SYRIA AND ISRAEL-PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE IS PEACE IN THE OFFING?

By Josef Olmert

There is never a dull moment in Middle East politics, but the following is arguably beyond the pale.  It has to do with a growing number of reports from various sources, Western, Arab, and Israeli, about peace signals and feelers sent by Syria to Israel. Also, the issue has become part of the troubling dialogue between the Biden administration and Israel, with mounting reports that the former reversing Trump’s policy about recognizing the Golan Heights as an Israeli sovereign territory. In a time, when the word peace is no more HARAM [in Arabic- forbidden], there should be no much surprise about this information concerning Syria, but in reality, it is a story that should lead to a more careful scrutiny, and this is because of what Syria has always stood for in the context of the Arab -Israeli conflict. It is, in particular, a topic of great interest to me personally, as I am a veteran of talks with Syria in the Madrid Peace Conference in November 1991, subsequent talks in Washington DC until April 1992, and one round of secret talks in OSLO[no, not OSLO with the Palestinians …] in October 1993.

That said, now is the time to describe and analyze the question of Syria’s relations with Israel in an effort to put the current discussion about these reported Syrian overtures towards Israel in its proper context.

SYRIAN POSITIONS ABOUT THEIR CENTRALITY IN THE CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL

Syria has always had a special place in the Arab front against Israel, surely claiming to itself such a place. This is the Arab country priding itself of being ”Kalb Ul Uruba”[The heart of Arabism], the birthplace of the Arab National Movement in the late 19th Century, and in the 20th Century the home ground of regional ideologies, both Pan-Arabism the Ba’th party style and Pan-Syrianism of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party [SSNP] of Antun Sa’ada. Both parties included Palestine from both banks of the Jordan River as part of what should be Syria. This concept has to be understood in the context of the centuries of Ottoman control, in which the Province of Damascus included the present-day state of Syria, most of present-day Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank/Judea and Samaria. During most of this time, Jerusalem was subjected to Damascus, another indication that the centrality of Jerusalem nowadays in the Palestinian /Muslim campaign against Israel is a modern argument adapted to the political needs of this conflict, not anything which reflects historical reality.

However, so far as Syria was concerned, the inclusion of ”Palestine” as they understood it to be was intended to give them a leading role in the anti-Israel Arab front, even to place them as those who care more for the Palestinians than the Palestinians themselves. In order to validate the point, successive Syrian regimes mentioned that in 1920, the Palestinians included themselves in the Syrian Kingdom proclaimed by the Hashemites, which never was established as the French nipped it in the bud in the Maysalun battle in 24 July 1920. In 1935, it was the Syrian sheikh Az Al Din Qassam who led a Jihad to ”liberate Palestine”[The man which the Hamas military wing is called after], and later in the war of 1947-9 leading to the establishment of Israel, the Syrian -Lebanese Fawzi Al Qawkji commanded the so-called ”Arab Liberation Army” invading Israel alongside the regular Arab armies. Later on, the Syrian Ba’th party established its own Palestinian terror organization Al Sa’iqa, which was commanded by the regime in Damascus, not by the PLO, and in 8 March 1974, Hafiz Al Assad gave a famous speech in which he referred to ”Palestine” as Southern Syria. Even the OSLO accords of 1993 between Israel and the PLO were rejected by Syria, claiming to be the best representative of the Palestinian cause. So, here it is about Syria as the champion of the Palestine issue, the purest and most authentic representative of the Arab national movement.

SYRIA ENTERS INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL-TALKS AND THEIR FAILURES;

