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United States and Saudi Arabia – How Actual Interests and Morality Collide

By Josef Olmert

It was an unusual meeting on 14 February 1945, aboard the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal, between two heads of state. On the one hand, Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR), President of the USA, the unofficial leader of the free world, was on the threshold of the final victory over Nazi Germany. On the other, King Ibn Saud, the founder of the new Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a tribal, authoritarian leader, who came accompanied by his astrologists and slaves, protected by bodyguards armed with swords. FDR was on his way back from the fateful Yalta summit in Crimea, a conference attended by his partners in victory in Europe, Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill. For Ibn Saud, it was his first foray out of his desert kingdom, save for a quick visit to Basra in Iraq. For FDR, it was his first meeting with a head of state from the Middle East and his last meeting with any world leader before his passing. The meeting could have been an episodic note in the history of American diplomacy at large and that of the Middle East in particular. However, it was not. In a speech to Congress on 10 March 1945, FDR said that he had learned more about Arabs and Jews than ever before. One of the President’s aides sarcastically remarked that what the President learned was no secret: The Arabs did not want to have Jews in Palestine. 

This meeting laid the foundations for a long and stable American alliance with Saudi Arabia. It was a historic meeting. Whereas the U.S.-ISRAEL relationship is viewed by many as a long-standing alliance between both countries, the fact is that these relations began to develop only after the 1967 war. It is also a fact that despite the references to the Palestine problem [as it was called] by both FDR and the King, Palestine was not the issue that constituted FDR’s or the King’s main concern.

To be precise-both leaders were interested in the issue. FDR even sent an envoy to the Middle East. Harold B. Hoskins, a rabid anti-Zionist, a member of the American University in Beirut’s American milieu to prepare a report about Palestine, which, as expected, was pro-Arab (although not adopted as an official policy due to pro-Zionist pressures from Jewish leader). Also, the King was interested in the problem. However, the King’s main concern was to contain and defeat his Hashemite Arab rivals. Palestine was part of it, but not the main one. The real bottom line of the FDR-Ibn Saud meeting was a sort of deal where Saudi Arabia agreed to supply oil to the U.S. in exchange for an American guarantee to protect the Kingdom.  

This agreement is still valid almost 80 years later. Saudi Arabia needs the United States and vice-versa. Every American president, whether Republican or Democrat, Conservative or Liberal, maintained a strong relationship with the Saudis as a matter of national interest. Few people can forget the meeting between President Obama and King Abdallah of Saudi Arabia in 2009. It was the U.S. President who bowed to the King as a gesture of respect.

 It is not that there have never been question marks posed by American politicians, media people, and academics over Saudi Arabia’s human rights records. There were. However, when dealing with Saudi Arabia, one could have expected not occasional question marks about the Saudi record but a much more vigorous and sustained campaign of protest in this regard question. Thus, the U.S alliance with Saudi Arabia has not been about oil primarily, but it has also been closely attached to the centrality of Saudi Arabia in the world of Islam and to the fact that the Kingdom has been a model of internal stability as of its founding in 1932.  

For the Saudis, the ongoing alliance was almost always a win-win situation, as they enjoyed the defense umbrella provided to them by the American air force in Dhahran air base and the Fifth navy in the Gulf. At the same time, they maintained the control of their oil resources, indeed after the nationalization of the industry, a process which started in 1974, when the Saudi Government increased its stake in ARAMCO to 60%, and six years later, when they took full control of the company. Unlike the case of IRAN in 1953, under the Leftist government of Mossadegh, when the American and British intelligence services toppled the government to prevent its nationalization of the oil industry, there was no need to do it in Saudi Arabia, where the nationalization was not a hostile takeover. The Saudis were not considered troublemakers, as was Mossadegh, which reflected good relations with the U.S. The fact is, however, that the Saudis did use the oil weapon against the U.S. in 1974 after the Yom Kippur War and participated in the oil embargo on the U.S., which was a major drag on the American economy for some time. Was that an indication that the Palestine problem was so important to the Saudis? The answer is that it was the exception, not the rule. Saudi Arabia did not cut off relations with the U.S. following the 1967 war, nor did it cause any crisis after the 1978-79 Egyptian-Israeli peace accords achieved with American mediation and active support. While the Saudis may not have been pleased with the Camp David Accords, they did not view it as a reason for a crisis with the U.S. The same logic applied in the aftermath of the Israeli war in Lebanon in 1982. The Saudis, it can be argued, preferred to maintain a good relationship with the U.S. rather than showing solidarity with the Palestinians. They were not risk-free in all that, as they were vulnerable to both external and internal pressures. In the 1950s and 1960s, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser called the Saudis ”puppets” of Western imperialism, and later, Saddam Hussein echoed Nasser’s accusations against the Saudis when the latter sided with the U.S against Iraq during ”Desert Storm”. Then, it was also clear that the massive American intervention was as much designed to liberate Kuwait as it was aimed at preventing the same from happening to Saudi Arabia itself. 

Saudi Arabia also faced the domestic Islamist opposition who complained against the Saudi alliance with the U.S. military presence in the kingdom. They showed their muscle with the attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, and later in the 1990s and onwards with the rise of Al Qaida, led by Osama Bin Laden, a prominent Saudi family member. The American-Saudi relation also risked a major crisis when it became known that the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were mainly Saudis. However, the alliance survived. Common interests prevailed, proving superior to common values that never existed.

IRAN and U.S POLICY 

The near-ideal picture presented here starts to show cracks later, mainly because of U.S. policy towards Iran and the events of the Arab Spring, mainly the Arab spring. The overall question of Iran’s policy in the Middle East is out of the scope of this piece. Still, the Saudis have regarded Iran as an existential threat from the time the Ayatollahs took over the reins of government in Tehran. For them, the new Iran constituted a threat to their very legitimacy, questioning the Islamic credentials of the Kingdom, which prided itself on being the center of the Sunni Muslim world. American readers being educated on the concept of separation between Church and State find it difficult to comprehend, but in the Middle East, the role of religion is overwhelming not just as a framework for core beliefs but also as a political force. For the Saudi Wahhabis, the emergence of Shi’i Islam in its aggressive form constituted a threat. The Saudis felt they needed more security assurances and protection than the alliance with the U.S offered. However, President Obama took steps that caused alarm in Saudi Arabia. Obama supported the Egyptian protest against President Mubarak and put pressure on the Egyptian generals to dismiss him and then hold free democratic elections, eventually bringing the Muslim Brotherhood and Muhammad Morsi to power in Cairo. For the Saudis, this was a breach of faith. The Saudis interpreted these actions as an American betrayal of his ally Mubarak and feared they could be next. President Obama started to lose points in the kingdom and more so after the debacle of the Red Lines about Syria, when the American president failed to act after Syria’s Bashar Assad used chemical weapons against the Sunni rebels, the Saudi allies in Syria. On top of all that, the U.S signed a nuclear deal with Iran in 2015 consideration. For the Saudis, the Obama drive to achieve a nuclear deal with Iran seemed an obsession and a very negative one. The Saudis were deeply offended by the fact that after more than seventy years of a U.S-Saudi alliance, an American president prefers to appease the haters of America at the expense of friends and allies. The Saudis viewed the Iran deal as a political and strategic gift to Iran, a choice of Shi’is over Sunnis, and an act of disloyalty. So, Barack Obama, who started his presidency with the infamous bowing to the Saudis, ended it with what they considered as the infamous surrender to the Iranians, to the Shi’is. Thus, the Saudis began to review their overall regional standing and policies, as well as their relations with the U.S. 

THE RISE OF MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN-MBS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 

In the last few years, Saudi Arabia has been effectively ruled by Crown prince Muhammad Bin Salman [MBS]. MBS embarked on a campaign of reforms almost instantly made him a favorite guest in the Western media, which was based on a gross misunderstanding of the meaning of reforms in an Islamic, Middle Eastern context. Like with the Young Turks of the late 19th Century, and more recently Bashar Assad of Syria there exists in the West a sense that just by having exposure to the West and using words like reform, Middle East rulers become like ”us”. The Jury is still out about MBS and the overall assessment of his reforms [see Daniel Brumberg, ”MBS’s new vision 2020; Reform and Repression”, Middle East, 7 May 2020]. However, his reforms are intended to turn the kingdom from being totally dependent on oil into a country with a much more diversified economy. SECOND, his enmity towards Iran is implacable. As part of this policy, MBS stepped far ahead of his predecessors and decided to adopt the old diplomatic dictum of the ”enemy of my enemy” is my friend-He discovered the wheel… namely Israel. MBS has a few good reasons to contemplate a change of attitude towards Israel, and IRAN is clearly the most important among them, but not the only one. There is fatigue in Saudi Arabia with the Palestinians, as it exists in other Arab countries. MBS wants economic and technological changes in his kingdom, and ISRAEL seems suitable to meet some of his expectations. Saudi newspapers both in the kingdom and those abroad publish regular interviews with Israeli officials, and at least one Saudi website Aleph is used regularly by Israeli officials as a channel for leaks which serves the goals of Israel’s defense and intelligence community. Flights to and from Israel are permitted over the Saudi air space, and countries like Bahrain and UAE making peace with Israel could only happen with Saudi blessing. That said, the impression is that MBS keeps the Israeli option open for various reasons, but he will not refrain from moving ahead with it due to the importance of the Palestinian issue. The Palestinian issue is not abandoned by the Saudis. However, Ali Shihabi, a Saudi banker known to be one of e of the closest to MBS, recently published an article calling upon the Palestinians to accept Israel and secure citizenship in Jordan, no more and no less. A coincidence? I, for one, do not think so. [Israel Hayom, 19 June 2022.] Third, MBS wants reforms but keep the level of repression. Shi’i agitators and some Sunnis are routinely being hanged. Sunni religious leaders who do not toe the line are silenced, and sometimes as brutally. Members of the Saud clan charged with corruption were forced to return more than $100 billion (Middle East Monitor, 24 November 2017]. On top of all that, the Saudis had the Khashoggi affair. That crime showed that democratic reforms are not part of MBS’ vision. The Khashoggi Affair also triggered the current tension with the US. On 2 OCTOBER 2018, Saudi agents sent by MBS murdered, mutilated, and his body dismembered on the premises of their own Consulate in ISTANBUL. Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi opposition columnist of the Washington Post, a resident of the U.S., though not an American citizen. It was an act of an arrogant and self-confident young man who overestimated his power. Such an act also indicated MBS’ lack of understanding of the international reality, especially the U.S.’ concern with human rights. This was the Trump era, and MBS may have thought that with a President who referred to Abdel Al Fattah Al Sisi of Egypt as ‘’my favorite dictator’’ [WSJ, 13 SEPTEMBER 2019] could also tolerate murder of this type. However, this impunity changed after Trump’s defeat. 

BIDEN AND MBS 

Joseph Biden did not mince his words about MBS before becoming president. On the campaign trail, Biden vowed that the U.S. would finally teach dictators a lesson by punishing Saudi Arabia. ’We were going to, in fact, make them pay the price and make them, in fact, the Pariah that they are’’. [Jonathan Guyer, VOX, Biden promised a harder line on Saudi Arabia. Why can’t he deliver?’’. January 23, 2022]. All this Biden rhetoric reflected a change of priorities. Diplomacy, dialogue, and a keen respect for human rights are to be the order of the day, with no travel bans, war on terror, or belligerent language. This was the new rhetoric enveloped with the high words about American values and American exceptionalism. MBS may have had by then good reasons for concern. But soon, it became clear that there are also other American values, such as low gas prices and the needs of the arms industry. Saudi Arabia is the supply of only 5 % of U.S. consumption [Oil Imports and exports-( U.S. Energy Information Administration-EIA, 21 APRIL 2022]. However, Saudi Arabia has a very influential position at OPEC and altogether continues to wield a significant role in the global oil market, thus affecting gas prices in the U.S. Already in late September 2021, as gas prices started to rise in the U.S., President Biden sent his national security advisor, Jake Sullivan to talk with MBS. The ”pariah” it seems, was not, after all, such a ‘’pariah’ ’Then there is the question of arms sales. The Obama administration sold 118 bn$ U.S. worth of arms to the Saudis. Trump only 25 bn$, and Biden wants to sell more arms to the Saudis, in order, for example, to strengthen their self-confidence in the face of Iran, but also to enable them to pursue the war against Iran’s proxies, the Houthis, in Yemen. [VOX, IBID]. This is the same Biden administration that took the Houthis off the terror list of the State Department [U.S. Department of State’ ’Revocation of the Terrorist Designations of Ansar Allah”, 12 February 2021], in what can be considered a confused and inconsistent policy. So, the Biden administration started its term in what can be defined as a crusade against Saudi human rights violations, a self-righteous campaign. Less than two years later, and before the war in Ukraine, the U.S. returned to what can be termed as ”back to basics” approach towards Saudi Arabia, suggesting to MBS that he should face no consequences for his behavior. And then came the Ukraine crisis and with it the dramatic rise of oil prices in the U.S., the rampant, unprecedented inflation, and the great crisis of the Biden administration, and with it, the return of Saudi Arabia, the reemergence of MBS, the application out of no choice of the politics of realism. Saudi Arabia is an important ally of the U.S., and as once was said by Winston Churchill, in diplomacy, timing is fifty percent of everything. Before we deal with this current stage of the relationship, it is worth dwelling on the question of sincerity and consistency in foreign policy. It is the place to raise a simple question. Was Biden’s initial sanctimonious rage against Saudi Arabia and MBS a real, sincere expression of morality, or was he not jumping on the Progressive bandwagon because he believed that the U.S. no longer depends on Saudi oil, so going against her posed no risk to U.S. foreign policy? I have my very deep suspicion that the latter is the key to understanding the initial Biden policy and the current attempt to woo back the Saudis. Talk about morality exists, but talk is cheap, and in Arabic, they say Mafish Gumrak [no tax on words]. Biden is simply returning to where it all started with Saudi Arabia during this meeting aboard the USS Quincy on 14 February 1945 [See above]. It is oil. It is the defense of Saudi Arabia. It is not the Palestinian issue. By defense, I refer to the elephant in the room, to Iran the Biden administration is bent, as it states repeatedly, on concluding a new nuclear deal with Iran, and they know full well the extent of both Saudi and Israeli opposition to such a new deal, which may be no more than a cosmetic change to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Saudi Arabia’s concerns need to be calmed down, and so is the case with Israel, and the need for the Biden administration to do that rests on two premises; one, that American assurances and guarantees to both countries will be sufficient to prevent them, mainly Israel, from acting independently against the Iranian nuclear project, something which could lead to a general eruption of violence in the Middle East. Secondly, by dealing with both Saudi Arabia and Israel, the administration believes that it serves the interests of both countries in a way that will be enough for them to accept a deal with Iran if a deal like this is at all possible. For Israel, there is the lure of having formal, open relations with Saudi Arabia, something which will be a game-changer so far as Israel’s position in the Middle East is concerned. For Saudi Arabia, the lure may be in having Israel interested in participating in the overall defense of Saudi Arabia, especially as the Saudis cast doubt on the American commitment to guarantee their country’s security. However, the Saudis have an oil card. Biden will be visiting Israel and Saudi Arabia in mid-July, and the main issue with the Saudi monarchy will be oil supply, not just Iran and defense. However, the question remains, Does the Saudi leadership trust Biden? Will the Saudis push for a restoration of the old Roosevelt-Ibn Saud formula of oil for defense and forget about human rights? Will the Saudis be willing to normalize Saudis to normalize relations with Israel? Clearly, Biden may like to see it happening, as it may help him explain the volte-face about Saudi Arabia to those in his own party and in the Republican side who care for Israel’s security. 

Biden’s visit could determine a great deal about the future of the Middle East, the question of Iran, and the specific future of the U.S.-Saudi alliance.

Dr. Josef Olmert is a Senior Fellow at the Palm Beach Center for Democracy and Policy Research and an adjunct professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina