THE ISRAEL-LEBANON AGREEMENT

December 9, 2024

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THE ISRAEL-LEBANON AGREEMENT

By Josef Olmert, PH.D.

THE FOLLOWING CONTAINS THE LAST CHAPTER OF AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED BY ME A FEW DAYS AGO ABOUT A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT AND WHAT I WROTE ABOUT THE ACTUAL AGREEMENT AFTER ITS PUBLICATION.

HOW TO END THE WAR -THE FUTURE OF LEBANON: [PUBLISHED ON 21 NOVEMBER]

Israel needs to come out of the war with Hizballah as the undisputed winner, and that should be in total contrast to the impressions created after the 2006 war. It has to be the LAST war with Lebanon, or with factions inside Lebanon. The idea, therefore, is to lead to that result, which, IF achieved, will be THE victory for Israel as well as for Lebanon.

Here is what Israel should not demand. First, no more talks about a new political order in Lebanon based on restoring some kind of Christian privilege-the days of Christian domination are past due and will never be restored. Along the same line, Israel should NOT try to intervene against the interests of the Shi’i community as such, as Shi’s are NOT the enemy. It is Hizballah, which is the enemy, serving the interests of IRAN, which are not necessarily compatible with that of ALL or even the majority of the Shi’is. That said, here are the required terms from an Israeli perspective: First-Hizballah is to be ONLY a political movement. They should be totally disarmed. The disarmament is to be performed in this way until the Litani river, 20 Km north of the border, by an international force AND the IDF, and NO IDF withdrawal from areas in Lebanon under its control until the IDF declares full satisfaction with the total disarmament of Hizballah.

In this area, from the Litani throughout the rest of Lebanon, Lebanon’s army AND international forces will seek the total disarmament of Hizballah. The international forces should NOT be comprised of troops from countries that are hostile to Israel and will not be under command and supervision of the UN General Secretary, even if for formal reasons it will be considered a UN force. The ideal is that the command will be in coordination with NATO.

Second, Israel will maintain the right to use force whenever there is an activity by ANY hostile force in Lebanon against Israeli territory and civilians. Such activities by Israel will be unnecessary IF the international forces will do what they have NOT done for so many years, and this is to prevent the creation of a monster army of terror like Hizballah was.

Third- International effective force should be stationed along the Lebanese-Syrian border, and It may be surprising to my readers, but participation of RUSSIA in this effort will be welcome, as RUSSIA is already heavily involved with the Assad regime and has an interest in its existence.

This interest is endangered by the Iranian presence and influence in both Lebanon and Syria.

Fourth, and this is about IRAN-you want an end to Iran subversive influence in Lebanon. Then make sure that the above specified conditions are fulfilled BUT ADD ANOTHER ONE-Provide Lebanon with a very generous economic aid, and in order to prevent the inevitable typical Lebanese corruption, make sure that the aid is controlled by the LEBANON INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION TRUST, run by a combination of Western states, led by the US with EU participation and MASSIVE GULF STATES CONTRIBUTIONS. This body will give the Shi’is what is their due and thus will make the Iranian investment in Lebanon unnecessary, in fact, forbidden.

So … what about the pathetic UN SC Resolution 1701, which theoretically is in force? Keep it in the UN books but ignore it. Do what has to be done, and IF the above approach, even with some changes, will be adopted, the greatest winners will be NOT only the ISRAELIS but also, and simultaneously, the LEBANESE people, who deserve to see their land of beauty and talent living in peace and prosperity.

Can that happen? Hopefully, but not certainly. Should it happen? No doubt about that, and it is not too idealistic and bombastic a vision.

POSTSCRIPT; THERE IS AN AGREEMENT -OVERALL ASSESSMENT; [PUBLISHED ON 27 NOVEMBER]

MILITARY SITUATION ON THE GROUND

This was published hours after the ceasefire was declared, and there have already been reports about some minor infringements on the Lebanese side, which were dealt with by the IDF without any serious repercussions. Before we analyze the actual agreement as published compared with what is considered THE ESSENTIAL AGREEMENT as was envisaged by me, here are the main points of the military situation on the ground on 27 November when the ceasefire came into effect. 1] IDF is in control of a large area of South Lebanon all the way to the Litani river and to the outskirts of the city of TYRE in the Western section of South Lebanon, far beyond and above the initial line of 3-5 Kms which was declared as the target of the ground operation when it started. 2] IDF destroyed 70-80 % of the firepower of Hizballah, including rockets, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones, as well as most of the sites where all this was produced. 3]Israel destroyed the Radwan Force, the so-called elite force of Hizballah which was ready to invade North Israel and repeat there what sadly Hamas was able to do in South Israel on 7 October 2023. 4] In every battle between the IDF and Hizballah forces, the Lebanese were defeated, and on many occasions the fighters of Hizballah fled and posed no actual resistance. 5] Israel achieved total aerial control over Lebanon, and all the anti-aircraft Hizballah weapons proved completely futile. 6] Israel almost completely destroyed the core of Hizballah stronghold, the Dahiyya of South Beirut. 7] Israel destroyed the bridges and roads on the Lebanese-Syrian border, through which Hizballah transferred Iranian weapons, mostly rockets and missiles, to Lebanon. 8] Israel Killed virtually the entire top level of Hizballah military leadership, particularly commanders of specific important units of the Hizballah army. 9] 4000 Hizballah fighters were killed in the ground operation, and many hundreds before it started. This is a vast loss to the terror army. 10] A million Shi’i residents of South Lebanon, the region which Hizballah swore to protect against Israeli ”aggression” fled the region, heeding the calls of the IDF to do so, and NOT Hizballah calling them NOT to. 11] Israel humiliated Hizballah long-held propaganda, for years believed by most Lebanese, not only Shi’is , that they could stand up to the alleged military might of Israel. 12] LAST BUT VERY IMPORTANT, ISRAEL KILLED THE LEADER OF HIZBALLAH, THE SELF-STYLED MODERN-DAY ABU ALI, SHEIKH HASSAN NASRALLAH.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARY SITUATION ON HIZBALLAH POSITION IN LEBANON

These are all specific undisputed facts showing that Israel achieved a decisive military victory over Hizballah. Here are political and strategic very significant by-products of the military achievements. 1] Hizballah was greatly weakened politically in Lebanon.

Leaders of all the communities in Lebanon, including Shi’i leaders, called publicly and firmly upon Hizballah to stop the military confrontation with Israel and remain only as a political and social organization. 2] Hizballah will need years, not weeks and months to rebuild itself militarily if it wants still to continue its self-styled role as the military organization which can stand up to Israel. 3] At least for a time span of many months Hizballah cannot fulfill the role assigned to it by Iran-to open an effective, formidable second front to Israel IF Israel or the US were to attack the Iran nuclear facilities. 4] AGAIN LAST BUT NOT AT ALL LEAST-Hizballah gave up on its stated demand from day one of the war to have a ceasefire in the North ONLY if there was one also in Gaza. Here is what was NOT achieved by Israel: Hizballah military power was tremendously destroyed, BUT NOT COMPLETELY. Hizballah remains a potent political and military force within the domestic Lebanese scene. With that in mind, here are the ISRAELI MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS. Israel of November 2024 is NOT Israel, as was envisaged by the Nasrallah COBWEB speech of 2000. Rather Israel proved that the scare campaign about the Hizballah ability to paralyze it and cause enormous amounts of casualties with their missiles was exactly that, a baseless campaign. There were 121 Israelis killed in the North since October 2023: 45 civilians and 76 soldiers; 121 TOO MANY-121 WORLDS, BUT NOT THE THOUSANDS THAT THE SCARE CAMPAIGN PREDICTED. Altogether, with the situation in Gaza and in South Lebanon, Israel reestablished the image of the supreme military power in the Middle East. Image and perceptions are SO important in the Middle East.

THE AGREEMENT

With all the above, the immediate sense is that Israel was on the eve of 27 November in a position enabling her to dictate the terms of a ceasefire and, in fact, to create the conditions that will make this war the LAST WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HIZBALLAH AND LEBANON. Sadly, the agreement is anything but that. Yes, the agreement reflects the achievements of the IDF on the ground, BUT ONLY TO A SMALL EXTENT. ISRAEL COULD AND SHOULD ACHIEVE MUCH MORE. THERE IS MORE LIKELIHOOD OF A FOURTH WAR, THOUGH NOT TOO SOON, RATHER THAN NOT. The main terms of the agreement are: 1]UNSC Resolution 1701 from 2006 is recognized as the basis for what would happen in South Lebanon. REALLY?-A pathetic resolution that was violated minutes after its adoption in 2006. 2] The agreement refers ONLY to the evacuation and disarming of Hizballah South of the Litani River, so it keeps the terror army intact north of it. 3] The Lebanese army and government will be the sole civilian and military power south of the Litani.

REALLY?-There is hardly any Lebanese government and army. Lebanon is without a president and is unable to elect one. 4]UNIFIL TO STAY AND PLAY A ROLE IN ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT. REALLY?-The same UNIFIL which for 18 years was completely complicit in the build-up of the Hizballah military power in South Lebanon. 5]The US will promote indirect negotiations between Israel and Lebanon regarding the final demarcation of the land border between the two countries. WHAT? There is NO problem; there are only false claims by Hizballah. This is a clear Israeli concession, and totally unnecessary and potentially dangerous. 6]There will be an international committee composed of the US and France, which will monitor and supervise all the arrangements. FRANCE? Yes, another Israeli concession as France, while withdrawing its support to the arrest warrants issued by the Hague court against Netanyahu and Gallant, still imposes an arms embargo on Israel. 7] And this is positive-IDF will not withdraw immediately from South Lebanon and will do so gradually in accordance with monitoring the planned clean-up of the South of Lebanon from Hizballah’s presence.

 

ISRAEL-US AGREEMENT

 

President Biden received a political gift 55 days ahead of his departure from the US political scene- The opportunity to issue a declaration announcing the agreement achieved with very significant American mediation. Biden declared, ”Let’s be clear: Hizballah violates the deal; Israel retains the right to defend itself. ”Israel, according to its agreement with the US, will be allowed for intelligence flights but NOT to break the sound barrier, a ridiculous condition in itself. The US will receive the Israeli complaints about alleged Hizballah violations, and its right to retaliate will NOT be automatic; that is to say, it will be subjected to American decision after consultation between the US and Lebanon. So, the US is becoming a key player in accompanying the execution of the agreement alongside France, and all this with the UNIFIL force still in place. Time now for an overall Israeli balance sheet of the agreement.

WHAT IS NOT IN THE AGREEMENT

First and foremost, complete dissolution of Hizballah militarily, only up to the Litani. No word about the role of Iran in continuing to support Hizballah militarily and financially. The reliance on the effectiveness of Lebanon’s army and government is a bad joke, in fact, a very sad joke. Unifil is both a bad and sad joke. US and French supervision may offer a potential for a big positive change compared with the aftermath of the 2006 war. However, it should be remembered that France and US political interests are not necessarily compatible with those of Israel, and NO guarantee that it would change in the case of the US even after Trump is sworn in on 20 January. Trump’s team was in the loop of the negotiations between Israel and the US leading to the agreement, and supported the Biden team efforts. Surely, the Trump administration will remove restrictions on the supply of arms to Israel and will be more conducive to Israeli interests regarding the role of the UN and possibly France, but may continue to resist the resumption of full-scale war between Israel and Hizballah. It is important that Syria is not mentioned in anything concerning the agreement, and that is opening the gate for Israel to continue its aerial campaign against targets in Syria, which are connected with the Iranian effort to transfer arms for Hizballah. But it also opens the gate for misunderstanding between Israel and Russia regarding the role of Syria. American support for Israel in that regard will be essential if Israel and Russia cannot agree between themselves, something which I will welcome if possible. WITH THAT SAID. HERE IS MY FINAL JUDGMENT ON THE AGREEMENT. ISRAEL COULD AND SHOULD ACHIEVE MORE. THIS IS THE END OF A ROUND, NOT THE LAST WAR-STRATEGICALLY A MISS OF A GREAT OPPORTUNITY TO ELIMINATE HIZBALLAH AS A THREAT. THE THREAT WAS REDUCED BUT NOT DESTROYED-IT COULD AND SHOULD HAVE -AND THE FACT IS, THAT DESPITE THE BRAGGING OF NETANYAHU, EVEN HE DOES NOT CALL UPON THE PEOPLE OF THE NORTH TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES-THIS IS THEREFORE A VICTORY IN BATTLES, NOT IN THE WAR!

 

Dr. Josef Olmert is a Senior Fellow at the Palm Beach Center for Democracy and Policy Research and an adjunct professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina

About the Author

 

Josef Olmert, Ph.D.

Josef Olmert, Ph.D.

Senior Fellow

Dr. Josef Olmert is a top Middle East scholar, former peace negotiator, much published author and journalist. He is currently an adjunct professor at the University of South Carolina.. Prior to this, he had an international academic teaching career in Israel, Canada and the United States where he taught at City University of New York, Cornell University and American University. In Israel he headed the Syria and Lebanon desks at Tel –Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies-where he served on the faculty.

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