After the first US-IRAQ war, known as ‘’Desert Storm’’ in January-February 1991, Syria agreed to enter peace negotiations with Israel. Hafiz Assad acceptance to do so constituted a departure from traditional Syrian positions on two accounts. First, the unconditional agreement to the principle of direct negotiations, without any timetable attached, seemed an acquiescence to Israel’s long-held insistence on face-to-face talks. Second, the demand for a complete Israeli withdrawal as a PRE-CONDITION for any talks became instead an uncompromising negotiating position DURING the talks themselves. As was customary in Syria, such a change had to get a Ba’ath ideological certificate, and Hafiz al Assad provided it as follows; ’in the second part of the Eighties, the feature of the qualitative world that emerged in the aftermath of [WW1-J.O]…seemed of little significance, in terms of the repercussions on the  Arab homeland, when compared to the far-reaching upcoming changes. Instead of making progress, we found ourselves continually retreating”.[al-Azm,s.j 15 June 2000, The view from Damascus, New York Review of books]. The Madrid and subsequent Washington talks did not produce any breakthrough. The only actual, positive outcome was Assad’s decision to finally allow, in April 1992, the hitherto oppressed Jewish community of Syria to leave the country to the United States. Still, while this step could be taken to be a Confidence Building Measure[CBM], both sides did not view it as such and remained locked in their fortified early positions on the territorial issue. NO concessions whatsoever on the part of Israel, ALL the concessions on the part of Syria. The importance of the talks though was their very existence, as it in itself broke the Syrian taboo on any contact with Israel. In the overall context of the conflict, it was not something to be dismissed as of no significance.

The fact is, that since 1992 when Labor led by the Late Rabin came to power until 2009, with the departure of then PM Ehud Olmert talks between Israel and Syria were taking place on occasions, still without the desired peace or normalization treaty, but still an indication, that with the breaking of the ice in Madrid, what was inconceivable until then, became part of the political landscape of the Middle East. Rabin held talks in 1993-4, even the First Netanyahu government in 1998, later the Ehud Barak government, and finally the Olmert government in 2008-9.[SEE MUCH MORE ON ALL THAT IN MY PREVIOUS MONOGRAPH AND ARTICLES ON THE SUBJECT, Y. Olmert, Toward a Syrian-Israeli Peace Agreement; Perspective of a Former Negotiator, The Washington Institute, April 1994, Israel-Syria; The Elusive Peace, Domes, Digest of Middle East Studies, Vol.20, no.2, Fall 2011, pp.202-211, Israel and Alawite Syria; The Odd Couple of the Middle East? The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, vol.7, no.1,2013, pp.17-25].

 It is important to note, though, that as of the days of the Rabin government till the Olmert government, 4 successive Israeli governments representing 3 different political parties, of Labor, Likud, and Kadima, were engaged in talks with Syria whose very basis was the idea of Land for Peace, and to be more specific, All the Land for peace. This was in sharp contrast to the talks during the Shamir government in 1991-2. Also, the US administrations were involved, and still the outcome was a resounding failure. There was no agreement with Syria of the Assads. WHY? And WHY the change in Israeli position after 1992?

There have been some reasons explaining the near-obsessive Israeli desire to achieve an agreement with Syria. To start with, the belief that Syria was the key to the rest of the Arab world, even though it was not. Syria of Assad created that impression, but in many respects it was founded on a fallacy-Syria ruled by a minority non-Sunni sect, the Alawites, could not fulfill this role. Israelis fell into the trap of believing otherwise, among other reasons, because of the fact that even in Israel, which claims to understand better the Arab world than the rest of the West does, there was not enough attention given to the role of sectarianism in Middle East politics, especially in Syria,  a subject which we shall return to later in this piece. Second, the Syrian army was considered a serious threat to Israel. Still, the reality was that with Egypt out of the conflict and  Saddam engaged in his conflict with the US. Syria was the only remaining credible threat- to take it out of the conflict may have seemed a logical consideration, but again a wrong one. Syria was NOT a credible threat standing all by itself against Israel, and the first one to acknowledge it was no other than Hafiz Assad himself, who developed the concept of Strategic Parity with Israel as an alternative to the crumbling alliance he had with Egypt and his near perennial crisis with Saddam. There was much talk about the new concept, but towards the end of the 1980’s even the regime realized that talks were cheap, reality was much more complicated. Syria was not a match to Israel standing all by itself.

Thirdly, there was a hope that an agreement with Syria will force the Palestinians to be more flexible in negotiating with Israel, as then they will remain isolated in the Arab world. Still, here again, a logical assumption proved unrealistic because the Palestinian intransigence reflected inner Palestinian structural issues and weaknesses. Syria could not overcome them even if it wished to do so. Fourth, there was the sense that Syria was the key to solving the Lebanese crisis, both domestically in Lebanon itself and with regard to Hizballah activities against Israel. Here the Israelis were deluding themselves because the 1980s and 1990s were the years of the Israeli predicament in  Lebanon, the quagmire developing after the initial Israeli successes in the early stages of the Lebanese war in 1982. If at all, the Syrian interest was to increase Israel’s troubles, rather than to decrease them, and after 2000, with Israel pulling completely out of Lebanon, it was already a new game in town, with the new actor IRAN   prominently becoming a factor affecting both Syrian and Israeli policies. 

Here is another reason, maybe a crucial one, for the desire to achieve agreement with Assad, this time Bashar. It was the hope that the bribe of the Golan given back to Syrian control would lead Assad to push the Iranians out of their growingly dominant position in Lebanon through their influence on Hizballah. This was THE most effective incentive to Assad. Can he refuse to get the Golan back? Isn’t it what he and the entire Syrian people really want to achieve? Well, this proved wrong again, and that brings us back to sectarianism, domestic Syrian politics, and the fundamental question of the political legitimacy of the Assad regime. The full range of SYRIA-IRAN relations is out of the scope of this piece, but it is important to briefly mention the basis for them in order to get the true picture concerning IRAN’s role. According to the Iranian scholar Ramazani, ’’both the challenge of revolutionary Iran and the response of other Middle Eastern states to Iran’s challenge are multinational”[See MY article, in D.Menashri[ed.], The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World, Boulder, 1990, pp.171-189.].This general observation is particularly true in the case of the IRANIAN-SYRIAN relations. These two are the strange bedfellows of Middle Eastern politics, as Iran is the bearer of the supernational Islamic revolution, while Syria is the bearer of Pan-Arabism.

Nonetheless, Iran and Syria have found enough common ground with regard to a host of regional issues and maintained their alliance for 40 years, not a small feat in the chronically unstable Middle East. A well-known Syrian expert and a supporter of the Assad regime, Josh Landis, told National Public Radio in 2007; ”Beyond Iraq, Syria and Iran also found common cause in Lebanon …nor were the ostensible sectarian differences between IRAN and SYRIA any bar to better relations, either, since the Assad regime is hardly less suspicious of Sunnis than in Tehran’ ’Then came the Syrian civil war as of March 2011 and bore out Landis’ words of wisdom, as Iran became one of the main backers of the beleaguered Assad regime. So, internal consideration coupled with sectarianism led to the  Assad choice-NO to  Golan from Israel, BUT YES TO IRAN’S SUPPORT.

With all that in mind, let us sum up the Israeli attitude after 1992 as one based on an array of strategic interests, despite the fact that all PMs involved paid lip service to the concept that Israel had a right to control the GOLAN, and all never rejected the logic which led PM Menachem Begin to extend Israeli Law over the GOLAN in 1992. PM Shamir, however, did cling to his ideological commitment about the GOLAN, and a significant reason for that was his belief that in the conflict with Syria time was on the side of Israel, let alone historic rights and security concerns.[He said it to me in so many words whenever we discussed the GOLAN during the first talks between the two countries-J.O].

ISRAELI PUBLIC REACTIONS TO PEACE WITH SYRIA

While it is irrelevant, for obvious reasons, to refer to public opinion in Syria, a country where the President was regularly ”elected” by 99.97% of the people, things are different with regard to Israel. This is a fully democratic state, and public opinion is of paramount importance, so it is significant to note that since 1967 ANY Israeli government has been under public pressure to make peace with Syria based on returning the GOLAN HEIGHTS to Syria. The Israeli Left Wing is nearly exclusively preoccupied with the Palestinian issue, which is their rallying cry. Moreover, some significant elements of the Left Wing doves, particularly in the Kibbutz and Moshav movements, are opposed to territorial concessions in the GOLAN because many of the Jewish residents there are Labor party supporters, surely have been for many years. Needless to say that Likud and other Right Wing parties are averse to any notion of withdrawal from there, and IF Netanyahu, for example, would have presented a withdrawal plan as was secretly discussed between him and the Syrians In 1998, his supporters would have revolted against him. On top of all that, Syria consistently refused to heed the advice of Americans and other mediators to engage in CBMs towards Israel, something which, IF happened, could have softened Israeli public opinion. Sadat of Egypt understood it, but both Assads of Syria never did. So, with no real popular pressure in Israel on governments to give land away in the GOLAN, the various rounds of negotiations between Israel and Syria stood little chance of success, as alongside the lack of  Israeli public enthusiasm,  there was the traditional Syrian intransigence and aggression. 

THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR-A GAME CHANGER?

This is not a piece on the Syrian civil war, not on its origins and course, an important subject in itself, which I have dealt with in so many other forums, articles, interviews, etc. But there must be a brief, condensed reference to two subjects-first, Israel’s policy towards the conflict and second-the results of the war as viewed at the time of writing and publishing this piece.

With regard to the Syrian civil war, the Israeli perspective of the situation unfolding there since 2011 should be seen in the context of the following considerations. First, the Assads maintained a very quiet and peaceful border with Israel as of the end of the 1973 Yom Kippur war. That happened despite the aggressive Syrian rhetoric and ideological commitment against Israel, as described above.  Being a minority rule over a Sunni majority, the regime was always aware of the danger of complete collapse as a result of a war with Israel, especially after Egypt’s defection from the active Arab front. While the regime feared the possibility of a Sunni backlash IF signing a peace agreement with Israel, it also feared a backlash IF defeated in a war against Israel in such a way that could jeopardize the very existence of the Alawite community. There was also another consideration connected with what  I can refer to as the ”LEBANON SYNDROME”, or the Israeli fear of interfering in another Arab civil war, a fear-based on the bitter legacy of the involvement in the Lebanese civil war and the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, known as ”Operation Peace For Galilee”. This fear was common for Left-Wing as well as Right-Wing Likud supporters, as the former traditionally resented what they considered to be Israeli aggression against Arab neighbors, whereas the latter had no ideological commitment of any kind to justify any such intervention. If at all, the atrocious nature of the Syrian civil war was used by Right-Wingers mainly as an argument in the ideological warfare with the Left Wing over the Palestinian question, by arguing along the lines of  ”you see how terrible they treat each other, imagine what will they do to us IF being able to defeat Israel”. The end of stability in Syria was another factor in Israeli policy. As I showed in an article on Hafiz  Assad, stable Syria was the ”devil we know”, a predictable actor in Middle East politics after 1973,  as opposed to unstable Syria, which was the main reason leading to the 1967 war.[SEE MY ”Domestic Crisis and Foreign Policy in Syria; The Assad Regime’’, Middle East Review, 20, pp.17-25].

Contrary to early assessments by Israeli politicians and policymakers, the Assad regime did not fall as quickly as predicted and led to a reserved Israeli attitude towards the conflict. Former PM Ehud Barak, for example, predicted in early 2012 that Assad would be toppled within weeks[JP, 2 January 2012]. When this did not happen, and the war became a regional, if not even an international conflict, with the intervention of so many actors, especially Iran, Russia, and the US, it added another dimension to the overall Israeli policy of reserve and moderation. The need for that was the inevitable consequence of the existence of so many outside actors in the Syrian arena, as it necessitated taking into account Israel’s relations with two important powers, the US and Russia, particularly the latter in this case since  Russia intensified its involvement in support of Bashar Assad as of 2015. On the other hand, there was the increasing Iranian involvement, so the choice for Israel as to which actor was the most dangerous was very clear-cut. It was  Iran with its attempts to extend its influence in the Middle East towards Syria, alongside its influential position in Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon trying to create the much-talked and feared Shi’i crescent, while continuing its nuclear program.  The Israeli strategic decision has been to stop Iran’s attempts to turn Syria into a basis of aggression against Israel but by using force in a way that will NOT lead to a regional conflict. Also, to do it and in coordination with and consent of the US AND RUSSIA. This is the policy of war in low profile, based mostly on aerial activity against Iranian targets, particularly the sites where they stored and constructed missiles that could be targeted at sensitive Israeli strategic locations. 

After 5 years of ongoing relentless Israeli activity, the jury is still out about its success in achieving the stated goal of reducing the Iranian danger, let alone eliminating it altogether.

Iran is still firmly committed to the policy of supporting the Assad regime and consolidating its presence in Syria. In fact, if at all, the Iranian policy may have received a major boost with the recent election of the notorious Jihadist, hard-liner Ebrahim Raisi as the new President of the Islamic Republic. Some points are relevant here as we continue to refer to a balanced assessment of the situation with regard to Iran’s presence in Syria and Israel’s response to it.

First, it is important to state that the Iranian regime has proved its determination to stay in Syria and invest heavily in material resources and economic cost despite all the pressures from the outside [Israel in particular] and the inside[OUT OF GAZA -LEBANON-SYRIA -A COMMON SLOGAN IN ANTI REGIME PROTESTS]. Moreover, contrary to the expectations of the Obama Administration as well as other Western countries, the regime did not use unfrozen funds/assets after the signing of the Iran nuclear deal in 2015 in order to alleviate economic misery in Iran, rather to increase investment in the aggressive Middle East regional policy. It has to be taken for granted, therefore, that Iran is ready to go to extremes in order to maintain and protect its investment in Syria. Qassem Suleimani was considered the architect of the policy, but in truth, he was the executioner, whereas the policy itself is an inevitable product of the ideology and modus operandi of the regime. Second, the Iranian presence in Syria, being based on strong Shi’i Muslim commitment and legacy, is deeply resented by many Syrians, Sunni Muslims in particular, but not only. Also, many Alawites resent it and view it as a foreign, colonial Persian domination of Syria, as well as an expression of Shi’ism, and we need to understand-THE ALAWITES ARE NOT SHI’IS.

Third, the growing Iranian influence turned the tables in regard to the relations between Syria and Lebanon. Traditionally, Syria was the ‘’big brother’’ of Lebanon, the outside power interfering in Lebanese affairs with a pretension to be in overall actual charge, if not even a formal one if possible. Hizballah, being an Iranian stooge, is a proponent of the Assad regime these days, a source of humiliation to many Syrians, including Alawites. Fourth, the Iranian presence has caused a split in the ranks of the regime itself, even within the Assad clan. Maher Assad, Bashar’s brother and commander of the Fourth armored division of the Syrian army, a unit considered the elite force of what is left of Assad army, is very close to the Iranians, while Bashar takes a distance, in line with other senior commanders of the army. Fifth, there are many reports to the effect that there is a growing rift between Russia and Iran regarding the increasing Iranian role in Syria-Russia clearly does not want to give Iran too much of a role in Syria, as its own investment in Syria is in danger IF the Iranians will finally become the chief power behind the Assad regime.

The Russian factor is very significant- with all the reserves which we need to maintain, it is NOT presumptuous to state that in actual terms, RUSSIA CONNIVES WITH THE ISRAELI EFFORT TO PUSH THE IRANIANS OUT OF SYRIA. This is a major success of Israel’s efforts in Syria-the high level of active, though tacit cooperation between the IDF and the Russian army in Syria. There is a joint coordination room for the two air forces, and many aerial Israeli attacks occur just miles away from the Russian air base in Khameimim. During the Trump years, there was no problem for Israel with the US, as the Americans gave an actual carte blanche to the Israeli activity. It remains to be seen how the Biden administration will relate to this activity.

Yet, despite all the above, Iranians are still deeply entrenched in Syria, and the consistent Israeli effort to evict them has NOT succeeded. It has exacted a heavy price from them, it slowed it down, it exposed major intelligence successes by Israel, and did not lead to a full-scale conflict with the Iranians, including also with  Hizballah in Lebanon. All these are achievements for Israel, but NOT full success. Iran is still there, and the question of whether aerial activity alone is enough to bring about their complete withdrawal remains open. As of now, it failed to achieve the ultimate goal. Can it be achieved IF there is to be a change of relations between the Assad regime and Israel? We shall turn to this question after reviewing 

the position of this regime in Syria 10 years after the outburst of the war there.

DID BASHAR ASSAD REGIME WIN THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR?

When we consider this question, we have to bear in mind that fundamental misunderstandings about Syria, its society, demographic composition, and cultural and political history led so many real and presumed experts to grant Bashar Assad the certificate of a reformer, nation-builder, and stable ruler. The same mistaken assumptions lead many such people to conclude that the Syrian conflict is over and Bashar Assad came out victorious. Wrong. Still too early to come to that conclusion. Yes, Bashar Assad is still the nominal ruler of Syria. He is hardly seen in public, and when he does, the events are well-orchestrated. Damascus, the capital, is indeed firmly under his grip, and the pockets of rebels’ resistance, while there, are not capable of large-scale organized fighting, though capable of terror attacks. Same goes for other large cities like Hamah and Homs, large parts of Aleppo, the second-largest city, and, of course, the Alawite enclave in northwest Syria. But the Alawites, the main pillar of support for the regime, have suffered enormously during the conflict, not less than a demographic disaster, with over 100,000 men, mostly young killed, and many others injured, and all this among 3 million people altogether. The Syrian army, mostly based on Alawites, has accordingly also decimated and can hardly be considered a viable fighting force, though still capable of dealing with sporadic rebel activity. However, even the rural areas outside of the big cities, including Damascus, are NOT under effective Assad control, and so is the case with the IDLIB province in the North-West which is under actual Turkish control, most of the Kurdish North-East which is having a large measure of effective home-rule and large parts of the South which are under effective control of local forces, mainly Druze. Even in Assad-dominated areas, the Russians, Iranians directly and indirectly through Hizballah are in control, and not the Assad troops, and in the North-East, there is American presence. In many regions of Syria, ISIS claims responsibility to anti-regime operations, and the news about its extinction in Syria has therefore proved to be premature. Add up to this the tremendous physical devastation, the ruined economy,  the huge number of casualties, estimated to be close to half a million, and the refugee crisis, both the millions displaced inside Syria and the millions out, and then we can more realistically relate to Assad’s ”win”. Here is the Syria of Hafiz Assad, ”the heart of Arabism”, the proud claimant to Arab leadership, and here is Syria of Bashar Assad, the playground of regional and international powers. So, we are dealing here with a failing state, a non-state state. Relating to ”win” under these circumstances is a matter of definition of what a win is. Assad is in the palace [or in the bunker underneath], but Syria is in the abyss. Ironically speaking, here is one ‘’win” to Assad-the change in the demographic balance in Syria. Many less Sunnis, who constitute the vast majority of the refugees, henceforth share the Alawites [despite their losses] and other minorities is now much larger. Twenty-two million people were living there before 2011, maybe only 15 million now, so the non-Sunni minorities are over 30% percent now compared to less than 20% before. With that in mind, let us now examine the question of a possible Syrian-Israeli rapprochement.

SYRIAN-ISRAELI RAPPROCHEMENT? AGREEMENT?

Let us start with what I consider to be the obvious-It IS always the interest of Israel to be engaged in negotiations with possible Arab partners designed to bring peace, stability, and prosperity to both Jews and Arabs. That, for me, goes without saying, and in this context, I view the possibility of a normalization /peace agreement between Israel and Syria. The examination of this question is based on a sober, realistic evaluation of the interests and implications involved, not on the basis of emotions and propagandistic arguments. On the basis of that, it is my judgment that an agreement of this kind is currently impossible, and this is regrettable, and IF one can be achieved in the near or foreseeable future, it is is bound to be very limited in scope and based on the formula of normalization/peace in return for normalization/peace, NOT on the formula of Peace for Land. First and foremost, there has to be a functioning, effective government in Syria. There is not one currently, and there will not be one so long as large sections of Syrian territory are under foreign, not Syrian control. The negotiations in the past described above were always based on an assumption which proved wrong, that Syria of the Assads matured politically to become a stable political entity and would no more be the ”sick man of the Middle East”. The implication is clear-EVEN IF Assad somehow will regain complete 

effective control over ALL his nominal territory, ANY arrangement with him should spread over a long period of time, time which will be effectively a testing period. To drive ALL the foreign powers out of Syria may seem near impossible in the near future, as was shown before when discussing the Israel-Iran confrontation in Syria. I will not advise any Israeli government to engage in a ground war in Syria in order to achieve this goal, nor to provoke a full-scale confrontation with Hizballah about that. ONLY  internal developments in Iran can lead the regime to change its regional priorities and decide to withdraw from Syria. Israel has very limited ability to bring about this result. Russia and the US can maybe do it, but they need to decide that it is THEIR interest to do it, not Israel’s, which will drive them into action. There are no indications that this is happening or about to happen. In fact, the US policy under Biden intends to resume, though with some modifications, the Iran nuclear deal, and that may achieve the opposite – it will enhance the regime standing in Iran and with it its motivation to continue the aggressive presence in Syria.

Then, there may be a question as to the desirability of ANY agreement with Assad under current circumstances when he is NOT in full control of ALL his territory. Is the situation described above a zero-sum game, whereby we consider Assad a partner ONLY if in full control, or a sworn enemy if he is not. Here are simple facts;

Assad army is NOT a real danger to Israel. Assad cannot effectively influence the situation in Lebanon in a way favorable to the Israeli interest. Assad cannot influence any Palestinian faction, and Assad is no more a key to the rest of the Arab world by virtue of being THE authoritative spokesman of Arab nationalism, no more the ”heart  of Arabism”, rather a state in a near pariah status in the Sunni world. Israel does not need any arrangement with Syria in order to be more acceptable in the Arab world. Recent developments, especially the Abraham Accords prove it. Ironically enough,  it is Egypt which is ready to accept Assad back to the Arab fold, simply because of the shared opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood, but Egypt will not change anything of substance in its relations with Israel even IF Israel were to get into whatever agreement with Assad. Jordan also will not object to Assad being reintroduced to the Arab League, but its overall input regarding the question discussed here is, at best, negligible.

An agreement with Assad may be welcome in Moscow, perhaps even encouraged there, but then it will have to be based on an Israeli guarantee to the maintenance of the Assad regime, something which Israel cannot and should not give. With regard to the US, then it is the policy of the Biden Administration to doubt, if not completely cancel the Trump administration recognition of the GOLAN annexation by Israel, and IF that happens, it will not be a positive contribution as it opens the GOLAN sovereignty issue for a discussion which will be futile-Israel under EVERY government will not open the GOLAN sovereignty issue for any discussion.

Here we come to the Assad government, and interests-He wants the GOLAN, but he knows that he will not get it, and as shown before, he will not put the question of the GOLAN above anything connected with ensuring his continued control in Syria at large, or what it is today. He may wish to see behind the scene understanding with Israel to the effect that Israeli attacks on Iran in Syria will not lead to a war between Syria and Israel. There are reports that elements in his intelligence community are already secretly helping Israeli attacks against Iranian targets, possibly in cooperation with the Russians. A veil of secrecy exists about a lot of what is happening, but the main fact to be borne in mind is that Israel relentlessly attacks Iranian targets in Syria, and the Syrian army is almost always out of the action, or engaging in the bare minimum of activity designed to demonstrate Syrian sovereignty. Finally, Assad can be interested in Israeli technological and even economic assistance, if not directly, then through third parties, and there is a lot that he can gain from this type of cooperation, for example, on issues concerning water supply. It is all iffy and tentative, but in a way, more realistic than creating over- played expectations which cannot be fulfilled. Bashar Assad is exempt these days from the need to prove his Arab national credentials, his regime is clearly known to be illegitimate in Syria itself, so Israel should not bother about the question of stability in Syria-it is a chimera, a fantasy not to be achieved. 

That said, the overall conclusion is that there should be  NO illusions about the merits of an Israeli-Syrian agreement, as reality on the ground shows us the near impossibility of such an agreement, even more so, the near undesirability of it, but with that in mind, we should remember, that it is Syria which should be desperate to reach such an agreement, so any change in the state of affairs which was described here depends on them and not on Israel. That in itself is enlightening evidence of the great improvement in Israel’s position in the Middle East in recent years-no more the odd man out, the outcast, but an actor of importance. It is Syria which is the pariah, odd country out, the outcast. 

Dr. Josef Olmert is a Senior Fellow at the Palm Beach Center for Democracy and Policy Research and an adjunct professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina