the demolition of Iraq’s military prowess after 2003 made the strategic-military side of an alliance with the Kurds irrelevant. All this seemed somewhat too optimistic and short-lived, though. The US left Iraq under President Obama, but the regional powers which traditionally have resented any sign of Kurdish self-rule, let alone independence, Iran, Turkey, and Iraq stayed, of course, and so, as of 2016, we see features of traditional Kurdish history being manifested again in a very tragic way. 

The Kurdish decision to hold a referendum in September in Iraq in 2017 about independence backfired, as the US preferred its relations with Turkey over the Kurdish allies and did not support the Kurds. In the Kurdish camp itself, the old Barzani-Talabani tribal-political differences prevented a unified Kurdish reaction to the Iraqi attack on them, which, in fact, was a semi-regional Iraqi-Iranian-Turkish operation. Also, the Syrian Kurds were later attacked by Turkey, and US under President Trump stood aside. 

One country only said whatever had to be said in support of the Kurds, and followed it with some limited action-Israel. Little could Israel actually do to support the Kurds in both Iraq and Syria. However, the words of PM Netanyahu and the modest humanitarian aid delivered by Israel to the Kurds struck a note. Kurds displayed Israeli flags in their demonstrations throughout Europe, and in Israel itself, civic organizations and public opinion at large displayed public and vocal support to the Kurds.

Let us be realistic about that; Both Israel and the Kurds may have overplayed their expectations, and in essence, their historic friendship, perhaps an alliance, had its built-in limitations, be them geographic, strategic, political. On balance, Israel gained more than the Kurds. In 1967 and 1973, the Kurds played a  role in Iraq’s inability to send troops to the Arab wars against Israel. As for the Kurds-It was American intervention, which led them to actual self-rule, not anything which Israel did.

Yet, this Israel-Kurdish connection has its deep roots in the reality of the Middle East with its turbulent bloody history of intolerance towards minorities, and Jews as well as Kurds are minorities in the Middle East.

The Kurds say that they have no friends but the mountains, whereas Israel is an island surrounded by an ocean of hostility, so it is in its vital interest to search for allies in a hostile environment. Hence, the overall search for allies among other minorities was understandable, in fact, most necessary, and it stands to logic even if the results were not as expected. 

This search led Israel to look for countries as potential allies, and this will be discussed in the second part of this trilogy.

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Dr. Josef Olmert is a Senior Fellow at the Palm Beach Center for Democracy and Policy Research and an adjunct professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina